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Reflections on the Quarter

National Security and the Test Ban Issue

WITH the resolutions submitted by Senators Thomas Dodd and Hubert Humphrey, the national debate on the nuclear test ban has taken a significant turn. The two Senators, until recently, had been arguing on opposite sides of the debate. Their joint resolution, disclosing a partial reconciliation of viewpoints, suggested that the United States should offer to the Soviet Union an immediate agreement "banning all tests that contaminate the atmosphere or the oceans."

The philosophy of this resolution is that atmospheric tests cannot be hidden; hence an agreement which does not require on-site inspections in the Soviet Union or in the United States, but which nevertheless cannot be violated, is feasible. In signing such an agreement, all signatories would remain free to conduct underground tests. Under the provisions of the test ban treaty which has been under negotiation in Moscow, it would have been difficult to monitor such tests anyway; hence an all-inclusive ban always would have contained the major loophole that a violator could cheat by means of underground shots. The agreement proposed by Senators Humphrey and Dodd would regulate those types of tests which cannot be conducted clandestinely but would permit nations to conduct those tests which can be performed secretly, even in the presence of an "inspection system." In short, the Senate resolution aims at achieving what is possible and practical, and by implication advises that we should cease negotiating for a test ban treaty which would lend itself to abuse and which therefore would tie the hands of the United States, while enabling the Soviet Union to achieve technological superiority.

There is substantial agreement among scientists, almost approaching unanimity, that through underground tests the United States could ensure *technological* progress. Those scientists who are convinced that significant advances in nuclear weaponry still are possible and, above all, are required for the security of the United States, believe that they can "live with" an underground testing program. To be sure, there are still many unresolved questions with respect to the effectiveness of nuclear shots in space, but since the resolution does not preclude space shots, those presumably might be conducted.

Such an agreement will probably not change appreciably the climate

Editor's Note: As this issue of ORBIS goes to press, negotiations in Moscow have produced a tentative agreement for a limited nuclear test ban. Developments in Moscow have not rendered invalid the discussion contained in this "Reflection." Therefore, the Editors of ORBIS have chosen not to alter the original text in order at this time to take into account the various proposals under consideration in the latest East-West talks on arms control.

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of the Cold War. Nor does it represent, as Senator Dodd argued, a "logical and easy step [which] will lead to further steps and that ultimately the Soviet Union, in the interest of peace, will agree to abandon its secrecy and open up its society." However, the resolution constitutes a step forward because it seeks to prevent the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. By postulating that the control or reduction of fall-out is in the interest of *all* countries and nations, and by proposing an agreement through which a particular hazard to public health is controlled, the debate on the test ban at long last has moved to an appropriate subject, namely, to health protection. A test agreement which is desirable, feasible and mutually beneficial, should be patterned after such models as the international control of epidemics, opium trade and white slavery.

Nevertheless, as it stands, the resolution is ill-considered and faulty in design. Low-yield "clean" shots are probably undetectable even if held in the atmosphere. If such shots are experiments in mass-producible battlefield weapons, all-fusion devices and neutron technology, this exception to the general rule of the detectability of atmospheric shots is by no means trivial. The side which continued such atmospheric testing might gain a considerable lead in weapons development.

Moreover, while it is desirable that radioactivity be controlled, the suggestion to ban *all* atmospheric and oceanic tests "immediately," as proposed in the resolution, is harmful to American security. We still must conduct various types of atmospheric and oceanic tests, lest our security be jeopardized. For example, we have never tested the vulnerability of our hardened missile sites. The hardening which we are building into underground silos is based entirely on "extrapolations" by construction engineers and mathematicians. There are no reliable extrapolative data for shots with very large yields, and quantitative data on hardening are deficient. Furthermore, even if no mistakes have been made, we still need *assurance* that these crucial calculations are correct. Suppose, for example, that the Soviets have conducted such tests and are in possession of more reliable data. If our sites are harder than we now believe they are, our international position would be enhanced and some economies might be possible. By contrast, if our missile sites really were softer than we supposed, we would be inviting attack and possibly defeat.

During recent years, the United States has placed ever greater emphasis upon its Polaris submarines. However, data on the vulnerability of such submarines are lacking. We have fired only a minimal number of low-yield water shots, and have tested neither larger yields nor the effects of nuclear explosions at various ocean depths. The vulnerability of submarine hulls at great depth is unknown. Surely, we need not enlarge on the tragedy of the "Thresher" which suggests that even small overpressures at extreme submerged depths could be deadly. We cannot obtain reliable data without

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systematic testing, and we are unwise to depend too heavily upon our Polaris fleet before the gaps in our information have been filled by testing.

Our knowledge of nuclear technology in the upper atmosphere leaves much to be desired. Our development of anti-missile missiles will be hampered so long as we do not know the effects of explosives at various altitudes. A second-strike force requires a large measure of invulnerability. Yet to reduce the vulnerability of our missile sites to the minimum, we require *both* hardening and anti-missile defenses in combination. In the absence of testing, the credibility of a second-strike strategy, which the U.S. has adopted for convincing political and moral reasons, remains in doubt.

It is conceivable that problems of this sort may be resolved by another twenty to thirty atmospheric and oceanic tests and that thereafter an atmospheric test ban would be acceptable. However, since technological changes in the design of weapons and equipment probably will make rechecks mandatory, such a ban could probably not be permanent.

It also should be observed that the Senate resolution makes no reference to the "Plowshare" program. Obviously, if we are to use nuclear explosives, for example, to build harbors and to improve the water supply of arid areas, explosions will have to be detonated in the atmosphere. A second canal across the Isthmus of Panama should soon be built. Without the use of "Plowshare" techniques, construction costs for such a project would exceed ten billion dollars. "Plowshare" would save about nine-tenths of this amount, but approximately 200 devices would have to be detonated to build the new canal. Sooner or later "Plowshare" techniques will have to be used for the mining of scarce minerals. Hence, a summary outlawing of atmospheric shots may be short-sighted. Surprisingly, the resolution ignored the enormous value which could result, not only to us but also to the Soviets, from the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.

Fortunately, it is possible to reconcile the apparent need for atmospheric shots with the control of fall-out. Representative Craig Hosmer, a foremost nuclear expert, has proposed a treaty on fall-out limitation, rather than on the abolition of atmospheric tests *in toto*. Such a fall-out limitation agreement could be enforced through two different methods. First, only totally clean devices could be tested in the atmosphere. In this case, there would be no limitation on the number of tests, as no fall-out would be produced. Secondly, in the absence of completely clean testing, which has yet to be achieved, nuclear powers would agree to phase their tests as well as to impose quantitative limitations upon the amount of fall-out which each nation is allowed to release per year. An agreement of this sort would allow the rapid acceleration of efforts to develop weapons which are required for Free World security. In order to minimize the fall-out hazard, a supplemental agreement might set aside a truly uninhabited part of

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the globe, such as Antarctica, as the common international proving ground for all unclean devices.

The time has come for an approach to testing which has the well-being of humanity at heart as well as the security of the Free World. The Dodd-Humphrey resolution points in the right direction —toward the formulation of a realistic nuclear policy.

Stalinism Revisited

Obscured by other international and national news has been the principal event of the post-Stalin era within the Soviet Union, namely, a major upheaval in the political leadership of the communist regime. Centered on the person of Khrushchev, the crisis occurred early in 1963. It concerned the opposition to his leadership and was of the utmost seriousness. As might have been expected, the clash resulted in victory for Khrushchev, the legatee of Stalin.

Irrefutable evidence of the eruption is supplied by the 15,000-word speech Chairman Khrushchev delivered on March 8, 1963 in the Kremlin before a Soviet elite group. The speech may have been in memoriam of Stalin's death which occurred ten years earlier on March 10, 1953. The Soviet press ignored the anniversary but gave full play to Khrushchev's pronouncement on neo-Stalinism.

Just as Zhdanov had done sixteen years earlier in Leningrad, at the beginning of the so-called Cold War, Khrushchev used a commentary on artists, writers, the intelligentsia and Jewry to veil an important message of warning. Khrushchev disclosed the existence of an internal power struggle and, seeking to draw the vacillating elements over to his side, indicated that he was about to gain a total victory over his opponents.

Of equal importance was Khrushchev's neo-Stalinist approach to political purges, together with his exculpation and praise of Stalin. Khrushchev spoke of spies, *agents provocateurs,* traitors, and other odious people who had bedeviled the communist party in pre-revolutionary times and afterwards. In referring to past or potential opposition within the communist party, he invoked Stalin's infamous indictment of "enemies of the people." He emphasized the dangers of espionage, plots, scheming, *provokatsia* and similar actions.

Even a casual observer of the Soviet scene could recognize that Khrushchev's message was not directed toward Yevtushenko, Ehrenburg or Moiseyev and his dancing Bessarabians, but at the contemporary Azevs, Malinovskys and Berias plotting for the restoration of "some sort of bourgeois freedom," as Khrushchev expressed it, in the Soviet Union.

Shortly after the speech was delivered, a whole series of personnel changes occurred within the higher reaches of the Soviet hierarchy. The major change involved the regime's second-in-command, Frol R. Kozlov, whose anti-Khrushchev inclinations had been rumored and who also was suspected of a pro-Mao Tse-tung orientation. Whether he was purged or whether he

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suffered a genuine brain hemorrhage cannot be determined.

Additional upheavals in the Soviet power elite concerned, above all, the military establishment. General Zakharov was demoted as chief of the Soviet general staff. Marshal Varentsov ended his tenure as chief of Soviet artillery and rocket forces. In the most important of the military changes, General Serov, former KGB (state security) chief and recently head of the security service of the Soviet armed forces, was removed from his post. It is too early to assess accurately the meaning of these "reassignments" but one may conclude with assurance that Khrushchev remains, for the moment, in command of the Soviet Union.

The famous Penkovsky case soon followed Khrushchev's March oration. For the moment, it must be recognized that Penkovsky *could* have been a Western agent operating in the Soviet Union. But he may also have been a double agent assigned by the Soviets to convince the U.S. that American armaments can be "scaled down." That Oleg Penkovsky's titular boss, D. M. Grishiyan, was promoted at approximately the same time that Penkovsky allegedly was being executed, casts doubt upon his part as a Western agent. The commentaries of observers at the Penkovsky trial (which was the most important "show trial" since the 1930's) and their uneasy consensus that *l'affaire Penkovsky* was a spectacle leaving more than a few inconsequential questions unanswered, also deserves more than passing attention.

In brief, Khrushchev's speech, emphasizing infiltration by hostile intelligence services and criticizing the various black arts in addition to the *beaux arts,* was clearly juxtaposed with these various personnel changes and the espionage show trial. Just as he had promised on March 8, Khrushchev carried out a selective and quiet purge.

Only short of the fantastic is the fact that the Western press and the American press, in particular, have misinterpreted the nature of these events. According to some Western commentators, Khrushchev had launched an attack on certain persons of artistic bent; the striking down of soldiers and politicians was not related to what was Khrushchev's most ambitious oratorical performance of the year. Such lack of analytical acumen is the more dangerous because it ignored the purpose behind Khrushchev's policy and at the same time confused his internal struggle with the Sino-Soviet rift, Cuba and Khrushchev's neo-Stalinist "liberalism."

American press accounts ignored the possibility that Kozlov may have been part of the group which sought to remove Khrushchev. Nor did Western commentators note that Kozlov, who reached his political prominence via the Leningrad party organization, had vacated his post under circumstances similar to those which accompanied the demise of his predecessors, notably Zinoviev (shot), Kirov (assassinated), and Zhdanov (allegedly by heart attack or stroke, but probably "liquidation" and subsequent state funeral).

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In no modern state are the chiefs of artillery, rocketry, espionage, security forces, and general staff, together with lesser military officials, dismissed except during a major crisis. Moreover, the incapacitation of Kozlov, the illness, although temporary, of Mikoyan, as well as Khrushchev's praise of Stalin as a genuine Marxist, add plausibility to the notion that the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1963, was in the throes of an internal power struggle.

The Cuban crisis probably contributed to the most recent Soviet purge. It is difficult to determine whether Khrushchev made scapegoats of those he removed or whether he has now adopted the policies of more "adventurist" groups in the Soviet hierarchy. Now that the Soviet Union's foremost proponent of long-range strategic weapon systems, Marshal S. S. Biryuzov, has become chief-of-staff, and the leading arms production expert, D. F. Ustinov, has taken charge of the Soviet economy, one may conclude that ICBM forces will assume a position of even greater importance in the Soviet strategic arsenal.

The Atlantic Trade Negotiations

At the meeting of members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), held in Geneva from May 16-21, the nations of the Atlantic Community began negotiations for the lowering of trade barriers. The conference had as its official task to prepare the way for the 1964 "Kennedy Round" of tariff bargaining, so-called because of the authority granted to the Administration to lower trade restrictions under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Although the conferees, many of whom represented underdeveloped countries, considered the problems of primary producers, the major concern of the meeting was the vexing question of trade within the North Atlantic area.

At the heart of the agreement which emerged from Geneva are two principles. First, the negotiators will follow the general rule of equal linear reductions in tariff structures at future talks. This method of tariff cutting, used by the Common Market, provides for percentage cuts in a nation's entire tariff structure, in contrast to the traditional idea of item-by-item negotiation. Linear reductions have the advantage of permitting a gradual lowering of tariffs while minimizing the economic pressure upon especially sensitive industries in a particular nation.

The second principal agreement of the Geneva talks concerns exceptions to the rule of linear reductions. According to the agreement, "in those cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application." The precise meaning of this exception remains obscure. In the official U.S. interpretation of "significant disparities," issued after the conference, the trade restricting effect, rather than a tariff height per se, is the American test for invoking the special rule. This interpretation

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none of the Common Market countries has accepted. The conference, moreover, left to a trade negotiations committee the task of working out rules under the provision for "significant disparity."

The initial U.S. position with respect to tariff cutting in nonagricultural products called for equal linear reductions as high as 50 per cent in all member countries. This the Common Market members opposed. The EEC held that, because the American tariff system contains predominantly either very high or very low duties, linear cuts of 50 per cent would work to the advantage of the United States. The lowering of high American tariffs would not reduce materially their protectionist effect, while cuts in those U.S. tariffs which are already low would not produce a marked increase in trade. The Six, moreover, were fearful that the application of this rule to the EEC would increase substantially the flow of imports from the United States, since reductions in moderate European tariffs would reduce their protectionist value, together with their power as a weapon in future trade negotiations. In point of fact, there are in Europe only seven types of nonagricultural products bearing tariffs higher than 25 per cent, and the maximum (applied only to carpets) is 40 per cent. In contrast, the United States applies tariffs of at least 50 per cent, and in some cases 75 per cent, to 110 types of nonagricultural products. Thus, the European case against the American proposal did not lack merit.

The Common Market countries countered with a plan, publicly attributed to the French and Italian delegations, for cuts of 50 per cent between existing tariffs and an "ideal" level of 10 per cent. According to this plan, higher U.S. tariffs would be reduced more than the lower duties of the EEC. The inability of the conferees, during the early days of the meeting, to agree upon a common policy led to pessimism that the conference might end in deadlock. The Six presented, in public at least—as they had in previous negotiations — a united front, despite U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between France and its EEC partners.

However, the Common Market abandoned its principle of an "ideal" level, and agreed to accept the U.S. plan for percentage cuts as a general rule. Nevertheless, the Common Market countries qualified their concession by insisting upon a "significant disparities" exception to the principle of equal percentage cuts. This qualification made the change in the EEC position one of form more than of substance. Although the United States first rejected the disparities principle, the American delegation, in a change of position, later agreed to this proposal. The United States hedged its acceptance with the proviso that the term "significant disparities" be narrowly defined, and that, in most cases, the principle of equal percentage cuts be followed. Subsequently, the Commerce and State Departments launched comprehensive studies of the respective U.S. and EEC tariff schedules in order to ascertain the effects relatively of tariffs and other restrictive

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elements such as discriminatory tax laws and domestic economic legislation upon trade.

The United States undoubtedly had little choice but to acquiesce in the disparities principle espoused by the Six. The Common Market countries realized that the United States, because of its balance of payments problems, had at least as much as the EEC to gain from the lowering of trade barriers. Moreover, the United States faced the prospect of losing lucrative agricultural markets in Europe to producers in the Six anxious to expand their output. The thorny question of agricultural trade awaits the opening of the next round of negotiations. In fact, however, the Six may be unprepared to conclude agricultural agreements with the United States until they have worked out in greater detail the farm policy of the EEC.

The success of the conference in achieving the objectives set forth in the Trade Expansion Act depends thus upon the definition which the parties choose to apply to the "significant disparities" clause. If the Common Market accepts the U.S. meaning, progress will have been made in lowering trade barriers within the North Atlantic area. If the Six stand firm, however, and the United States refuses to compromise with the European interpretation of this provision, the Administration's trade objectives may remain unfulfilled. The Geneva Conference represented a change in the economic dialogue between the EEC and the United States. The discussion moved from the general to the specific, from lofty talk of a "Grand Design" and a "partnership" to consideration of the mundane but important problems of tariffs and other forms of trade discrimination.

The Administration has viewed the Trade Expansion Act as the first step toward the building of an Atlantic Partnership. Yet the United States, in its Grand Design for Atlantic unity, envisages also the strengthening of political and military ties within NATO. The Administration has chosen, thus far in its negotiations with European allies, to separate the economic from the political and military problems confronting the Atlantic Alliance. However, it is in political and military affairs, rather than economics, that the United States possesses the greatest bargaining power vis-à-vis the Common Market. Moreover, in the Atlantic Community, as in the United States, economic, foreign and military policies cannot be treated in isolation. In the resolution of NATO's political and military problems lies the key to the achievement of the Administration's international economic objectives. Paradoxically, the future of the Trade Expansion Act itself may hinge in large measure upon the ability of the United States to link its tariff proposals to measures which satisfy European aspirations toward a greater voice in the Atlantic Alliance.

The Hispaniola Dispute

At the root of the dispute which erupted this spring between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is the incompatibility of the governments headed by François Duvalier

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and Juan Bosch, the first democratically elected president of the Dominican Republic in more than a generation. Perhaps because he felt uncomfortable next to the Dominican Republic in the post-Trujillo era, Duvalier welcomed to Port au Prince in April three members of the Trujillo family. To the new government of the Dominican Republic this step in itself appeared to be an unfriendly act. Moreover, when Haitian troops violated diplomatic courtesy by invading and searching the Embassy of the Dominican Republic for political refugees, Bosch issued a twenty-four hour ultimatum and massed troops on the Haitian frontier. Duvalier removed his guard from the Dominican Embassy grounds and agreed to permit certain refugees to leave Haiti. Thus, the Haitian president averted, for the moment at least, an armed conflict between the neighboring countries which occupy the island of Hispaniola.

The United States faces several dilemmas in its policy toward Haiti. To support the Dominican Republic against Haiti by intervening against Duvalier might alienate other Latin Americans suspicious of U.S. intervention in hemispheric affairs. To withhold assistance from the Dominican Republic might weaken the hand of President Bosch, whom the United States has sought to bolster in his bid to introduce democratic rule to his country. Moreover, to acquiesce in Duvalier's repression of the revolt against his regime might be repugnant to those who oppose authoritarian governments in the Western Hemisphere.

Since 1957, U.S. assistance to Haiti has totaled 43.5 million dollars, a large percentage of which was spent on the Peligre Dam, which could have supplied electricity to the capital city and its environs but has yet to produce its first kilowatt. Such results do not augur well for the Alliance for Progress, for one of its basic assumptions is that Latin American governments are competent to prepare plans for economic development and to make effective use of funds from the United States. Because the Haitian government proved itself unable to meet the qualifications for U.S. assistance, and because of the growing harshness of Duvalier's rule, the United States "phased out" its aid and suspended further grants in 1962.

The Administration apparently decided this spring that Duvalier could not long maintain himself in power. Incidents against Duvalier's regime mounted as May 15 approached, the date when his term of office would be extended in violation of the Haitian Constitution, which limits the president to one term. After several shootings, together with acts against U.S. Embassy personnel, U.S. dependents were ordered home and the U.S. Ambassador returned to Washington for "consultations". A U.S. aircraft carrier stood by with marines poised to occupy Port au Prince if necessary. The United States, moreover, suspended official relations with the Duvalier Government.

Yet U.S. diplomatic pressures did not cause the downfall of Duvalier.

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Instead, they may have strengthened his position for the short run. Duvalier cleverly exploited the U.S. racial problem by emphasizing the fact that Haiti is a Negro republic. Although Duvalier has few friends in Latin America, he directed his propaganda against the United States to less informed peoples in Africa and Asia, and even cabled a message to the Conference of African States assembled in Addis Ababa.

Had the United States brought about a change of government in Haiti, it would have had little assurance that events would proceed along a path acceptable to the U.S. and most of its Latin American neighbors. In 1958 the United States contributed to the rise of a communist regime when it withdrew military and economic assistance from the Batista Government in Cuba. Such might also have been the case if Duvalier had been overthrown.

The communists have recognized the possibilities which Haiti offers for exploitation and manipulation. Communists are alleged to hold positions of responsibility in Duvalier's government. Moreover, Haitian authorities have dispatched trade and aid missions to Poland and other communist bloc countries in recent months. There are indications also that French-speaking African communists, after intensive training in subversion, have entered Haiti across the fifty-mile Windward Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola.

Duvalier publicly denies pro-communist leanings. Nevertheless, broadcasts from Havana have been suspiciously silent about Duvalier, and have concentrated their venom instead upon the United States. Cuban statements stress the need for supporting Haiti's president in his efforts to maintain the island republic's independence in the face of "imperialist" threats. Such propaganda might conceivably veil a communist maneuver to seize power behind a façade of rule by Duvalier. This strategy might enable the communists to gain power, in measured stages, and thus to avoid the risk of U.S. military intervention which might accompany an overt effort to communize Haiti.

Haiti presents a target of considerable strategic importance to the communists. Should the communists gain power in Haiti, they might then control the two largest islands of the Caribbean. Bosch's government, laden with the legacies of the Trujillo period, might fall prey to communist subversion. Both Puerto Rico and Jamaica are near Hispaniola. Already, Castro's forces enjoy access to the remote reaches of the Yucatan peninsula. In Haiti the communists would gain an additional base from which to launch guerrilla operations against neighboring islands and against Venezuela and Colombia. The United States, therefore, has the formidable task of easing the transition in Haiti to a more responsible government, while using its influence to avert the danger of communism. For another communist foothold in the Western Hemisphere would truly diminish U.S. prestige and place in question the power of the United States throughout the Free World.

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RESTRAINTS, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL

by George E. Pugh

ACCORDING to the legislation which established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to a rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully." In the present international climate it seems unlikely that this goal of a disarmed world under international law will be achieved in the near future. It is therefore appropriate to inquire what steps can be taken, in the absence of enforceable world law, to improve international security and contribute to an environment where world law would be possible. While the ultimate goal may involve revolutionary changes in the international environment, those steps which can be taken in the absence of world law are necessarily evolutionary. They must be soundly based on military and political realities and well integrated with other aspects of national strategy.

In an environment without enforceable international law, arms control arrangements are, in essence, mutually accepted restraints on the size, the type, deployment or employment of military forces. Considering the historical role of restraint in conflict situations, the principles which govern arms control proposals should not differ widely from those involved in other forms of self-restraint observed by sovereign nations.

The Historical Role of Restraint

The impression is widespread that the consideration of such restraints in actual or possible military conflict situations is in some way new, and perhaps unrealistic. The fact is that many examples of mutually accepted restraints have become so commonplace that they have almost ceased to be recognized for what they are. Examples of restraints commonly accepted by nations at opposite poles of a political power confrontation include: freedom of the seas; respect for the integrity of neutral nations; restraint in the use of chemical and biological warfare agents; restraint in

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the use of military methods to harass potential enemies in time of peace; recognition of "open-cities"; and the immunity of diplomats. Thus, an analysis of restraints is not an academic pursuit. As the above examples indicate, they have played a real and important role in international relations. Some restraints have been honored even in wartime, others only in peacetime.

The appropriate conventions of restraint for any period of history should be matched to the political and military environment of the time. Since strategic deterrence (which in itself is only a method of enforcing restraint) has now become a primary security objective, it is appropriate to re-examine the traditional concepts of restraint, and to inquire how modifications of these concepts might contribute to improved security in the present military environment.

Examination of the existing examples of restraint reveals a common motivation for observance: In every case these restraints have been observed, not because of any direct advantage to be gained, but because of the indirect advantage secured when restraints are mutually respected by other powers. Restraints have operated most effectively a) where any advantage to be gained from unilateral violation of the restraint would not be decisive, and b) where mutual violation of the restraint could have serious consequences for both sides.

While the conventions of restraint can be important elements in strategy, it is foolhardy to allow one's security to become overly dependent on the restraint of an opponent. All the above restraints have one element in common: they have all been violated at one time or another.

Violation is always possible, and in fact, likely, if it can give one side a decisive advantage over the other. It is irrelevant whether the restraint has been incorporated into a formal treaty (e.g., the Washington naval limitation agreement of 1922) or based on no more than an informal understanding (as was the case with the last nuclear test moratorium). Treaties and informal agreements between sovereign nations can and will be broken when it appears that an important net advantage can be gained. This net advantage must, of course, compensate for any loss of prestige or bargaining power. The Soviet Union has demonstrated by its past behavior that it places a relatively low value on these considerations. For example, although the USSR had concluded treaties of friendship and nonaggression with

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Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, it invaded and communized all these nations.

One may reasonably ask why the United States should enter into a formal agreement with the USSR at all, since the latter appears to place such a low value on honoring its treaty commitments and preserving a reputation for honest bargaining. However, where it is desirable to establish conventions of restraint that are too involved for an informal agreement, a formal treaty can provide a clearer definition of the rules and thus improve the chances that the agreement will survive. (An example is the diplomatic convention drawn up at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which still serves as the basis for the rules of international diplomacy.)

Role of Restraints in a Deterrent Strategy

The tremendous firepower in easily deliverable packages, which thermonuclear weapons have made possible, has made an effective defense against thermonuclear attack exceedingly difficult because even a few penetrating warheads can do enormous damage. Consequently, the U.S. and other major powers have moved toward dependence on a deterrent rather than a classical defensive strategy.

The major advantage of a deterrent strategy is that it can provide a degree of national security without the necessity for a successful physical defense. The disadvantage is that it makes the national defense dependent on the restraint of potential enemies. Thus, it would not be chosen as a desired strategy except for the fact that the successful physical defense does not, at present, appear possible. The high cost of providing a defense against nuclear firepower, and the relatively low cost of increasing the available firepower, makes it unlikely that a satisfactory defense will be achieved in the foreseeable future.[1] Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union can be expected to continue for some time to depend for their own protection on the restraint of the other. The primary role of the deterrent forces is, in fact, to provide the motivation for this restraint.

The restraint which is imposed by strategic deterrent forces does not stop with its effect on the employment of these forces. Indeed, it extends throughout the entire spectrum of the conflicts between the East and the West, for without some restraint in

[1]While effective defense against full-scale attack by the USSR does not appear probable, effective defenses against small-scale attacks, or attacks by minor powers, may be quite feasible.

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methods and objectives any limited East-West dispute could escalate to a full-scale nuclear exchange. It is, therefore, highly appropriate that serious thought be given to the conventions of restraint, since the success or failure of the strategy of deterrence is dependent on the satisfactory operation of a variety of such mutual restraints.

Restraints may include political and economic as well as military factors. The military restraints might include restrictions on the use of military forces, or on the production and deployment of forces as well. Both East and West are faced with a central dilemma: excessive restraint in the East-West confrontation may lead to setbacks in the Cold War. However, with too little restraint, the Cold War could lead to thermonuclear war. A difficult task which confronts the strategist today is how to encourage the establishment of a set of conventions of mutual restraint which will reduce the risk of such a war and still be consistent with the realities of the East-West conflict, in which neither side can be expected to relinquish its own power position.

Restraint conventions can be modified in a variety of ways: by formal treaties, by threats and promises, by observance of new restraints, or by violation of old ones. Each of these factors can influence the expectations of a nation concerning the consequences of various actions it may wish to take, and thereby can influence the development of various modified conventions of restraint.

It does not follow that formal treaties or informal understandings, which would place restraints on the size or deployment of military forces, would necessarily add to, rather than detract from, stability and national security. Thorough examination of all proposals to ensure that they do indeed add to, rather than jeopardize, stability and security is of highest importance.

Inadequate attention to the military and strategic implications of such proposals could lead to agreements which would weaken the Western position, or tend to destabilize the military environment and therefore increase, rather than decrease, the danger of uncontrolled escalation to general war. Each proposal must be scrutinized very carefully—not only before it is implemented, but before it is proposed.

Objectives of Arms Control Proposals

The conventions of restraint can be influenced by arms control negotiations themselves whether or not any treaty is signed.

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Moreover, the dialogue of such negotiations inevitably becomes an important factor in the Cold War. The present pressure of public opinion (particularly in Free Europe) for efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear devastation makes it advisable for the U.S. to engage in active arms control negotiations, regardless of any expectation of success. However, the U.S. must assure its allies that any proposals made are in their best interest. Similarly, the dialogue of the negotiations can have an impact on the extent to which the U.S. will be able to obtain or sustain support among the uncommitted nations of the world; consequently, the proposals made by the U.S. must be evaluated, in part, in terms of their potential impact on these nations. The decision to propose any sort of arms control must be influenced by the impact the proposal will have, whether it is accepted or not.

The objectives of any arms control proposal, therefore, should be: a) if accepted, to provide an improvement in U.S. and Free World security; b) if rejected, to provide a demonstration of the sincere intentions of the U.S. and to do this without producing any disadvantageous change in the conventions of restraint.

It follows that U.S. proposals for arms control should be evaluated in terms of their potential contribution to the security of the entire world, as well as in terms of their value for the security of the United States. Certainly the Soviets will refuse to accept any proposal which they feel does not serve their own security interests and will break any agreement when they deem it to be no longer in their best interests. Thus, no agreement can be implemented, remain in operation, and contribute to U.S. security *unless* the Soviet Union is convinced that the agreement also contributes to Soviet security. The U.S. is not likely to be credited with a serious effort, and both our allies and other Free World nations will doubt our sincerity, *unless* the U.S. proposals appear to be consistent with the legitimate security interests of the USSR as well as those of the Western nations.

Because of the essentially irreconcilable conflict between the U.S. and USSR, it is inevitable that both sides will attempt to inject into potential agreements certain elements which are designed not to contribute primarily to mutual security, but rather to further unilateral long-range objectives at the expense of the opponent. Paradoxically, however, it is not necessarily to the advantage of either side to drive a "hard bargain," since an agreement which holds little advantage for the other signatories is most likely to be broken. Thus, to increase the chance of success

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in the negotiations it is important to try to include *only* those items which contribute to mutual security, and to eliminate from both U.S. and Soviet proposals those items which appear to contribute primarily to unilateral objectives. It may be preferable in the future to seek agreements, where possible, on an informal basis; the false sense of security which can result from formal agreements may tend to make such treaties less viable and thus more deceptive than informal agreements where the option to violate is obvious to all concerned.

Character of Potentially Useful Agreements

One of the most common of all disarmament proposals involves across-the-board reductions in military forces of both sides to some agreed fraction of existing forces. While this type of agreement can provide a simple and apparently equitable way to initiate a disarmament agreement, as an arms control agreement it can contribute little to military stability. It leaves untouched all the basic instabilities of the *status quo ante*.

Such agreements on across-the-board proportional reductions in forces can contribute to world security only insofar as they provide a basis for first steps toward enforceable world law, reduction in secrecy, or a reduction in the probable level of damage if war occurs. U.S. military thinkers have logically been skeptical about this general type of proposal. Certainly, other types of agreements which are deliberately designed to reduce instabilities, as well as minimize damage in the event war ensues, are much more likely to contribute to security. Examples of such agreements might be:

a. Selective reduction or elimination of certain types of systems from both sides:

(1) Systems which are particularly useful to a potential aggressor in an offensive rather than a defensive role;

(2) Systems which are particularly vulnerable, and therefore invite attack;

(3) Systems which threaten excessive collateral damage beyond the needs of legitimate military tasks:

b. Unsymmetrical agreements to redress force inequalities in different locations or in different types of armament, such as:

(1) A reduction in force at one level of escalation in return for a reduction in force by the other side at a different level of escalation (for example, a reduction of U.S. nuclear forces in Western Europe in return for a reduction of Soviet conventional ground forces in Eastern Europe).

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(2) A reduction in deployment in one area which appears to be a threat, in return for a compensating reduction by the other side in some other area.

c. Agreements to improve the availability of information in order to decrease the risk of miscalculation or accident, or—looking further into the future—agreements to introduce or strengthen the machinery of enforceable international law.

Because agreements must remain acceptable to both sides, they cannot be designed to obtain an obvious major military or political advantage, but should, in general, tend to stabilize an existing military balance and minimize the risk of miscalculation or accident. If either side believes it has a chance to obtain military or political dominance in a given region, then agreements are likely to be much more difficult to obtain. Even when the intended method of obtaining this dominance is political or economic, the importance of military realities cannot be denied. (One needs only to recall the influence of the USSR in instigating new elections in Finland, or the role of the United States Fleet in the post-Trujillo crisis in the Dominican Republic to realize the tremendous effect that military dominance can have on the normal political processes.) Thus, where a region is in political ferment and the expectations and future goals of both sides are different, agreements which would affect respective military postures in these areas are likely to be difficult to obtain. On the other hand, where there is a stalemate politically and militarily, or where a stalemate is clearly imminent, the chances for an agreement should be relatively good.

Concept of Defense in an Age of Deterrence

The dominant feature of the present deterrent environment is the fact that both major powers can maintain a capability to inflict crippling damage on the other, irrespective of any foreseeable defensive measures which either side can take. To understand the role of military forces in this environment, one must bear in mind that all actions by both sides take place under this threat of ultimate retaliation. The threat of ultimate retaliation, however, is only the cap on the bottle. By itself, it could not convincingly restrain a number of possible aggressive acts below the threshold of all-out war. The restraint of lesser forms of aggression must be achieved by applying defense strategies at lower levels of violence, and by threats of lesser retaliation (not necessarily military) commensurate with the values involved.

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These threats of less-than-total retaliation may be employed in the immediate area in question, and may be integrated with a basic defensive operation. Alternatively, they may be purely punitive and be applied in any other related or unrelated area. It is only necessary that they be clearly recognized as retaliatory responses. They might embrace, for example, local military actions, economic sanctions, blockade, or even threats of limited nuclear attack. They could be, in the aggregate, a "mix" of any one of a number of these potential combinations. Ideally, they should be so selected that they require a relatively low level of commitment on our part and a relatively high level of commitment for the opposition.

We can assume that we will be harassed in those areas, such as Berlin, where a low commitment by the Soviet bloc requires a high level of commitment from us. In any such situation we will face a difficult dilemma. We can choose to respond locally and limit the area of crisis despite the adverse commitment levels, or, alternatively, we can expand the area of crisis to include new elements for which the commitment levels are more in our favor. The decision will always be difficult; our actual course of action will have to be decided in each case by a detailed evaluation of relative strengths and weaknesses and of relative commitment requirements along the entire spectrum of escalation, up to and including thermonuclear exchange.

There is a wide diversity of possibilities in this area of limited military and nonmilitary conflict which tends to complicate the problem. For instance, it is even conceivable that the U.S. could attempt to deter Soviet action against Berlin by threatening some retaliatory action against a place as far away as Cuba. Thus, given the ubiquity of the East-West power struggle, one cannot reach definitive conclusions through the examination of security problems in only one area at a time.

However, from the point of view of arms control negotiations, there are certain rules of thumb which help to simplify the consideration of possible proposals. Since one Western objective usually will be to limit the area of conflict, it will generally be better to have deterrent assets on the spot, rather than to be compelled to depend on countering the enemy's moves by provoking or fanning crises in other parts of the world. Similarly, it will generally be better for the West to be able to defend at a low level of escalation, rather than to have to depend on raising the level of escalation. Thus, while a successful defense of disputed

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areas does not absolutely require Western superiority or even equality in all areas, it is nevertheless true that a military environment which is relatively balanced at all levels and in all areas will generally be preferable to one in which we are dependent on the credibility of threats in other areas or at other levels of escalation.

None of this is intended to mean that communist aggression is deterred only by our military posture. The Soviets, to a large extent, are deterred from aggression in some areas by their own strategy. If they were to attack Iran, for example, they might jeopardize the success of their strategy in other areas of primary interest such as Western Europe. If their primary objective is to divide the NATO alliance, an overt attack on Iran or some other small state might serve to strengthen NATO, a development which the USSR would seek to avoid, even if it meant revising lesser policy goals.

In any event, the dialogue of threat and counterthreat in areas of limited military and nonmilitary conflict is a significant part of the East-West struggle in the deterrent environment. Western threats of limited retaliation, necessitated as this dialogue develops, do not require the same high level of Western commitment as threats of a massive strategic response, since the former are less likely to cause the enemy to invoke full-scale retaliation. Our behavior in such comparatively "minor" crises can demonstrate our willingness to pay a price to restrain aggression, and can imply a risk of escalation to higher levels of retaliation if aggression is carried out. Thus, under the ultimate threat of strategic retaliation, the international power arena no longer resembles a competitive game which is likely to end with a victor and a vanquished. It is, instead, more analogous to labor-management negotiations where negotiations take place either during a strike, or under threat of a strike, which would injure both parties and, if the impasse is not broken, might result in a permanent work stoppage. In this type of conflict situation, gains and losses by the competitors are likely to be influenced by: a) their degree of commitment to various objectives; b) their willingness to make sacrifices; c) their ability to communicate to the opponent the degree of their commitment to the various objectives involved; and d) their ability in individual situations to make the required commitment level higher for the opponent than for themselves.

The physical ability to defeat the opponent at the highest level of violence which, in a sense, is possessed by both sides, is no

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longer the primary controlling factor. The modified role of military forces in this environment which relates primarily to items c) and d) above can be summarized briefly as follows: a) to raise the price associated with lesser aggressive acts to such a level that lesser aggression will also appear undesirable, and to do this at as low a level of military commitment as possible; and b) to maintain the ultimate retaliatory capability as a final deterrent to a major attack and to do whatever is possible to limit damage to ourselves if deterrence fails.

Thus, while the gains and losses of East and West are likely to be governed in large degree by the extent of their commitment to their objectives and their willingness to make sacrifices, the military capability of both sides still plays an important role because it serves to increase or to decrease the relative sacrifices required by both sides in any specific conflict situation. A well-designed military force for this new type of environment is clearly one which in each area of confrontation can demand a large commitment or sacrifice on the part of the opponent and can keep the level of commitment required of one's self as low as possible.

In most respects, this modification of military objectives does not seriously alter the design criteria for military forces. A superior tank is still a superior tank, and a superior nuclear weapon remains a superior nuclear weapon. However, the adaptation of military objectives to the changed conflict environment does affect major policy decisions concerning the relative commitment of effort to broad classifications of military systems.

In the military environment before the advent of nuclear weapons, the ability to match an opponent at every level of the weapons spectrum could be quite irrelevant to the outcome of a conflict. If one nation had decisively superior tanks, mortars and machine guns, it was hardly worth noting that the opponent might be more effective if the conflict were limited to the use of knives, spears and axes. Now, however, given the effective stalemate at the highest potential level of violence—a level which both sides wish to avoid—the relative military strength of the two sides at lower levels of violence takes on a new importance. In specific situations the balance of lesser capabilities can have a decisive role in determining the degree of commitment required of either side. For instance, even though we may be clearly superior in the strength of our nuclear forces, we cannot assume that this will prevent aggression. Specifically, in certain areas the opponent

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could become convinced that our commitment to our local objectives was not sufficient to justify the price of even a limited nuclear war (with the associated risk that such a conflict could escalate to an all-out nuclear war). However, if we also were prepared to defend successfully on a conventional basis, this conventional capability could provide the necessary deterrent. Under such circumstances, the question whether our degree of commitment would justify a nuclear war would be irrelevant to the enemy's calculations and to our own.

Obviously, the ideal U.S. military posture would be one which could provide for a successful defensive operation in every region of the world and at each level of violence, up to that level at which the total national resources of the disputed territory are necessarily destroyed. Because of the essential dominance of destructive capability over defense, the defense cannot physically stop an attack designed to destroy the country. Consequently, the only possible protection against attacks of this magnitude is to deter them. An effective defensive strategy must assure that the aggressor cannot benefit from such an attack. If the primary object of the attack were to capture the existing economic assets of the nation, the fact that these assets could not be captured intact would remove the primary motive for the attack. However, if the purpose of the attack were to achieve a psychological or military objective, deterrence of the attack might require a plan for the destruction of assets within the aggressor's sphere of influence which he considered more valuable than the prize of successful aggression. Such a response should more than offset any benefit sought as a consequence of the attack.

Clearly, such an ideal defense in every region and at all levels of violence is not economically feasible. In some areas, it is necessary to defend by threatening to escalate any engagement which begins at a low level of escalation, where the defender's weaknesses are obvious, to some higher level where either defense is possible or the prize is destroyed.

In those cases where the destruction of the values to be defended is inevitable if the conflict escalates, the defender's threat of escalation may not be credible unless it can occur either accidentally or by automatic processes inherent in the defender's war plans and pattern of deployment. This requirement to enhance the credibility of a threat to "raise the ante" by providing in advance for automatic escalation devices has influenced much of our deployment in Free Europe. Despite this fact, a posture dependent on

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automatic escalation is undesirable, if a workable defense can be found at lower levels of violence. Such a posture is also undesirable because it automatically commits the defense to a course of action which might not be justified by the nature of the enemy attack. In short, it eliminates escalation as a deliberate decision taken by the defender to improve the likelihood of his successfully countering the aggressor. This is a particularly serious a priori commitment since the defense might have had other options had there been a longer "pause" to identify the magnitude of the enemy effort. Moreover, the greater the flexibility of response implied by the defender's pre-attack deployments and weapons "mix" in the area, the more uncertain the potential aggressor will be about how to assess correctly in advance the ultimate outcome of any attack plan he may contemplate. Decreasing the enemy planner's ability to predict a successful outcome can, in itself, contribute to deterrence.

In all cases of this type, it is to the advantage of the defense to try to hold violence at the lowest possible level consistent with successful termination of the war. Similarly, it is to the advantage of the attacker to keep the level of violence at as low a level as is consistent with the attainment of his objectives. A primary function of any limited conflict is to demonstrate a level of commitment and thereby to modify or limit the objectives of the opposition. In designing military forces for this type of mission and in considering arms control proposals which might modify the effectiveness of military forces on both sides, it is important to take these general principles into account. It is equally essential to understand the implications of these considerations in terms of our unilateral preparation for various types of engagements that we must be prepared either to fight or to threaten to fight.

Clearly, we will be better off if we have selectively allocated our military expenditures in favor of those types of forces which can play a crucial role at the various potential levels of escalation. However, in order to accomplish this it is necessary to have a well-defined concept of the distinguishable levels of escalation, and to understand the role of various types of military forces at each such level.

Distinguishable Levels of Restraint or Escalation

In any discussion of levels of escalation, it is easy to stray into an unresolvable controversy about the probability of any set of

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restraints being respected by both sides in an actual military confrontation. Lacking a well-defined geopolitical and military context, such speculation is necessarily fruitless. In any given situation, restraints will be observed *only* if both sides believe the restraints to be advantageous within that particular context. Even when the context is real and well-defined, one can only conjecture about the viability of specific restraints. Either side can violate the restraints at any time, and neither the course of the battle, nor the motives and degree of commitment of the opposition, ever can be predicted with confidence.

In the heat of conflict, restraints will not be effective unless they are fairly simple and can be readily discerned by both participants. Therefore, the restraints must be defined by some clearly distinguishable parameters, known and accepted by both sides, so that their observance by one side can be easily recognized by the other. For example, a restraint which confined the use of nuclear weapons to tactical rather than strategic applications would almost surely fail (even if both sides were strongly motivated to honor it) because of the nebulous line between the tactical and strategic applications of such weapons. Such a restraint would necessarily be unworkable unless the international dialogue preceding the conflict had resulted in a clear and unambiguous distinction between the tactical and strategic applications of nuclear weapons. In order for a restraint to be viable during a prolonged conflict, which necessarily would include periods of reversal for both sides, it must be founded on an unambiguous and mutually recognizable distinction.

This is not to imply that qualitative and somewhat ambiguous distinctions have no role to play. Occasions can certainly arise where it may be desirable—in order to provide a demonstration of commitment and willingness to escalate to a higher level—to move into the next distinguishable level of escalation. Under such circumstances, one can anticipate that the enemy also may move in the same direction. The initiation of such a move is, in effect, a challenge. The opponent, depending on his degree of commitment, can reply in any of the following ways: a) by an immediate effort to negotiate; b) by a limited reply at the new level or at some higher level in an effort to achieve a more favorable political settlement; or c) by extending the conflict *in toto* to the suggested new level or even to some higher level of escalation. Unless the opposition interprets the move as a bluff, he can-

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not expect to continue his conduct of the engagement at the lower level of escalation with any prospect of winning.

Such limited maneuvers into higher levels of escalation, with deliberate intent to limit the level of violence within the new level of escalation, may be useful for their political and psychological effect. These moves are designed primarily as demonstrations of intent rather than as decisive military operations. Such limited military operations should not ordinarily tax the capability of either side to fight at the next level of escalation. Therefore, the fact that such incidents may occur should not be a primary consideration either in structuring military forces or in weighing the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides for purposes of negotiation.

An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of opposing military forces must be based on an assessment of their *maximum* capability within each *distinguishable* level of escalation. In order to proceed with such an evaluation, we must first determine what potentially clear distinctions exist which could serve to define these identifiable levels of escalation. However, the mere fact that two levels of escalation are theoretically distinguishable will not make these levels distinguishable in the real world unless the dialogue between the participants has served to make both sides aware of the potential dividing lines which separate them. Since the existence of such distinctions can, in itself, contribute to military security by providing potential stopping points in the escalation process, one of the functions of arms control negotiations might be to contribute to the clarification of useful distinctions.

Based on the fact that the most effective distinctions should be simple, clearly defined and unambiguous, we can now list some of the most important factors which could serve to delineate potential levels of escalation. Some possible distinguishing factors are:

a. The use or nonuse of nuclear weapons:
  (1) Airburst only
  (2) Both air and groundburst.

b. The use or nonuse of chemical or biological weapons.

c. Geographic sanctuaries or limitations on the extent of the combat area, or on the use of atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) weapons within the area. Possible geographic distinctions could involve present (or in some cases even historical) national boundaries, or topographical features such as rivers and coastlines. The use of ABC weapons might

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be restricted to sea warfare, or to air defense, or to "defensive" application only, i.e., within friendly territory.

d. Direct versus indirect U.S. and USSR participation:

(1) Moral support only
(2) Supply of armaments
(3) Supply of combat personnel and armaments.

The above factors, in a variety of combinations, can provide potential distinctions which could be used to limit the level of violence. While there is no assurance that in specific cases the distinctions could or would be recognized, there does not appear to be any sound basis for ruling out any of them as potentially useful criteria for introducing restraints.

Some other factors which are sometimes considered but which do not appear to satisfy the requirements for simplicity and lack of ambiguity are listed below:

a. In nonnuclear war, the use or nonuse of mechanized or armored forces can be rejected because of the practical impossibility of excluding all mechanization and because of the difficulty in defining what is meant by armored.

b. Limitations either on the amount of U.S. or USSR support, once substantial logistic support is given, or on the numbers of troops furnished, once U.S. and USSR units are involved in significant numbers, can be rejected because of the practical difficulty of establishing equivalent levels of support.

c. In limited nuclear war, the use of nuclear weapons in a defensive role only (except as indicated above employing geographic distinctions) can be rejected because of the practical difficulty of distinguishing in specific cases between the defensive and offensive applications of such weapons.

d. Confining the role of nuclear weapons to use against military targets only (i.e., exclusion of targets intermingled with civilian populations or, for that matter, even purely civilian targets) can be rejected because of the practical impossibility of reaching a workable definition of how many civilians are to be permitted to remain how close to how important a military target, and the difficulty of defining a military target.

e. Limitations on the total number of nuclear weapons used and on the rate of their employment can be rejected on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the discrepancies in the spectrum of yields available to both sides can introduce difficulty in establishing relative equivalence. Practically—and perhaps more important—given the potentially strong incentive to use nuclear weapons (if at all) where and when required and in the needed quantity, it is unrealistic to assume that their use could be limited on the basis of an arbitrarily determined pre-conflict scale.

f. Limitation on the use of thermonuclear versus fission-only warheads can be rejected because of the possibility of overlapping yields and

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the practical difficulty of maintaining a check on either the yield or the thermonuclear component of the yield under combat conditions.

g. Limitations on the method of delivery of warheads (i.e., aircraft, missile rocket, gun or man-portable warheads) can be rejected because of the difficulty of recognizing the method of delivery after detonation.

h. The limitation suggested above on the use of airburst-only rather than groundburst nuclear weapons, in order to minimize collateral fall-out damage, may or may not be feasible. Where there is a motivation for a very low-altitude detonation against a hard target, the distinction between air and groundburst can be fuzzy. Moreover, fall-out from a low airburst or a fusing failure might be mistakenly interpreted as deliberate initiation of groundburst warfare by the opponent. However, since both sides may be motivated, to some degree at least, to minimize radioactivity on the battlefield, it is possible but by no means certain that this type of restraint could survive a substantial number of misunderstandings.

Thus, none of the finer distinctions considered above appear to hold much prospect of providing sharply drawn boundaries between the various levels of escalation. This is not intended to imply, however, that they would, in all instances, be disregarded completely in any given conflict. Both participants might be willing to accept some slight degradation in the total effectiveness of their military operations in order to avoid wholesale destruction of lives and property. However, if a slight crossing of such vague boundaries could affect the course of a battle significantly, it seems unlikely that ambiguous restraint parameters like those involved in delineating the finer distinctions above could be operative under battle conditions. It would appear, therefore, that both unilateral decisions on the structure of our armed forces and Western evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of Allied versus communist bloc military postures as a basis for arms control negotiations should be made with great care. Such decisions and evaluations should be addressed to the capability of the forces to carry out their defensive missions in the context of limited war situations which involve the major restraint concepts outlined above.

In some instances, for sound reasons of strategy, the U.S. government may find it advisable to assert our intention to ignore some of the broader restraints suggested. For example, it has long been U.S. policy to insist that the West would resort to nuclear weapons to counter any significant communist attack on a portion of NATO Europe. Furthermore, we have declared that any major attack in that area could trigger U.S. nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland. This position is, in effect, a statement of

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intent to respect neither the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons nor the political boundaries of Europe as restraint criteria in the event of an attack on NATO. The existence of such a declaration of policy does not contradict the idea discussed above which states, in effect, that if both East and West believed it in their best interest to avoid the use of nuclear weapons or to accept geographic limitations on their employment in the European theater, it might be possible to abide by these restraints.

Conclusion

Arms control and strategy are intimately related. Thus, arms control can be successful only if it is soundly based on military strategy and capabilities—whether it be by formal agreement or by tacit understanding. Indeed, a measure of arms control automatically inheres in a defense policy which offers a wide range of choices below the level of general nuclear war. The formulation of a feasible arms control policy must begin with a careful assessment of the range of military options available. This does not mean, of course, that military capabilities and strategy must remain inflexible. In some instances, it may be possible to facilitate arms control by modifying the existing strategic concept or posture. But any Western effort to formulate an arms control scheme which seeks in procrustean fashion to make military force posture and strategy fit a preconceived arms control plan will inevitably fail either to gain the necessary domestic and foreign acceptance or to provide international security.

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U.S. STRATEGY AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

by Pierre M. Gallois

THE foreign policy of the present United States government has been deeply influenced by the revolution in weaponry. Studies of foreign policy and strategy conducted at Harvard or at the RAND Corporation, which take into account the scientific and technical advances of the last few years, have gradually influenced the doctrine of the Kennedy Administration and inspired a repudiation of the ideas of such earlier policymakers as Admiral Radford and John Foster Dulles. Thus, a U.S. foreign policy to which, not so long ago, many peoples had entrusted their security, has been reversed.

In 1958 the United States was still bound by treaties to help defend some forty-four countries in which 350 million people lived. Four years earlier, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, had offered an unlimited pledge to protect them. He specified that there could be no question of the U.S. facing the opponent's large armies with conventional weapons. Instead, aggression was to be discouraged by the threat of "massive retaliation." Since 1961 the U.S. administration has been saying exactly the opposite.

What has happened to the policy of total guarantee so generously extended to the allies of the United States? What reasons do U.S. leaders invoke as they abandon a policy which seemed to correspond to the power and purpose of America? The answer can be found in the area of science and weapons technology where a formidable revolution has altered everything.

Indeed, by the time of Dulles' death, the U.S. had lost her unquestioned nuclear supremacy. The main advantage which the U.S. had possessed in the early years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty did not exist nine years later. But even after the passing of her nuclear monopoly, the U.S. retained the power to strike the USSR while remaining outside the reach of the Soviets. All this changed within three years, 1959-1962. In the course of forty months the ratio of U.S. to Soviet forces, once believed to be a factor permanently favorable to the U.S., became a matter of speculation and concern.

Four developments, three of them technological in nature, were at the source of this radical strategic and political change.

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Soviet Acquisition of the ICBM

The first of these four developments was the Soviet acquisition of intercontinental missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads. Today the United States finds itself in the same strategic position as the European countries which have been for so long a time the battleground of the great conflicts. Because of the advent of ballistic missiles, there is no longer any significant difference between the six or seven minutes which are necessary for a missile launched from the USSR to reach a target located in Western Europe, and the thirty or thirty-five minutes that another Soviet missile would need to travel to California or Texas.

The largest oceans as well as the highest mountains are no longer obstacles to the trajectory of missiles, and each country, almost independent of its geographical location, is equally vulnerable. The only difference would be the precision of the Soviets' firing and the relative remoteness of the New World, which compounds the problem of the accuracy of ballistic missiles. In order to destroy an American target, especially if it is as small as a missile located in a silo or even at an airport, the Soviets must launch a higher—perhaps four times higher for a very small target—number of missiles than if this target were located in Western Europe. Hence the United States may still rely for a long time upon the threat of retaliation represented by more than 1200 missiles buried, as are the Minutemen, in individual silos. In Western Europe, permanent mobility (airplanes carrying missiles similar to the Skybolt or submarines armed with missiles similar to the Polaris) ensures the invulnerability of nuclear retaliatory forces.

What really matters is that yesterday U.S. territory was out of reach, while today it lies in the front lines. Although two Soviet ballistic missiles are sufficient to destroy a town of Western Europe, perhaps three or four of them must be launched to level to the ground a large American city. Yesterday, participating in a world-wide conflict and playing a decisive role implied for the United States, at worst, the loss of an expeditionary force; today, it involves the risk of grave destruction to the Continental U.S.

Although World War II caused 55 million casualties, the United States, thanks to the quality of its weapons, its industrial power, its gift for organization and, above all, the advantages of geographical location, lost only some 350,000 combatants. In recent years, civil defense programs and literature on nuclear

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warfare have taught the American public that, in case a war should break out with the Soviets, more than one-half of the population and three-fourths of its cities might be destroyed within a few hours, even within a few minutes. The gradual realization of this new and terrible vulnerability is modifying the views of the American people as to national security and their safety. It has already upset United States policy toward Europe.

Yet today, the American people, perhaps not yet fully aware of their vulnerability, seem ready to take greater risks than their government. At the time of the Cuban crisis, the average American urged stronger action upon the White House. In the years to come, however, public opinion will change. The situation is unprecedented. Americans, traditionally, have taken their might for granted; they know that, since 1812, their territory has never been invaded. They cannot believe that in these last few years everything has changed and that world-wide conflict, which yesterday cost them only several hundred thousand combat casualties, could now kill tens of millions of them in their own cities. The civil defense drills, the campaign for fall-out shelters, and the "literature of fear" which is sweeping book stores and newsstands, will give rise, gradually, to a far keener awareness of the dangers of the nuclear era.

Likewise, the U.S. will be led by prudent men who will be less inclined to take risks which are all the more uncertain because no nuclear war has ever been fought. The government fully realizes the immense destructiveness of the weapons now available. During the last two years, it has revised its foreign policy in order to take this basic factor into account.

The Continuum of Conventional and Atomic Weapons

Ten years ago, the difference between the destructive power of the most dreadful conventional weapons and that of the least powerful nuclear weapons was enormous. For example, the type of bomb that was dropped by the hundreds of thousands on the factories of the Third Reich, had a destructive radius of a hundred meters or so. At Hiroshima, everything was destroyed within a distance of approximately two miles from ground zero.

This difference of effects between conventional weapons systems and nuclear weapons systems helped to prolong the Korean conflict. If, at that time, "small caliber" nuclear arms had been operational, and if General MacArthur, at the time his troops were thrown back behind the 38th Parallel, had used them, passing

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gradually from the most destructive conventional weapons to the least powerful atomic weapons, the conflict would have ceased abruptly, for neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans could have responded in the same manner. These weapons would have compelled the communists to disperse their forces. Then the communists would have been unable to stop the American-led troops, who, immune from atomic attack, could have fought in close formation.

Today, provided both sides are equipped with the complete conventional and nuclear panoply,[1] armed conflict is rendered less probable. Neither knows beforehand which side would choose to capitulate rather than climb progressively the "steps" toward a conflict whose destructiveness would be out of all sensible proportion to the initial issue at stake. The Cuban crisis illustrated this new phenomenon. At the time Cuba was blockaded, the Soviets and Americans vied courteously with one another to avoid at any cost the incident which would have confronted both with this dilemma: capitulation or "escalation."

But the risk does exist that an incident will get out of hand, especially in Europe where the two camps confront one another. In order to minimize the danger, the U.S. administration, taking advantage of the lack of understanding of the European public, has tried to remove the first "steps" of the nuclear staircase.

For more than a year, Washington has assiduously sought Allied acceptance of U.S. nuclear "disengagement." The recourse to submarines and now to surface ships cruising off European coasts, the refusal to deploy on the soil of Western Europe medium-range ballistic missiles, the withdrawal to the British Isles, and even to the United States, of the atomic-supported forces, are among the many disengagement formulas suggested. The aim of American policymakers, apparently, is to place Western Europe in the same strategic category with other allies of the United States whose defense does not necessarily pose the risk of nuclear war.

Naturally, the European allies are worried about such arrangements. Yesterday, their territory, like that of the United States, was assimilated into a kind of "sanctuary" which no aggressor could violate without taking the same risks involved in attacking the American continent. Now, because of "escalation" and its dangers, Western Europe is to be "denuclearized," that is to say,

[1]According to Alain Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, there even exist nuclear explosives with a destructive power inferior to that of the most powerful TNT. *Aviation Week,* February 18, 1963.

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reduced to the level of those countries which may become host to local conflicts on the pattern of Korea, Indochina and Malaya. Washington is now trying to design a strictly conventional defense of Western Europe, for the risk inherent in nuclear escalation in Europe is, according to Washington, all the graver since American territory is now "under the enemy's guns."

Fact number two (the spread of small-caliber nuclear weapons) combined with fact number one (the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet ballistic missiles) leads Washington to oppose any conflict which, begun outside the United States, could lead to the destruction of U.S. and Soviet territories. However important the stake of this conflict may be, it is no longer deemed proportionate to the cost. It is, therefore, important for the U.S. to try to avoid such a contingency. Thus, removing the "rungs" of the nuclear ladder leading to an exchange of blows between the U.S. and the USSR becomes a matter of extreme urgency. Within the past two years Henry Kissinger suggested that in Western Europe tactical nuclear weapons should be grouped under one command and brought back to the "rear," so that their use would depend upon a calculated policy decision and not upon the vicissitudes of combat.[2] There are indications that the U.S. administration would like to go much farther and, if possible, withdraw all nuclear armament from the soil of Western Europe, which then would be protected only by strictly conventional forces.[3] Yet, most military authorities are convinced that a con-

[2]See *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 92-93; and "Problems of European Defense," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1962, p. 540.

[3]Senator A. Willis Robertson (D., Va.), Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production, declared that "we should take a careful look at the cost of defending Western Europe without the use of nuclear weapons." (*New York Herald Tribune,* March 9, 1963.) Such a statement indicates that a purely conventional defense of Western Europe has been studied and even considered favorably by the Congress.

[*Editor's Note:* Apparently the author infers that the long-term intent of the U.S. administration is the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from European soil. This deduction is debatable in view of the statements made by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in particular his statement made before the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963. Mr. McNamara spoke as follows:

> I have repeatedly stated before this Committee that even in limited war situations we should not preclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
>
> However, we may well be faced with situations in Europe where it would not be to the advantage of ourselves or our Allies to use even tactical nuclear weapons initially—provided we had the capability to deal with them through non-nuclear means. Nuclear weapons, even in the lower kiloton ranges, are extremely destructive devices and hardly the preferred weapons to defend such heavily populated areas as Europe. Furthermore, while it does not necessarily follow that the use of tactical nuclear weapons must inevitably escalate into global nuclear war, it does present a very definite threshold beyond which we enter a vast unknown.
>
> This does not mean that the NATO forces can or should do without tactical

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ventional defense of Europe is no longer feasible and that a nuclear withdrawal would seal Europe's fate.

Admittedly, many Europeans, unmindful of the imperatives of their own security, subscribe to the new doctrines of the White House. Through the voices of its leaders and the use of the mass media, the United States exploits—just as the USSR did for different reasons with the Stockholm Peace Appeal—the aversion that nuclear weapons inspire, in order to beguile the Europeans with the benefits of a purely conventional defense. Thus, progressively, Western Europe loses the advantage which she once held, namely, of forming an integral part of the American security area. Europe is no longer an area of the world for the protection of which the United States would categorically assume the supreme risk.

President Kennedy said in his Berlin Crisis speech to the American people on July 25, 1961: "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action." It is the word "choice" that worries those Europeans who are aware of the logic of the nuclear era.

If U.S. territory were seriously threatened, the government at Washington would not "choose"; it would strike, and with all its might. From the very moment the President of the United States declares that he wants to be free to choose the way in which he would act in the defense of Europe and of each of the states of Europe, the security of Europe is jeopardized. The American guarantee which only yesterday was unconditional is now conditional and, hence, under some circumstances, uncertain.

Such is the first consequence of the combination of the danger of escalation and the vulnerability of American territory to the destructive blows of an opponent.

Invulnerable Retaliatory Weapons

The submarine and the Polaris ballistic missile constitute the third of the technological factors responsible for the present change in strategy.

As long as U.S. and Soviet nuclear retaliatory weapons consisted of ballistic missiles on launching pads or buried in silos made of concrete, it was still possible to plan an act of aggression which would have been a rational gambit. Knowing the location of these missiles, the assailant could plan their destruction before

nuclear weapons. On the contrary, we must continue to strengthen and modernize our tactical nuclear capabilities to deal with an attack by conventional forces which puts Europe in danger of being overrun. We mean to defend Europe with every kind of weapon needed.]

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they were launched upon him. If the assailant had previously developed the necessary and formidable arsenal,[4] he could, by a surprise volley-firing of missiles, destroy his opponent's means of counterattack and thus ensure the latter's defeat. Despite the formidable quantities of destructive energy required for the annihilation of each other's retaliatory forces, such an exchange of blows could have kept at least the appearance of rationality, since each belligerent could have hoped to launch the preventive blow which would destroy the forces of the other and thus eliminate or at least minimize a retaliatory attack. Furthermore, it might still have been possible to protect a friendly country or a group of allied countries, since the guaranteeing power could hope to destroy its opponent's missiles or bombers on their launching pads and airfields.

But today the submarine armed with Polaris missiles has deprived thermonuclear war of its last semblance of rationality. The United States possesses a fleet of submarines armed with missiles, which are now and will remain for many more years proof against simultaneous destruction. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets, too, will build the same kind of fleet with a similar degree of invulnerability to American anti-submarine weapons. Because of this development, neither of these two countries will be able any longer to use a counterforce strategy against the other and each will have to be content with "peaceful coexistence" with its main opponent, or otherwise risk national suicide.*

The Soviets will still be able to destroy American urban centers, but their aggression would set off a counterattack, led by submarines armed with Polaris missiles, which, in turn, would reduce the principal Soviet cities to ashes. Conversely, this reasoning applies to a U.S.-initiated attack. For the two Great Powers, equipped with nearly invulnerable retaliatory weapons, peaceful coexistence is the only solution, since resort to force would lead to the near-extinction of both belligerents.

[4]According to Dr. Ralph E. Lapp's calculations in *Kill and Overkill* (New York: Basic Books, 1962, p. 73), if Soviet missiles have a CEP (circular error probability) of two miles and carry ten-megaton warheads, the Soviets would have to fire a volley of 10-12,000 ICBM's in order to have a 90 per cent probability of knocking out 1,000 U.S. missiles in single silos. If the warheads were only one megaton, the Soviets would have to fire a volley of 40,000 to achieve the same results. The Soviets do not, at present, field as many as 200 intercontinental missiles. Of course, in the not too distant future, improvements in accuracy and reliability will considerably reduce the figures suggested by Dr. Lapp.

[**Editor's Note:* This conclusion rests on the assumption that neither side will achieve an effective missile defense or some other technological breakthrough which could alter the existing strategic situation.]

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Everyone might rejoice at the stability resulting from this situation were the strategy of the mobile and nearly invulnerable retaliatory forces (Polaris) not marred by a serious shortcoming. If resort to force no longer implies risking merely the loss of an expeditionary army but hazards the very substance of national life, it is clear that such a risk can be taken only for oneself—and not for others, including even close allies. This conclusion signifies the complete collapse of the collective defense systems upon which the security of the Western world has hitherto been based.

With soldier-like frankness, General Maxwell Taylor stated the dilemma of Western defense in a widely acclaimed book. It seems that the congruency of his views with those of President Kennedy's leading strategists prompted his recall from retirement and appointment to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wrote:

> Under the conditions which we must anticipate in the coming years, it is incredible to ourselves, to our allies, and to our enemies that we would use such [nuclear] forces for any purpose other than to assure our national survival. When would our survival be at stake? Two clear cases would be an atomic attack on the Continental United States or the discovery of indisputable evidence that such an attack was about to take place. A third possible case would be a major attack upon Western Europe, since the loss of that area to Communism would ultimately endanger our national survival. These seem the only situations imaginable in which our atomic retaliatory forces might be deliberately used. Hence, they are the only situations to which their deterrence applies.[5]

It will be noted that General Taylor envisages the use of American nuclear weapons in Europe only in the case of a major attack, i.e., the least likely military contingency in Europe. In the case of lesser threats, which are the only ones that Europe must dread, the American nuclear retaliatory forces will not be used. To meet these, General Taylor suggests conventional warfare:

> Having recognized the limitations of our atomic deterrent forces, we should, in consistence, redefine general war as being synonymous with a nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR. Limited war would then be left to cover all other forms of military operations. The question of using atomic weapons in limited wars would be met by accepting the fact that primary dependence must be placed on conventional weapons while retaining readiness to use tactical atomic weapons in the comparatively rare cases where their use would be to our national interest.[6]

[5]Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 145.
[6]*Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

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General Taylor's statement does not allow for any misunderstanding. The absolutely vital interests of the United States, i.e., the United States *itself,* will be protected with the help of nuclear weapons. As far as other nations are concerned, their defense will be left to the fortunes of conventional warfare. If one wins, so much the better. If one loses, one does not lose everything, for a war conducted with conventional means does not involve the defense of absolutely vital American interests. In good time, the essential stakes having been preserved, one will try—always with conventional means—to recover what has been lost.

Atomically, the U.S. can therefore guarantee only its own territory. Western Europe, having lost the status of an atomically protected "sanctuary" which it had enjoyed until the end of the 1950's, is now viewed as a potential arena of limited conflicts. General Taylor's position is diametrically at variance with the statements made in 1953 and 1954, according to which any aggression against any NATO territory would be followed by nuclear retaliation.

With much stubbornness and great courage President Kennedy has managed gradually to provide the means to realize General Taylor's ideas about the security of the Free World. It has been suggested that, since the publication of his book four years ago, General Taylor has modified some of his stated views, especially regarding the security of Europe. Indeed, on August 9, 1962, General Taylor declared:

> I am known as the advocate of powerful strategic nuclear forces and also of tactical atomic weapons to support land operations. In order to have all the freedom of being able to choose [the best counterattack] at the time when it would be necessary to decide, it is important that the defense of Western Europe be secured by an abundant supply of nuclear weapons of various types, together with modernized and strong conventional forces. It seems to me that, faced with an attack aimed at Western Europe, we would have to use the necessary weapons and forces to triumph, whatever these weapons may be. Now, to face a massive attack, and because in the West we do not have at our disposal adequate conventional forces, it would be necessary, nearly at the starting point of the conflict, to resort to the use of atomic weapons.[7]

Incompatibility Between the Nuclear and the Conventional

The last sentence of the 1962 statement quoted above is ambiguous. General Taylor must know very well that no nation can establish a powerful military organization based upon the use

[7] In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, as reported in *Le Monde* (Paris), August 10, 1962.

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of conventional weapons and then expect it, if the need arises, to fight a nuclear war.

More keenly than anyone else, U.S. Army generals are aware of the incompatibility of the two systems. As early as 1953, while observers began to think about the tremendous transformations brought about by atomic weapons, the U.S. Army initiated studies aimed at finding out how this new explosive could be used in land warfare. Every type of organization was considered and many schemes were tested. After several years of work, the obvious had to be acknowledged: it was impossible to reconcile nuclear weapons with the traditional forms of land combat. The new explosive was not only far more powerful than TNT, but it simply did not fit in with the historic curve representing the continuous increase of the destructive power per fire-unit. In fact, nuclear firepower rendered obsolete all the notions about military and combat organization to which centuries of warfare had given rise, and which were deeply rooted in the military mind.

Organizational schemes such as the pentomic division, the "air cavalry," and the "atomic combat unit," advanced as solutions to the problem posed by atomic weapons for conventional armed forces, did not stand up either under analysis or in test maneuvers in the field. For these reasons, it is difficult to understand why General Taylor, going back on his former writings, should say that if Western Europe lacked "adequate conventional forces" to meet a massive attack, "it would be necessary, nearly at the starting point of the conflict, to resort to the use of atomic weapons."

What does General Taylor mean by "adequate conventional forces?" If, as he leads us to believe, and as all the other NATO military commanders have declared, nuclear weapons would have to be used at a given time in the conflict (because the opponent is numerically superior and is himself armed with nuclear weapons), it is difficult to see why the Western world should resort to nuclear weapons only after it has sacrificed important conventional forces. The greater these forces and the longer their commitment to a conventional strategy, the more costly and absurd would be their sacrifice and the weaker NATO's capability to stand its ground in Europe when the conflict became nuclear.

The U.S. government has been urging the European nations—excluding Britain which, despite its 52 million inhabitants, will not maintain 450,000 soldiers and has given up conscription—to increase their conventional forces. America's allies might well ask this question: What does the Alliance leader want? His present

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position lacks consistency, at least from a military point of view. No amount of subtle and sophisticated jargon on the part of American policymakers will suffice to convince astute European observers that one can strengthen the military posture of the Alliance by weakening it.

Contradictions in U.S. Policy Toward Nato

Does Washington really believe in the military worth of its proposals? Or does the Administration believe that the current leaders of the European allies are so ignorant of the state of military arts as to acquiesce in those solutions to the problem of the defense of Europe which appear less dangerous to Washington because they would fix limits to U.S. commitments? These are the questions raised by the new American policy toward the security of Europe.

Increase in Conventional Forces. Why does the American government demand, with surprising insistence, an increase of conventional forces on the Central Sector? What magical virtues does it confer upon the number 30? This figure of 30 land divisions had been fixed in 1954. It represented the total number of divisions that the Allied nations proposed as their contribution to the defense of the Central European Sector in 1957. Why has President Kennedy fixed the raising of these 30 divisions as one of his prime objectives for the defense of Europe?

At the time the Allied countries were considering raising a force of 30 divisions, the Soviets were thought to have 175 land divisions and the satellite countries together had about 50. Since then, American experts have estimated that the forces of the Soviet bloc are much smaller. At each session of NATO, the representatives of the U.S. government, anxious to make the increase of the Western conventional forces which they demand of the European countries appear less ridiculous, have produced smaller and smaller figures for the Soviet conventional forces. One wonders why, if the 22 Western divisions deployed in the Central European Sector were sufficient to hold the Soviets back when they were so powerful, it is now necessary to field at least 30 divisions to deter Soviet forces which have been reduced almost by half? If, as General Taylor wrote, it will be necessary at a certain time to resort to nuclear weapons, why, one may ask, would the American command use its nuclear weapons only when 30 Western divisions have been routed and not use them when only 22 divisions were beating a retreat?

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According to the estimate supplied by American experts themselves, the Soviets, in order to launch an attack against the Allied forces holding the Central European Sector, would have to deploy at least twice as many forces.[8] If, for example, the Allies had 25 divisions at their disposal, the Soviets would therefore have to send 50 against them, i.e., 75 divisions would have to fight. Does the U.S. government believe that if 75 divisions were fighting against each other in Europe, the European allies of the United States would consider this struggle a "limited conflict" in the sense General Taylor used this term in his book?

According to those Americans who demand an increase of conventional forces in the Central European Sector, the Western world would be properly defended only if 30 divisions were raised. By the above calculation, 30 NATO divisions would measure themselves against 60 Soviet divisions. It is only "above" such a conflict threshold that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons—at least, this is what U.S. officials, in calling for an increase in conventional forces, told the European allies.

There is undoubtedly a relationship between the Administration's desire to increase conventional forces and its desire, as reported by Stewart Alsop in his article on the President's "Grand Design,"[9] to have a choice between capitulation and nuclear war. The Europeans, mindful of the defense of their vital interests, regard this kind of choice with as much skepticism as would the Americans if it were a question of protecting *their* vital interests. For the sake of argument, imagine that the Soviet Union, having occupied Canada, threatens the United States from across a common border of some 2800 miles. Would the government in Washington rely for the safety of the U.S. on raising the number of its divisions from 15 to 20, and then content itself with fighting a conventional war in which 60 American and Soviet divisions were engaged in Montana, North Dakota and Minnesota? If the United States, its 20 divisions on the point of giving way under the pressure of Soviet forces, finally resorted to nuclear weapons, what benefit would have been derived from the deployment of conventional forces? Would not the initial preoccupation with a conventional deployment be blamed for having actually courted

[8]The American experts thus hope to convince their European allies that the imbalance of effectives is not as serious as it seems, because a defensive position can always be held with a number of forces smaller than that of the attacking ones. On occasion, Soviet forces and weapons have been evaluated differently according to time and the internal American situation (for example, the 1960 Presidential campaign "missile gap" which subsequently mysteriously disappeared).

[9]*Time and Tide,* March 29, 1962.

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the aggression? By accepting the very idea of conventional war in defense of the "boundary states," by removing the ominous specter of a nuclear war, would not the U.S. government have encouraged the Soviets to venture upon a "cheap" war of conquest?

The Pause Concept. Three years have passed since, at the request of Washington, General Norstad, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, began to talk of a "pause." The "pause" was one of the principal features of the circumspect policy adopted by the U.S. toward the defense of Europe. Not only was the idea of a massive nuclear retaliation against any aggressor threatening NATO-controlled territory no longer mentioned, but an additional brake was placed on any Western reaction to the threat of Soviet aggression: Nuclear weapons would not be used until after a suitable period of reflection which, it was hoped, would be sobering for the aggressor. In short, Moscow was assured that the Western powers would not reply with nuclear weapons to an attack against their forces. If they finally had to move up the nuclear ladder, it would be as a last resort, because the enemy had increased its pressure. Nuclear weapons would be employed because the delay granted to the enemy did not deter him from carrying out his design, presumably after consultations between the Allies or even tentative negotiations with the aggressor.

Though seemingly cautious, the "pause" is, in fact, an extremely dangerous gambit. Under the pretext of reducing hazards incurred in a premature use of nuclear weapons, it emasculates the deterrent and gives the enemy to understand that he runs much less risk than before in using force. Far from yielding any benefit, the "pause" provides the adversary with so great a maneuvering advantage as to allow him, by adhering to the rules laid down by his opponent, to attack at a lower order of risk. If NATO were to "pause," who would prevent the Soviets from occupying, let us say, Hamburg or some other territory theoretically guaranteed by NATO? In such a case, what would be the reaction of the Allies? Would not all of them, except the one most directly affected, be prepared to act with the utmost discretion, thus weakening the restraining effect of the threat of eventual retaliation with nuclear weapons? Besides, the aggressor, if by any chance he found the going slow, could easily call for a peace conference in Geneva. Thither he would rush to negotiate a peace agreement on the basis of positions acquired just before the end of the "pause." After a few similar "pauses," Western Europe would cease to be free and independent.

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Limiting Weapons Modernization. The idea of a "pause" having encountered some harsh criticism at home and abroad, the American experts looked for other means of limiting the risks of an American nuclear commitment in Europe. One method adopted was to refrain from modernizing the tactical atomic weapons used by the Army and the Air Force as devices intermediate between large-scale nuclear and conventional weapons. Short- and medium-range missiles, designed for the protection of the European theater and the destruction of the opposing tactical forces, gradually had to be replaced by more up-to-date weapons. When General Norstad himself asked that some of the tactical nuclear weapons then in service be replaced by mobile medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), his request was turned down by Washington. The retirement of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe was probably not unrelated to his unequivocal views on how best to carry out the mission entrusted to him in Europe.

Tactical Nuclear Support from Outside Europe. On the other hand, Thomas Finletter, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, proposed several times that the desired "tactical atomic support" be assured by earmarking weapons deployed outside Continental Europe: one might for instance use the SAC bombers now partly relieved —because of the availability of operational intercontinental ballistic missiles—of their strategic mission.

It might also be possible, Finletter suggested, to resort to Polaris missiles carried either by submarines or by surface ships sailing in European waters. This scheme is, to say the least, ill-advised. The European theater target list contains several hundred Soviet military objectives marked out for destruction (in fact, about one thousand). To accomplish this mission, approximately 2000 Polaris missiles would have to be launched against hard Soviet targets. But could the necessary 125 submarines be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe? Even if these missiles were available, it is not easy to understand why tactical objectives would justify the use of 500-kiloton explosives in instances when warheads 100 times less powerful would suffice. If one must compensate for the inaccuracy of a Polaris missile, launched from a distant craft, by its huge destructive power, why should the Europeans subscribe to it, and thus acquiesce in the hurling of more than 1000 megatons onto their own continent when ten would suffice to destroy the tactical objectives?

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Nuclear Disengagement and the Multilateral Force

The most serious of the contradictions in U.S. policy toward Europe arises from the Nassau accords. The Nassau Agreement provided an opportunity to reconsider the question of nuclear disengagement and present it in a new form acceptable to certain allies. Just as Soviet propaganda had stressed the danger inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons, so many American spokesmen and journalists had, as early as 1960, begun to underline the risks taken by European populations who accepted the nuclear protection of their territory. The deployment of these weapons in Europe was deemed a serious danger which could be easily averted by reliance on nuclear weapons kept at sea or even in the U.S. Thus, the fears inspired by the massive destructiveness of nuclear weapons has brought us, indirectly, to a "denuclearization" of Western Europe which bears a strong resemblance to the so-called Rapacki Plan.

A nuclear force at sea, whatever its multilateral aspects, would be under the strict control of the President of the United States, and thus would have the advantage—for Washington—of avoiding a commitment of the Western forces, i.e., the American forces. Moreover, it is well nigh certain that such a nuclear force, if it were really multilateral and thus subject to the veto of several Allied nations, would be totally paralyzed. Thus paralyzed, it could not possibly take any action that would involve the U.S. against its will in a nuclear engagement. However, the planned nuclear force was not meant to be multilateral in terms of political controls. The Nassau plan had only the appearance of a certain degree of nuclear decentralization among the NATO powers and of concessions made to the national pride of those European nations which renounced the creation of independent nuclear deterrents; in reality, the Nassau proposals provided a solution only to the anxieties of Washington. Exposed to light, the offer shrank to a scheme for associating the Allies with the U.S. "nuclear operation plans" and for circumscribing the NATO nuclear force by placing it under strict American control. Thus, the U.S. would have another guarantee against the risk of escalation in Western Europe.

Here again, we are confronted by obvious contradictions between political-strategic realities and the position of the White House. Indeed, so obvious are these contradictions that Washington is very much perplexed as to how to gain acceptance for its

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proposal—an implausible proposal despite all the publicity given to it—as a gesture of American good will toward the other nations of the Alliance.

The first of these contradictions was startlingly revealed by Secretary of Defense McNamara. The Secretary, having declared in Athens in May 1962 that it was dangerous for countries (other than the U.S. and the USSR) to create small nuclear forces that could only pursue an anti-city strategy, subscribed nonetheless to a project of a multilateral nuclear force based exclusively on anti-city weapons.[10] The very size of the multilateral nuclear force which the Secretary now proposed was hardly larger than that of the national force which he had criticized so severely a few months earlier. The American press had ridiculed the British and French nuclear forces which, it was said, represented only 2 per cent of the American potential. But now Washington offered as a substitute for these national nuclear forces a multilateral force which would be numerically inferior to the British and French deterrent. One may wonder why this "2 per cent" force would have no power of deterrence whatsoever in British and French hands, and why even a smaller nuclear force under complex Alliance controls now should be powerful enough to discourage aggression! Is it more unlikely that a government would use its anti-city weapons to defend its own country than that six members of the Alliance would risk committing collective suicide on behalf of a seventh member threatened by the aggressor?

Another contradiction arises from the incompatibility between the use of nuclear weapons, particularly when they are aimed at enemy cities, and the multi-government control systems. At the time of the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy declared in substance that, when the safety of the American people was at stake, he would act first and then consult his allies. This was good common sense. Why should not each of the Allied countries reason in the same manner as the United States, and why should it not declare that, in case of a serious threat against its national security, it would act first and consult its allies afterward? And why should it then subscribe to President Kennedy's proposal to participate in a multilateral nuclear force?

What is the real significance of this retreat to a "peripheral strategy" relying on Polaris missiles carried by nuclear sub-

[10]In a speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962, Secretary McNamara stated: "There is, for example, the Polaris force, which we have been substantially increasing, and which, because of its specially invulnerable nature, is peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic reserve force."

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marines? And how can anybody assert plausibly that this strategy will spare Europe the destruction entailed by a nuclear war? Is it believable that, if the submarines launched their Polaris missiles toward Soviet cities, the Soviets would retaliate against the submarines rather than against the territories of the Allied countries, members of the multilateral force?

The United States did not content itself with submitting a proposal for a multilateral force to its allies. The United States proceeded to take unilateral action. The Cuban crisis and the Nassau meeting have resulted in an actual nuclear disengagement on the part of the U.S. in Turkey and Italy. The withdrawal from these two countries of land-based missiles was presented officially as a "modernization," and some ill-informed quarters in Europe accepted this interpretation. In reality, the Turks and Italians bartered a real deterrent weapon for the mere shadow of security.

Let us consider the case of Turkey. As long as fifteen Jupiter missiles, placed under the control of both Americans and Turks, were based on Turkish soil no potential aggressor could take the risk of attacking Turkish territory with conventional forces without exposing himself to a possible retaliation with missiles. Granted, the missiles could not have been fired without the agreement of Washington. Even though no single Jupiter missile was powerful enough to raze a large city, the Soviets would have been foolish not to take the nuclear batteries into consideration. They could not be certain that, under all circumstances, these rockets would not be fired with or without the consent of Washington. In any plan of aggression against Turkish territory, the Soviets could not possibly ignore the existence of these rockets, however outmoded they might be. It is obvious that any attack against Turkey would have had to be preceded by the elimination of the fifteen Jupiter missiles. Their destruction might have been a relatively easy operation, for these rockets stood exposed on their "soft" launching pads and their locations were well known to the Soviets. But the aggressor would have had to run a double risk: First, he would have had not only to cross the border, but also to strike at the geographical center of Turkey. Secondly, and this would have been even more serious a matter, he would have had to take the nuclear initiative—not only destroying the rockets but also inflicting nuclear blows upon their American crews.

Washington announced that, by substituting Polaris missile submarines for the Jupiter rockets, it was modernizing the means

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of retaliation, and the Turkish government, uninformed or complaisant, agreed to this peculiar transaction. In fact, by placing its retaliatory force on the high seas, Washington makes matters easier for the aggressor, who no longer has to be the first to fire nuclear weapons and run the risk of atomizing American military forces on station. On the other hand, the decision to strike first and to strike atomically now rests with the U.S. government.

Since the Polaris missile is an anti-city missile, the United States would find itself in a most uncomfortable position: either not to retaliate at all, which decision the hypothetical Turkish crew members aboard the submarines would be unlikely to reverse, or to retaliate and destroy Soviet cities, knowing full well the heavy price which would have to be paid for this act as long as the United States remains exposed to Soviet ICBM's. As, in any case, the U.S. government does not intend to strike first, it appears that by "modernizing" its retaliatory arrangements, the United States succeeds in neutralizing its own nuclear force when it is supposed to be providing Turkey with better protection.

The modernization of armament has always been costly. This particular attempt at weapons improvement might prove ruinous for the Turks. The Italians are not better off. Yet it cannot be argued convincingly that these two allies have proved more disloyal or feckless than the other members of NATO, or have pressed for "disengagement."

After promising the Allies the creation of a multilateral force consisting, in its first phase, of B47 American bombers and British "Vulcans" (all of them subsonic aircraft designed some fifteen years ago) and, in its second phase, of Polaris missile submarines manned with international crews, the U.S. government suggested that, upon further reflection, it might be preferable to arm surface ships which are less expensive to build and technically better adapted to European capabilities. George Ball, Under Secretary of State, had secured the approval by Italy and Germany of a multilateral force based on Polaris missile submarines. Two weeks later, Ambassador Livingston Merchant arrived in Paris to discuss the conditions under which such a force could be created. All the capitals of the Alliance, save Paris, rejoiced in the new idea: the Western allies would use in common the most modern weapons created by the inventive genius of the Americans. France would be excluded and, no doubt, would soon regret it.

One month later, the Department of State revealed that the nuclear force proposed to the members of the Atlantic Alliance

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would be equipped with surface ships, rather than with submarines, armed with Polaris missiles. The U.S. Navy appears to have been responsible for this reversal on the part of the State Department. Navy officials could not reconcile themselves to the idea that Polaris missile submarines, with their elaborate systems of navigation and communication and, especially, their highly sophisticated sonar, should harbor foreign specialists, even if they were allies. A search of the Pentagon files was rewarded with an old study proposal for a Polaris surface ship. A fleet composed of fast craft carrying Polaris missiles could escape destruction, or at least the simultaneous destruction of all of its units. But detection by orbiting satellites of surface movements makes the stationing of nuclear weapons at sea even more hazardous an undertaking than their stationing on the ground. Hence, long ago, the Pentagon had turned down the proposal for the Polaris surface ship as one of small benefit as far as the security of the U.S. was concerned. Resurrected from the files, the proposal was nonetheless submitted to the European allies who, since they had no better weapons of their own, would have to be content with this solution to their problems. Thus, the Polaris merchant-marine project, although condemned upon serious examination by American experts, was now adorned with new virtues and substituted for the Polaris of the depths.

But Livingston Merchant, before he had a chance to initiate talks with the Allies in order to persuade them to accept the transformation of the multilateral submarine into a trawler, was forestalled by untoward developments. The Atomic Energy Commission stated categorically that an amendment of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act was out of the question, and that it was unthinkable to give nuclear weapons to non-U.S. forces. Thus, Merchant was deprived of his most telling arguments; President Kennedy's idea was opposed by an agency of his own Administration; and the multilateral force was transformed into a multilateral farce.

The story of the proposal for multilateral forces resembles uncannily that of the Anglo-American negotiations over the Skybolt missile which terminated in the cancellation of the development of this weapon. In the beginning the parties to the negotiation agreed to develop and use the Skybolt, to halt work on competing projects and to rely on a common policy. At the same time, bitter words were used to describe governments foolish enough not to take advantage of the opportunity of adhering to

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the agreement. Then, the agreement was rescinded by the party that had proposed it. It was asserted, in the wake of the Nassau Agreement, that the Skybolt was no longer essential to the security of the U.S. A few months later, the Allies were given to understand that the Polaris missile submarine was too secret and too complex for their handling, and that they must be content with more overt and simpler surface vessels.

A Conventional or Nuclear Defense?

The recapitulation of these complex diplomatic manipulations shows, once more, that the Western peoples still have much to learn about the characteristics of the nuclear era in which they must live and in which some of them must answer for the security of the world. Clearly, the responsibility for keeping a nuclear arsenal cannot be shared. The United States would be better advised to accept national deterrent forces instead of straining its diplomatic ingenuity to inhibit their creation. The present United States administration, had it better understood the problems of defending a European continent menaced by an adversary brandishing thousands of deadly weapons, would not have inaugurated its reign by asking for an increase in conventional forces.

Let us summarize the argument for more and better conventional forces: President Kennedy, like his predecessor, does not wish to be confronted in Europe with the dilemma of nuclear war or surrender. Understandably, he wishes to have the time to ponder the appropriate response to whatever might be the challenge. Yet, military specialists have known for years that it is impossible to switch suddenly from one strategy to another when one has to deal with arms as different as conventional and nuclear weapons. Two years ago, Henry Kissinger made it clear that once committed to a conventional defense system, the country that decided to switch to nuclear weapons would be lost.[11] Besides, there is no reason why a country should not resort from the start to nuclear weapons if it knew that it could thus gain a complete and immediate victory. Almost ten years ago, General Ailleret, the present Commander-in-Chief of the French military forces, defined cogently the differences between conventional and nuclear systems. More recent studies have merely confirmed his views.

[11]Henry Kissinger, "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear," *The Fifteen Nations,* March 1961.

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In a lecture to the French Military Staff College in the fall of 1954, the then Colonel Ailleret stated:

> The extreme vulnerability to nuclear weapons of military personnel and vehicles in movement, of the means of communication, and of the strategic routes and port equipment will probably paralyze armies. Armed forces will have to spread out on very large areas and limit their actions to numerous infiltrations carried out by small units, for concentrations will be no longer possible. . . .
>
> Concentration of large infantry and artillery units gathered around centers of resistance are now out of the question. They would be easily destroyed or neutralized. Large units now must be abandoned, just as close order formation had to be when the automatic rifle was adopted.

It is likely that, after many years spent on study and experiment, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have come to the same conclusion as the present French Commander-in-Chief. Hence the contradiction between the views of the American Supreme Commanders-in-Chief in Europe, who insisted unwaveringly that Europe cannot be defended without resorting to nuclear weapons, and the arguments advanced by the U.S. government in favor of an increase in conventional forces.

It is easy to demonstrate that the two systems—the conventional one and the nuclear one—have hardly anything in common, and that, in a future contest, the latter must inevitably triumph over the former.

Clearly, the conventional system rests on the concentration of men and matériel, and its firepower is proportionate to troop concentration. It requires a complex logistics system capable of disposing of huge quantities of voluminous and heavy matériel. This form of war is dependent on time, for the "wearing out" of the belligerents is relatively slow. There is sufficient time to make use of mobilized reserves, to step up the production of armament, and to exploit industrial resources.

Nuclear weapons, unheard of twenty years ago, have upset these calculations. Because of the extreme vulnerability of any surface target known to the enemy, concentrations of men and matériel are no longer possible. Traditional supply systems court destruction even before they can become operative. A long, organized conflict is no longer conceivable. Consequently, it is now out of the question to contemplate calling up reservists and increasing factory production. Neither the field of battle, nor the time, nor the men, nor the matériel, nor the doctrine, are the same in the two systems. The mode of combat must be chosen before coming to blows. And this choice must be determined now by appropriate

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studies, research, armaments, recruiting and training of men, and physical preparation of the terrain. Any compromise in this matter would lead to disaster.

Once committed to the atom, it is impossible to draw back. What role could the 180 British bombers (compared to the tens of thousands of planes available in 1945) hope to play, if they could not carry at least one nuclear explosive? The same ratio holds for the U.S., whose number of delivery vehicles is scarcely one-tenth what it was in the TNT era. The passage from one system to the other is all the less possible because the Western world remains on the defensive and, by definition, the adversary is given the initiative and the choice of means.

To make European countries believe that they must increase their conventional forces, and that only upon the defeat of these forces should recourse be had to nuclear weapons, is a fanciful endeavor. Great Britain understood long ago the uselessness of conventional armament in Europe. The more the European nations on the Continent equip themselves conventionally, the more vulnerable they will be to nuclear attack and therefore the stronger will be the temptation for the opponent to use nuclear weapons. Thus, the promoters of conventional rearmament in Europe are defeating their own aims. They strengthen the potential power of the adversary, who knows that he has no reason to fear a nuclear response. They offer to his nuclear cudgel unprotected and tempting targets, and thus encourage him to take the initiative.

The likely explanation for such dangerous advice must be sought elsewhere than in the canons of strategic logic. Is it given with an eye to preparing the way for Western Europe's "denuclearization?" By substituting for the nuclear system an enlarged conventional system, backed up by a dubious threat of strategic nuclear action, the lower rungs of the nuclear ladder on which many Europeans think that their safety hinges would be removed —and "escalation" would, hopefully, be halted at the bottom.

Many decisions taken unilaterally by Washington convey the idea that this, indeed, is the policy of the United States. Thus, we have gone a long way from the solutions put forward by the United States in 1957, when it proposed to extend nuclear weaponry to all NATO theaters and to make available to the Supreme Commander in Europe IRBM squadrons that would be manned by European personnel. The nuclear tide of the late 1950's is now

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receding. Reliance on conventional means, though diminishing the direct risks of the Americans, certainly increases those incurred by the Europeans.

It has been said that these risks will remain acceptable so long as American and British troops are stationed in Western Europe. But, according to the British "White Paper" on Defense (1962), the presence of British troops on the territory of West Germany depends on the balance of payments between that country and Great Britain. Following the visit to Bonn of Roswell Gilpatric, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense, the French daily *Le Figaro* reported on February 23, 1963: "If Bonn, in accordance with the Franco-German agreement, increases its imports from France to the prejudice of the U.S., American troops stationed in Germany will be removed, or, at least, some of them. . . ." It is a strong alliance, indeed, where bilateral bargaining and unilateral decisions could mean a military disengagement and thus compromise the security of European countries.

The reason for the long-standing crisis of NATO is simple: the leader of the Western coalition tries to reconcile the irreconcilable. He refuses to accept for his country the formidable risks now inherent in all alliances. But, at the same time, he dares not face up to the logical consequences of the new situation, and proposes alternative solutions which are inadequate and dangerous as well as unacceptable to any country other than the U.S.

If it is not too late, it might be better to return to the policy of the previous Administration, namely the unconditional guarantee of the security of Western Europe. Today, Khrushchev is not afraid to run the very same risks in Cuba which Kennedy would like to avoid in Western Europe. But if the United States deems it imprudent to go back to Dulles' forthright pledge, then it must accept a measure of proliferation of nuclear weapons, a proliferation which it cannot prevent—no more in Western Europe than it has been able to do in China. The United States, by coming to terms with the necessities of the age, might find a way out of the deadlock in which it has become entangled.

The tenor of official British pronouncements sounds as embarrassed as that of the United States official voice. In the House of Commons, Mr. Thorneycroft, Minister of Defense, declared:

> As an increasing number of more and more powerful missiles will be aimed at Washington and New York, can we be certain that a threat directed against our country would always be answered by an American

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counterthreat? And should we admit this certitude, would the Russians be equally persuaded? Is a deterrent under the exclusive control of America absolutely reliable?

Mr. Thorneycroft questioned, though his words were couched in the language of diplomatic discretion, the permanence of American guarantees—guarantees entailing enormous risks for the U.S. itself.

A few days after Mr. Thorneycroft revealed his gnawing doubts, Lord Home, Britain's Foreign Secretary, addressing the members of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on March 20, 1963, advised his colleagues against examining too closely the intentions of the United States regarding its commitments in Europe. Thus, when the independence of the instruments of *British* security is at issue, Her Majesty's Government is concerned about the uncertain character of the American guarantee. On the other side of the Channel, however, Lord Home declines to recognize the right of other peoples to question, when the security of the *Continent* is at stake, the intentions of the United States.

As long as Washington and London do not understand—or ignore—the imperatives of security in the nuclear age, the situation will remain confused and all the proposed solutions will prove ineffective or unacceptable. Powerful men do not find it easy to relinquish long-held and cherished, though fallacious, ideas. More than two years have already slipped by. The U.S. administration perhaps has not had sufficient time to adjust itself fully to the demands of the leadership it must exercise and on which, for better or for worse, the security of the West depends. In fairness, no one can deny that the problems are immensely difficult and the choices breathtakingly hazardous. But the problems grow every day more intractable, and the right choice will have to made, lest policies of procrastination and ambiguity result not only in the discomfort of this or that ally of the United States, but in collective Western disaster.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN IMPERATIVES

by Lionel Gelber

BRITAIN'S exclusion from the European Common Market has thrown up a serious roadblock to the European policy of the United States. The United States had anticipated that, upon Britain's entry, U.S. trade objectives might be pursued in one all-embracing series of negotiations with the Common Market. Now that Britain has been debarred, U.S. trade policy must be reconsidered. Indeed, the entire range of U.S. policies toward Europe—political and military as well as economic—must be re-examined.

General de Gaulle correctly perceived that the needs of Britain and the Commonwealth countries could not be met without altering the character of the Common Market. Indeed, Britain's international status would, upon her entry into the Common Market, have been drastically recast. In turn, a transformation in Britain's status would have created for the United States, as leader of the West, a number of far-reaching economic, diplomatic and security problems. These ramifications of Britain's accession to the Common Market seem to have been neglected in the calculations of British and American statesmen. They cannot be neglected again except at considerable cost to the Free World.

Does U.S. policy no longer conceive of a major role for Britain? Some observers have concluded that Britain has ceased to be the premier ally. But, if this is true, the United States would probably have been less concerned over Britain's exclusion from the Common Market. For her part, Britain, if she wishes to play a major role, must toughen her economic sinews. Nor is that all. Many lands, particularly those within the Commonwealth and the sterling bloc, revolve around Britain. If underdeveloped countries are to be assisted with more than palliatives, and if some of the foreign aid burden borne by the U.S. Treasury is to be lightened, a new, imaginative American program for expanding international trade will have to be launched. The part that Britain and other, more developed Commonwealth countries can play in this wider trade program should not be underestimated.

I

The search is on for an economic alternative to British membership in the Common Market. But it will be a half-hearted

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one so long as official London and official Washington assume that Britain can still pry open the door to the Common Market; that any economic alternative to British membership will be only a temporary expedient. Interim arrangements which have been earmarked in advance for eventual liquidation cannot inspire confidence in other Commonwealth countries or elsewhere in the Free World. And how can the West hold together if there is a lack of confidence?

In some respects, France has not been a good ally. But General de Gaulle, when he vetoed Britain's application, merely placed his official stamp upon conflicts of interest within the West that had been clearly visible for a long time. More has been involved than one man's caprice, although this was the picture conveyed to the British people. The United States, for its part, cannot stand aloof from these deep-seated conflicts. The consequences of these conflicts must be brought home to the American people, for only then will the United States join in the quest for an economic alternative to membership by Britain in the Common Market. But Americans have, first of all, to discharge a duty that they shirked during the protracted negotiations between Britain and the Common Market. Before the United States will assume the task of mounting a countervailing economic initiative, its political rationale must be spelled out. Before the next round of talks on European economic integration, the United States should reconsider its conception of Atlantic political unity, and the place of Britain in such a "Grand Design."

This will not be easy to do. A major role for Britain may be an American objective, but what if London and Washington differ, as they sometimes have, over how that role can best be played? Paradoxically, greater harm could have been done by the merger of Britain into an integrated Europe than by the recent Anglo-American dispute over the type of British deterrent weapons and their utility—and this notwithstanding the fact that London and Washington both concurred in the desirability of Britain's entry into the European Economic Community.

Not that these vexed topics were unrelated. After joining the new Europe—an incipient economic union which promises to become a political union in the future—Britain could not, in the nature of things, maintain a deterrent of its own. For the independent deterrent symbolizes the utmost in autonomy and, as integration waxed, British autonomy would have waned. But, if

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the "Europeanization" of Britain would curtail Britain's autonomy, was this a move that the United States should have ever favored? It was not. For Britain could not be "Europeanized" without grave damage to American interests in many corners of the earth.

As long as France retains an independent deterrent, it may be difficult—even for a Labour Government—to let the British deterrent, now assigned to NATO, wither away. In any event, since the British deterrent has always been coordinated with the overall U.S. deterrent, it was the independent French deterrent to which the United States objected more strenuously. By the Nassau Agreement of 1962, the British have shown that, whatever they might do, they will not merge their deterrent with the nascent French *force de dissuasion*. And if the British will not "Europeanize" their deterrent—it is here that Nassau confirmed General de Gaulle's long-standing suspicions of the English-speaking peoples—they will not be disposed wholly to "Europeanize" themselves.

About much else the President of France has been in error. From French sabotage of American leadership in the Western alliance the French people would suffer as greatly as any. But General de Gaulle was not wrong when he noted that, in keeping with historic overseas interests, Britain must still look beyond the new Europe, and that she will have to shake off her overseas bonds if she is to be, in his sense, authentically European. Lest Anglo-American affinities thwart him, he thwarted them: that is the real meaning of the French veto at Brussels. Yet what does the Anglo-American connection mean? The French know its meaning and dislike it. But how well do the English-speaking peoples themselves grasp the inwardness of their connection?

II

Since World War I, British policy and British interests have not invariably coincided. Similar discrepancies in the conduct of American affairs have afflicted the West, although some of these can still be put right. Nothing demands fresh thought more, if Anglo-American interaction is to remain a positive factor, than the role of Britain. British political independence, together with the geographical detachment of the British Isles from European neighbors, has been one of the rudiments of a Free World order for which, in two world wars, the United States has had good

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cause to be grateful. Now that the United States herself is the principal guarantor of European security and the defense of the West, Britain's position in Anglo-American relations has changed. In addition, the United States, which facilitated the recovery of Europe, is now discomfited by certain European trends. This makes it all the more necessary for her to recall that, among her chief transatlantic allies, Britain is still the one with which, despite many divergencies, some basic unison is most apt to endure. It could not endure, however, if the residual power of Britain had, in consonance with Washington's own precepts, been undercut.

Nothing would have done as much to diminish Britain's residual power as that "Europeanization" of Britain about which, as it happened, official London and official Washington have been in accord—and with which, in the long run, Anglo-American interests would have been at odds. Dean Acheson stirred up a hornet's nest when he said that Britain's role as a major ally, supported by Anglo-American and Commonwealth ties, was about played out. Nevertheless, some of those who rebuked him had themselves, in advancing the case for "Europeanization," been playing down those very ties. None of this impressed General de Gaulle. If the British role supported by Anglo-American and Commonwealth ties had indeed been played out, he would not have reacted as firmly as he did.

Strange, all the same, is the company in which so eminent a custodian of the French heritage can now be found. The Tsar Nicholas II railed against Anglo-American friendship before he aligned himself with Edwardian Britain; at the turn of the century the Emperor William II did what he could to disrupt transatlantic amity, a force which contributed greatly to the undoing of that monarch's Nazi heir; its latent strength has puzzled Stalin and Khrushchev. France herself owes much to the overseas factors that sustained Britain's position in two world wars.

Britain's great debate has confused many. While the public's attention has been fixed upon the economics of British membership in the Common Market, the politics of British entry was uppermost in the mind of official London and official Washington. The Kennedy Administration reasoned that American negotiations with the Common Market would have borne richer fruit if Britain could have joined and, with her broader background, could have counteracted autarchic European tendencies from

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within. An Atlantic partnership has been President Kennedy's goal, together with the reduction of obstacles to trade within the Free World as a whole. Fear of trade discrimination by the Common Market evoked the Kennedy proposals for lower tariffs. But Washington, it is clear, has also been anticipating other anti-American ventures by this new, free-wheeling European combination.

For keeping a united Europe on an even keel the United States has relied upon a British stabilizer. Nor is she alone in relying upon Britain's steadying influence. Domination by their own senior European partners is not a state of affairs that the Belgians, the Dutch, the Luxembourgers and the Italians will relish. And what, they may inquire, will post-Gaullist France be like; how robust is the attachment of the Bonn Republic to the West; how far to the Left will Italy herself be moving? A British presence to redress the European balance would have reassured them. It was precisely because General de Gaulle did not want the European balance thus redressed that he objected to the British presence.

Yet how effective could be the British presence if, upon "Europeanization," overseas sources of British strength—Commonwealth ties, Anglo-American friendship, and other world-wide links which have lent Britain weight beyond the immediate physical resources of the British Isles—had been allowed to dry up? In a European union no integrated component could be the hub of an oceanic complex or possess its own individual means of playing an important part in Europe itself. The problem would be less disconcerting if Britain could retire into her own shell and, like Sweden or Switzerland, permit the burdens of world order to rest entirely on other shoulders. But what suits lesser neutrals will not suit a small island in the North Sea with a much bigger population, a welfare state to be financed, improved mass living standards to be maintained and an important part still to be played in European and world politics. Over the continuance of British influence across the Channel, London and Washington have been at one with each other. But they have been far from explicit on the prerequisites for keeping alive Britain's influence.

III

These vagaries are not inexplicable. When autocracies operate abroad, they seek to deceive others; democracies, on the other hand, are prone to deceive themselves. In their approach to the

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new Europe, London and Washington have been actuated by motives that neither could frankly avow. Hence their ambivalence. The conviction that they would "run the show" prompted the advocates of "Europeanization" among the British. The U.S. desire that the British should assume a leading position in Europe stemmed, in part at least, from Third Force trends which Washington may have detected in the Common Market.

Misgivings about some of those European trends had been entertained by weaker members of the Common Market before the British, under an edict from the Elyseé in Paris, were debarred from it. Negotiations for a political union—even for one as limited as General de Gaulle contemplated—have, therefore, again been postponed. But the Common Market may not stand still. For making it work, for getting the most out of it, supranational devices are needed. Could an integrated Britain have been extricated from the accelerating growth of European supranational institutions? She could not. For the Common Market's gravitational pull would have proven irresistible. And none should have realized this better than the Americans themselves.

In endorsing the close integration of Western Europe, the United States has been more European than the Europeans. And yet she herself is the chief example of how centralizing impulses take over when, in a large territorial expanse, the dynamics of bigness hold sway. In the loose-knit American economy of the nineteenth century, a Civil War had to be fought before states' rights could be subordinated to an overall federal sovereignty. Centralizing impulses in Western Europe today do not resemble those over which Americans spilled their blood a century ago. But while integration can be achieved by a number of methods and under a variety of labels, its consequences will be much the same—the eventual subordination of Europe's nation-states to a central authority.

While a continental environment has been the mold for American politics, Britain made her mark in an oceanic complex. Free countries as vast as the United States, Canada and Australia might never have attained national unity without some federalizing machinery. But while the British have conferred federal systems on others, they themselves, in their tiny, compact island, have had little direct experience with the theory and practice of federalism.

Many in Britain and in the United States could not readily

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discern the implications of British membership in the Common Market. In its "grand design" for a United States of Europe, the United States of America saw a projection of its own federative experience. At the same time, nevertheless, Washington sought to protect American interests in the prospective European federation by ensuring within it a place for Great Britain. Perhaps the United States acted in such a manner because, in American endeavors, doubt and faith have been commingled.

The "Europeanization" of Britain would, in American eyes, have reduced two alternative hazards: Britain could have supported France in a United Europe should the West Germans ever be tempted to defect to the East. Conversely, Britain could have backed the United States if a European Third Force, under Franco-German hegemony, attempted to seize the leadership of the West or make a separate settlement with the Soviets.

It is the global and regional guarantees provided by the United States which have made it possible for any future Third Force even to contemplate an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Moreover, while France might consider herself the senior partner, it would be the Bonn Republic that would stand to gain the most in a Third Force. German reunification has been the aim of the Bonn Republic and its allies but only Moscow can bring this about. Until the Soviets are ready to strike a bargain acceptable to Bonn, the West Germans have nothing to lose by remaining firmly linked to the West.

The two Germanys could not be reunited, either under the auspices of the West or the East, without France being dwarfed. Thus, which alternative becomes, for the French, the lesser evil: accepting American leadership or threatening her own position in Europe through a Third Force policy? The hegemony of France in noncommunist Europe has been the Gaullist objective. By their policies, however, the French may unwittingly help to foster German predominance in Europe.

What would the Soviet Union gain from German reunification or from a Third Force movement in which a greater Reich is the master? NATO would have been dislodged at last from Western Europe. But the Soviet Union would have had to abandon the economic and strategic control of East Germany. Moreover, the resurgence of a greater Germany could not be taken with equanimity by the people of the Soviet Union and her captive states.

The Soviet Union, distracted by the Communist Chinese, may

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wish to have its rear in Europe reinsured. In the nuclear age, it will also be vulnerable on the world front; thus, a settlement with the United States rather than with a Third Force in Europe is what the Soviet Union needs most. A European Third Force, causing a grave shift in power balances against the West, might only be hoist with its own petard. In such a situation, Anglo-American friendship would become more than ever the mainstay of the West.

IV

Had the ill-fated negotiations for British membership in the Common Market succeeded, the Anglo-American accord might have been dealt a fatal blow. Anglo-American friendship has been a cardinal factor in the world politics of the twentieth century. But this relationship could not have survived the "Europeanization" of Britain. An integrated Britain would have forfeited her autonomy and would have abandoned her overseas sources of residual strength. Moreover, Britain, as a federated unit, could not have played the part of European stabilizer envisaged for her by the United States. For such a role Britain would have needed considerable leverage for maneuver—a condition unlikely to exist in the Common Market when it becomes, as it must if it is to flourish, a tightly-knit union.

Organic European links would have been incompatible with an updated version of Britain's classic European role: *la puissance mediatrice*. Those who sought to revive this role for Britain would have been among the foremost in stifling it. Now, thanks to President de Gaulle's veto, Britain may yet retain the necessary latitude. Yet Britain can only function as a European regulator if she eschews a full commitment to Europe and if she maintains a certain detachment from Europe. A synthesis of the European with the non-European is a clue to British statecraft in modern times. Britain could not be "Europeanized" without the breakdown of that crucial synthesis, and she could not have carried weight in a federalized Europe as if such a synthesis remained intact.

The question of Britain's future bears directly upon U.S. leadership of the Free World. World-wide contacts have bolstered the status of Britain in Europe. Widespread would be the repercussions if Britain were to join a European federation. The Commonwealth would fall apart. The more militant "Europeanizers" among the British themselves took for granted the disruption of

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the Commonwealth; and what this might entail has never worried Americans in public life. Yet such thinking lacked vision. The interest of the United States, as the leader of the West, lies in the prosperity and growth of all Commonwealth countries. Nevertheless, the United States has long fought against Commonwealth trade preferences. Washington was as blind as London to the dislocations in the Commonwealth which would have attended the "Europeanization" of Britain.

The political consequences would not have been the same for all other members of the Commonwealth. Britain's older overseas partners might have forged closer links with the United States. The U.S. has already underwritten, through the ANZUS Pact and SEATO, the security of Australia and New Zealand. Intimate strategic and economic bonds, under which Canada often chafes, link the United States and her Commonwealth neighbor to the North. These two North American countries may form even closer ties, should Britain join the Common Market. Yet in such an eventuality Canada's political independence might be impaired, for Commonwealth links have provided Canada with a counterpoise against even greater penetration by her giant American neighbor. With the "Europeanization" of Britain, this counterpoise having vanished, Canadians would be even more hard-pressed to maintain a national identity.

In Asia and Africa, on the other hand, the Commonwealth nexus could not be ruptured without the frustration of some of America's own global policies. When key powers of Africa and Asia still value their membership in the Commonwealth, none in the West should discourage them. The United States, together with Britain and others in the West, has spent huge sums to strengthen India and thus to preserve in that populous Asian land the British legacy of parliamentary democracy. Although the Commonwealth has not always enjoyed Prime Minister Nehru's esteem, he displayed a more sympathetic attitude during Britain's negotiations with the Common Market and when, in the autumn of 1962, the Chinese communists crossed the Himalayan frontiers of India.

Underdeveloped countries may be more handicapped than at present without an adequate substitute for existing Commonwealth trading agreements. The result could be realignments in Africa and Asia which the United States, together with Britain and others in the West, would long regret. The Commonwealth

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has served as a bridge between the Occident and the Orient. Since the departure of South Africa in 1961, its value in the eyes of Africans and Asians has increased. The Soviets must envy the ease with which the West, through the Commonwealth, retains links with nations voluntarily joined in an association that cuts across so many barriers of geography and culture, race and creed. If such is the case, the West should not actively strive to shorten the life expectancy of the Commonwealth. Whatever Washington and London do to promote the merger of Britain with its European neighbors will disrupt the Commonwealth, and thus divide, not unite, an important segment of the Free World.

V

Such, however, has been the irony of events that only through the *folie de grandeur* in Paris have London and Washington been saved from their own peculiar brands of folly. The respite thus obtained should enable them to put Anglo-American friendship in proper perspective. No other factor in the defense of Western civilization has proved so durable as this Anglo-American relationship. But the conditions under which it can endure must be understood. If they had been understood, the "Europeanization" of Britain could not have been depicted as a forward step when, in point of fact, it would have been a step backward.

With a better grasp of the nature of Anglo-American friendship, journalists and other commentators, both in the United States and Britain, might not take periodic differences between the two allies quite so tragically. The U.S. did not support Britain during the Suez crisis. Britons criticized the United States when, in 1962, the Kennedy Administration insisted upon the removal of Soviet offensive missiles from Cuba. Not a few British observers failed to perceive that the U.S. citadel of Western power could not be imperiled without the freedom of the West as a whole being placed in jeopardy. This the Macmillan Government sensed, although most British opinion media were loath to acknowledge so basic a principle of Western security. Resentments that were the product of the Suez crisis flared up in some British quarters, and the unilateral nuclear disarmers engaged in neutralist and anti-American agitation. Yet such escapist upsurges quickly subsided, for the majority of Englishmen realized that in the Cuban missile crisis Britain's interest lay with that of the United States.

The Skybolt controversy quickly followed the Khrushchev

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Cuban missile gambit. Out of it, under the Nassau Agreement, came the proposal to establish a NATO deterrent based on Polaris missiles. This President de Gaulle rejected. Unlike many in Britain and the United States, the French President detected in the Nassau Agreement a new manifestation of Anglo-American friendship; De Gaulle saw in the agreement an instrument for the renewal of accord between the two chief English-speaking allies. A *démarche* for nipping the French deterrent in the bud could not win President de Gaulle's assent. More dramatically, by crystallizing French objections to the British phase of American policy in Europe, the Nassau Agreement also precipitated the Gaullist blackball of British entry into the Common Market.

Such episodes serve to point up one salient characteristic of the Anglo-American relationship. In the fundamentals of Anglo-American friendship, there has, from generation to generation, been no change. Friction between the United States and Britain must, by every test, be distinguished from friction with Gaullist France and any that arises with the Bonn Republic. Unlike France, Britain, by and large, accepts American leadership. Unlike West Germany, Britain has no unsatisfied territorial aspirations. Anglo-American divergencies are differences of degree rather than of kind. With the "Europeanization" of Britain, a separate Anglo-American relationship would have been eliminated. To this relationship, civilized society owes much; the fact that it has not been extinguished, that it can still be reactivated, should be reassuring.

This is not to say that all Britons have accepted without reservation the leadership of the United States. One important, if unpublicized, hypothesis of the so-called "Marketeers" was that a role as first among Europeans equals might have been less irksome to Britain than that of junior partner to the United States. Their emphasis upon Europe coincided outwardly with American promptings and proddings; nevertheless, discontent with American leadership, a kind of British Gaullism, is what spurred some Britons to urge British membership in the Common Market. But could Britain, in place of her special relationship with the United States, have stood first in Western Europe? Britain had not negotiated with the Common Market from a position of strength. After President de Gaulle vetoed her application, the impotence of those in the Six who opposed French policy was all too apparent. Britain, in order to exert influence in Europe, must draw upon sources of strength beyond Europe.

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VI

The question remains as to the future of Anglo-American relations. The most constructive response should come from the United States. But concurrent reassessments in Britain must take place.

It is essential, first of all, that Americans and Britons alike see the Commonwealth as it is. It is not an entity apart from Britain; Britain is also a Commonwealth country—a point often glossed over. Commonwealth devotees, on the other hand, must understand why the notion of a self-sufficient Commonwealth is so illusory. Trade is not the only field in which self-sufficiency would be infeasible; defense is another. Most Afro-Asian members are neutralist, while Britain, Canada, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand have strategic arrangements of their own with the United States. It is, in fact, because Commonwealth ties and Anglo-American friendship are so interwoven that, for Britain, each of these vital relationships must form part of a single comprehensive whole.

It has been suggested that organic links between Britain and Continental Europe are impossible if Britain is to remain as the hub of an oceanic complex, a role which is, for numerous reasons, in the American interest. But the same argument may be stated in another way. Britain, one may contend, can remain the center of an oceanic complex only so long as the United States retains the leadership of the West and only so long as the conditions for Anglo-American friendship (a prime element in American primacy) are preserved.

American leadership of the West would be hamstrung by a U.S. withdrawal from Western Europe. If the United States does not help to maintain the European balance, the global balance will shift against her. Regardless of the Gaullist analysis, an American commitment to Europe is still a *sine qua non* of U.S. security. Britons, as well as other Europeans, can take comfort from this reality which has guided U.S. policy since World War II.

There is one argument which, more than all others, bespeaks the value to Britain of Anglo-American friendship. The critics of the U.S.—those who believe that the merits of American leadership are outweighed by its demerits—are numerous. Yet the more enigmatically the new Europe behaves, the more imperative will become strong American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance and the Free World. Britain, because she has access through her "special relationship" to U.S. leadership, retains an influence in

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U.S. policy formulation beyond that of her Continental neighbors. She could not possess this unique access if she were to be absorbed into the web of European integration. It is by clinging to her special relationship with the United States that Britain may still play an important part in Europe and elsewhere.

As a full member of the Common Market, Britain would have made sacrifices which would not have been in her own interests or those of the United States or the Commonwealth. An associate membership, on the other hand, might have permitted Britain to reap economic advantages without sundering cherished Commonwealth and Anglo-American ties. But such an economic solution would have denied Britain a seat in the inner political sanctum of a newly integrated Europe. London and Washington were reluctant to settle for less.

VII

When President de Gaulle excluded Britain from the Common Market and rebuffed the Anglo-American proposal for a French contribution to a NATO deterrent, Washington was in no mood to turn the other cheek. But the United States was prudent not to aggravate tensions within the Atlantic Alliance. Even without American advice, Europeans might come to realize the futility of a Third Force. France, moreover, holds a vital geographical position within NATO. The Franco-German *rapprochement* ends a feud in which not only both parties have paid with their blood and treasure, but so has the West as a whole. Unresolved, however, is the question whether Brussels is to become the economic center of the Western world. It is difficult to envisage American political leadership if the U.S. forfeits to the new Europe the economic leadership of the West.

Issues such as these could never have arisen in the days of the Marshall Plan. It was the very success of that great American undertaking which has brought them to the fore. At the top of the Kennedy Administration's agenda are programs for stimulating American economic growth. The U.S. must also halt the deficit in its balance of payments if American investment abroad is not to be further curtailed and if American tariffs are not to be raised. One solution lies in the assumption by European countries of a greater portion of the burden of Western aid and defense. Unfortunately, the more "inward looking" America's allies become, the less can the United States, as the leader of the West, afford to cut back its own military expenditures and assistance programs.

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The U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 marked the first step toward that Atlantic Partnership of which President Kennedy has spoken. The absence of Britain from the EEC narrows the range of negotiations between the Common Market and the United States. But perhaps opportunities will still open up for sweeping tariff reductions when GATT members assemble in May 1964. Benefits which flow from American negotiations with the Common Market will be shared by Britain, by the European Free Trade Association and by overseas members of the Commonwealth—as well as by other countries from Japan to Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. But what if it proves as arduous for the United States to negotiate an economic accord with the Common Market as it was for Britain to obtain entry? If it does, the case for exploring other economic alternatives would have been strengthened.

The course which an American initiative may take cannot yet be forecast. Washington regarded the Common Market as a steppingstone toward freer trade throughout the noncommunist world. To achieve this objective, the United States might now sponsor world commodity agreements which, in turn, might alleviate the poverty of underdeveloped countries and thereby provide a fillip for international trade as a whole.

Since the Marshall Plan, Washington has fostered an economic regrouping in Western Europe. Now the United States may have to organize an economic regrouping elsewhere in the Free World. Such a countervailing effort will wring anguished cries from protectionist elements in the United States and in Europe. Protectionist elements, however, must reassess their interests in the light of broader U.S. and Western imperatives. But there must first be a reconsideration within the Kennedy Administration as to the future of the Common Market. The new Europe has revealed that a venture which is progressive in theory may prove regressive in practice. To attain its goals, the United States may find in older friendships and combinations the best means for accomplishing her objectives.

The United States, if it were to follow such a course, might ease Britain's problems created by her rejection in Brussels. Then, Britain could reinvigorate her Commonwealth ties. Canada, Australia and New Zealand might reconcile their defense commitments to the United States with their attachments to Britain. Neutralist members of the Commonwealth might feel less isolated.

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The United States would have found a way out of the impasse resulting from the failure of the Common Market negotiations. The Kennedy Administration would thus strengthen Britain, its closest major ally, while also adding to the stability of the Free World as a whole.

The future of the Atlantic Partnership which President Kennedy has advocated may still be in question. It will differ from the project envisaged by those who urged Britain to join the Common Market. But, should the U.S. undertake initiatives outside the Common Market to fortify the Free World, the aberrant Third Force tendencies of a united Europe might also in time diminish. An Atlantic Partnership could bind together all of Western Europe with a broader grouping of Commonwealth countries and the United States. Such an arrangement would fulfill one of the great desiderata of the age by preserving, not destroying, those many and various ties which link free peoples within and beyond the Atlantic world.

More likely than not, differences of emphasis will continue to enliven the Anglo-American connection. We study the past in vain if we do not expect these differences. Yet the Anglo-American connection remains, as in times past, an inestimable boon to the West. Of all major allies, Britain is the one country whose interests are most similar to those of the United States. History may judge adversely those in Washington and London who in recent years have been tempted, albeit with the best intentions, to undermine one of the cornerstones of Western security.

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THE U.S. PLAN FOR A NATO NUCLEAR DETERRENT

by Christopher Emmet

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S attempt to build an independent French national nuclear deterrent at any cost, followed by his veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market and his criticism of the United States' European policies, forced upon the Kennedy Administration a reappraisal of its designs for the defense of Europe. The result has been a compromise plan intended to satisfy our NATO allies that we do not propose to retain permanently our total nuclear monopoly. Furthermore, since the three other leading NATO allies—Britain, France and the U.S.—possess national nuclear forces, some form of multilateral nuclear force has to be devised to prevent the Germans from being cast in the role of second-class allies—the mere foot soldiers of NATO. Conversely, it is necessary to still the fears which would be aroused by an independent German national nuclear force, which would play into the hands of communist propaganda and anti-bomb agitation in the West.

The American plan proffered at least a small olive branch to De Gaulle: he was offered a chance to merge all or part of his *force de frappe,* when it has become operational, into a genuinely multilateral NATO force which would not be dominated by the United States.

Such a force would require amendment of the McMahon Act which forbids the sharing of U.S. nuclear secrets. It will take some time to persuade Congress to amend this act, and evidence of a workable plan acceptable to most of our allies will increase Congressional willingness to do so. For this reason, as our allies realize, the present U.S. offer is only a first step.

Viewed in this light, the Nassau offer to set up a NATO interallied nuclear deterrent and also a multilateral nuclear deterrent within NATO (two different things) was the best possible temporary solution. The interallied deterrent was the most publicized of the Nassau agreements. The U.S. undertook to supply the British with Polaris missiles to replace the Skybolt, and to assist them to build a Polaris submarine fleet, so that Britain would have a nuclear force which could function after the present British manned bombers become obsolete. The agreement was that the

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British would place these nuclear forces under the supreme NATO command, with the proviso that the British could use them on their own in case of some dire national emergency.

The multilateral NATO force of submarines or ships, probably with mixed crews and commanders, provides a framework which can be expanded to become truly multilateral when and if Congress gives its consent. Actually, this involves no military delay because the Polaris submarine and/or nuclear surface fleets will not be available for several years.

Once U.S. nuclear secrets and control of nuclear warheads can be shared, the use of mixed crews will become unimportant and may prove inefficient. But the mixed crew plan is at least a useful goal at this stage, because it symbolizes the idea of a truly NATO operation.

Nevertheless, as expected, not only the French, but American critics of the Kennedy Administration, have had a field day in ridiculing the present inadequacies of the plan. Such criticism is based on the assumption that the plan is now in its final form. Walter Lippmann's idea that all German NATO personnel must be excluded from *any* NATO nuclear force until Germany is unified is clearly incompatible with the NATO alliance.[1] Cyrus Sulzberger, writing from Paris, claims that there is a genuine European demand for a nuclear deterrent independent of the U.S.[2]

However, the fact remains that the main expression of this supposed "European demand" so far comes from Americans or Frenchmen. Moreover, it seems to come largely from Frenchmen who are naturally preoccupied with the problem of how to arrive at a solution acceptable to President de Gaulle, and from Americans preoccupied with considerations of domestic politics, although there are also some qualified nonpartisan critics.

In the Common Market countries outside of France, most of the press and the politicians have been criticizing De Gaulle's attitude toward NATO, the United States and Britain even more outspokenly than he has been criticized in America. Also the governments of Italy and Germany, the two leading Continental countries next to France, have indicated their approval of the multilateral deterrent and Germany has tentatively offered to contribute large sums to its fulfillment. Italian approval now, of course, depends on the attitude of the new government.

[1] *New York Herald Tribune,* May 9, 1963.
[2] *New York Times,* May 1, 1963.

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Skepticism has been expressed in the European and U.S. press about the military inadequacies of the U.S. plan, but these shortcomings result from the fact that the plan remains incomplete. The Administration cannot make public promises that Congress will share our nuclear control. However, the government has a perfect right to assure our allies privately that it will urge Congressional action at the appropriate time, and that Congress will probably consent. In any event, if there has been some criticism of the NATO plan, there has been little demand for a European deterrent except as a device to propitiate De Gaulle and persuade him to give a modicum of support to NATO. This is different from a demand for a purely European deterrent, for its own sake.

The Monnet Plan

There is one voice in favor of a European rather than a NATO multilateral deterrent which commands almost as much attention outside Europe as any of the governments: the voice of Jean Monnet, the great French opponent of De Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market. In a recent interview with the Milan newspaper, *Corriere della Sera,* Monnet urged a European deterrent which included Britain as part of a necessary effort to overcome "the crisis of confidence" caused by the veto. He stated:

> It is difficult to conceive that the people of Europe will engage themselves toward a common economic destiny without engaging themselves toward a common political destiny, and, necessarily, that leads them to have a common defense. England is part of Europe. It is obvious that she must participate in the common defense. . . .
>
> But to assure European defense, the participation of the United States is necessary. For that indispensable participation to be established on a durable basis, there must be developed a relationship of equal partners between the United States and Europe. . . .
>
> This relationship of equal partners must be applied to the responsibilities of the common defense. It requires, among other things, the organization of a European atomic force, including England, and in partnership with the United States.[3]

As an economist, Monnet naturally gives priority to the fortunes of the Common Market. For this reason, he is willing to offer a political and military concession to De Gaulle—that is, a purely European nuclear deterrent, excluding America, but including Britain, under which De Gaulle might be willing to place all or

[3]As reported in the *New York Times,* April 8, 1963.

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part of his *force de frappe,* and in return for which he might soften his terms for Britain's entry into the Common Market.

The fact that Monnet's plan is primarily a formula for a compromise with De Gaulle is no reflection on its worth. Since some compromise is probably indispensable, this may eventually prove the best one from the point of view of all concerned. However, in deciding how urgent any immediate change in the multilateral nuclear force plans may be, the question of how much our non-French European friends really want a purely European deterrent for its own sake, and not merely as a sop to the General, is highly pertinent. For there is no assurance that De Gaulle will accept Monnet's terms for admitting Britain into the Common Market at an early date, which is part of the bargain; in any event, there will have to be long negotiations with the British. According to recent inspired reports from Paris,[4] General de Gaulle feels that it would be another ten years before the unity of Europe has advanced to the point where it could efficiently control a nuclear deterrent. This attribution, presumably, was meant to answer Jean Monnet.

Moreover, it will be easier to obtain the approval of the U.S. Congress for sharing American nuclear secrets with a NATO group in which the U.S. has an equal or leading voice, than with a European group from which the U.S. is excluded. Thus, the European independent nuclear force inevitably involves a delay in solving the immediate problems—U.S. nuclear predominance and the prohibition against West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons—while the U.S. plan does begin to solve them now. *There is no reason why the plans for a NATO nuclear deterrent could not eventually be diverted into a European nuclear deterrent if our allies really desire it.* Even that most outspoken advocate of continued U.S. control of NATO's nuclear force, Dean Acheson, writing in the January issue of *Foreign Affairs,* holds the door open for changes in the future when he says "the control of nuclear weapons is impossible to solve at the moment because of intractable differences between the allies, which for their solution *require, in part, the erosion of time.*" (Emphasis added.) Later, he says, "It should surprise no one if the need for supranational organizations grew fast in this forcing bed." A truly multilateral NATO nuclear deterrent would be such an organization.

Naturally, such a goal will not be easy to attain, but nothing is

[4]See Max Frankel's dispatch to the *New York Times,* May 27, 1963.

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easy in this field. A truly multilateral nuclear force would not only require the U.S. to give up its secrets, its monopoly control, and even its veto, but would require the European participants to abandon their own vetoes so that there can be majority decisions laying down the conditions under which the force will be used, and delegating to a viable command structure, say of three men, the power to "pull the trigger." This goal will be achieved only in stages, if at all. The first stage would probably involve the delegation of the power of decision to the three or four nations contributing most to the NATO multilateral force—one of which would be the U.S.—with each of these powers retaining its veto. Even so, three or four "fingers on the trigger" are preferable to fifteen.

There are other reasons why we cannot start now with plans for a European nuclear force. Britain cannot possibly join the Common Market until after the next election, which will probably not take place for a year or eighteen months. If Labour wins, there is certain to be a longer delay, since a Labour victory will make the negotiations much more difficult. We must remember that Monnet has not urged a European nuclear deterrent without Britain; Britain's entry into the Common Market is part of his proposed package.

Further, a so-called European nuclear deterrent without British or American participation would either appear in practice to be a French dominated nuclear force, or a Franco-German dominated nuclear force. Germany's participation in the control of a nuclear force in which its weight would only be counterbalanced by France might induce fear that nuclear weapons were being placed in German hands, or at least in hands which the Germans might dominate after the departure of De Gaulle. In any case, communist propaganda all over Europe would make the most of this contingency, however remote, as their vicious attacks on the Franco-German treaty indicate. A NATO deterrent in which the U.S. as well as Britain would participate would be less vulnerable to communist exploitation of latent fears of a German militarist revival.

Political Advantages of a NATO Force

Even if Monnet's plan for a European nuclear force including Britain were eventually accepted, it has another possible disadvantage as compared to a NATO force. The military contributions and cooperation of the United States and West Germany form the

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backbone of the NATO ground defense of Western Europe. Placing the control of the tactical as well as strategic nuclear weapons which the German troops could use under a purely European command (even if it were under the NATO "umbrella"), would tend to weaken the present intensive American-German military cooperation. It could also reduce the unity and effectiveness of NATO by introducing a new group into an already complex command structure. This might not be true in theory, but it would probably be true in practice, for psychological reasons.

At least it could lessen the present direct defense contacts between Americans and Germans. Any lessening of these contacts seems regrettable because the U.S. and West Germany, among the NATO allies, pursue the firmest policies against communist aggression along the entire spectrum of the Cold War, from Berlin and Eastern Europe to Cuba and Laos. For example, Britain and France favored an even "softer" approach in Laos than that of the Kennedy Administration. And in the recent vote in the UN General Assembly on accepting, for the first time, the credentials of the Hungarian communist delegates, the British and French voted affirmatively while the United States at least reserved its position—a gesture feeble enough, considering past UN resolutions on Hungary.

In some respects, General de Gaulle has taken a stronger stand than President Kennedy on Berlin, but it has been largely a matter of words rather than deeds. De Gaulle, probably wisely, refused to take part in talks with the Soviets on the issue of Berlin alone, on the ground that it is a sign of weakness to initiate such talks while Soviet threats and blackmail continue. On the other hand, France contributed nothing to the military build-up in 1961, which certainly played a key part in Khrushchev's decision to abandon the plan to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, to which he was publicly committed. Of the military build-up spurred by the Berlin crisis, including the large increase in NATO's ground forces, 90 per cent was provided by the United States from 3,000 miles away, despite its balance of payments deficit.

On certain issues U.S. policy is more firmly anti-communist than that of West Germany, for example, on the control of East-West trade in strategic or semi-strategic goods. During the spring of 1963, the U.S., supported by the NATO Council, appealed to the German government to cancel the oil pipe deal between some German steel makers and the Soviet Union. The German govern-

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ment loyally followed the NATO Council's request, but it had to do so against a majority of the Bundestag. President Kennedy has stood firm, in words as well as deeds, on the *fundamentals* of the Berlin question.

The present trend in both Britain and Italy is to support a softer policy in relations with the Soviet Union on such issues as increased East-West trade in what are really strategic goods, e.g., Soviet oil. They also have favored weakening our demands for inspection on a nuclear test ban treaty or future disarmament agreements; have been reluctant to control their shipping to Castro's Cuba; and have spoken of the possibility of recognizing the Ulbricht regime.

The Germans and the Greeks were the only allies which fully responded to U.S. requests on shipping to Cuba during the crisis in the fall of 1962, just as the United States was the only NATO power which responded in full measure to the Berlin crisis. Thus, a European nuclear force, which would tend in some respects to reduce the unity and importance of NATO, would partly isolate Germany from her strongest and firmest ally, and incorporate Germany into a European alliance, where both Italy after the recent elections and England perhaps under a Labour government would probably press for recognition of East Germany. In the light of the past, French policy even under De Gaulle would be rather unpredictable, still more so under his successors.[5]

The leftward political trends in some other European countries are all the more important when one considers that German policy itself has been weakening with the approach of Chancellor Adenauer's resignation and under the impact of a series of Social Democratic victories in state elections. The combination of the *Spiegel* affair, which discredited the most brilliant young minister in the Chancellor's cabinet, together with the dispute over Adenauer's successor, have contributed to this decline. The trend of the elections and opinion polls makes it entirely possible that after the next elections the German government may be a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, which formed the majority in the debate over the oil pipe issue.

[5]Nobody knows the present efficiency, morale or political orientation of the French Army, with its officer corps split by bitter feuds and purges. Many Europeans are deeply concerned with this uncertainty. One may also mention the possible security weakness in a purely European nuclear force in view of past communist espionage in Britain, France and Germany, especially Britain. The U.S. has not been immune, but our security record, especially in nuclear matters, has been better. Fuchs and Pontocorvo both worked for the British.

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Under these circumstances, it seems all the more unwise, both from the American and European point of view, to weaken America's intimate links with Germany to the slightest degree in these uncertain times. Fortunately, the leaders of the German Social Democratic Party are very friendly to the U.S. and the Kennedy Administration. Thus the close German-American cooperation, begun soon after the end of World War Two, might be continued under a new German government, provided American influence in Europe remains strong and the trend toward the Third Force attitude (which plays some part in the demand for a European nuclear deterrent) does not prevail. Probably the best German political combination for continued close American-German cooperation would be the so-called Great Coalition government, combining the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. Such a government could also best mediate between the U.S. and De Gaulle on both economic and military issues, since the CDU is the most pro-French as well as the most pro-American of the German parties.

The need to keep American influence strong in Germany and Europe is all the greater because the influence of the Vatican and the Catholic Church, which had been the main bulwark against communism and the greatest factor in the movement for European unification promoted by Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi, now may be thrown toward an "opening to the Left" in places other than Italy. There can be little doubt that Pope John's reception of Khrushchev's son-in-law, Azubhei, shortly before the spring 1963 Italian election, and the tremendous publicity this received, inadvertently contributed to the communist success.

Another contributing factor was the failure of the Pope's noble and eloquent Easter encyclical on peace to mention Soviet colonialism in the captive countries of Eastern Europe, while it placed great stress on ending colonialism in Africa and Asia. This helped the communists to heap praise on the Pope's message, even giving rise to talk of awarding him the Stalin Peace Prize. All this was bound to weaken gravely the effect of Pope Pius XII's threat of excommunication against Catholics who vote for the communist party.

Disadvantages of the Force de Frappe

There is also the question of whether an independent European, or a French national, nuclear deterrent would weaken or

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strengthen the West's present deterrent posture. The French argue that while the United States may be prepared to defend Europe even at the risk of U.S. cities now, no one can be sure what the U.S. would do ten years from now; hence a French or European deterrent is necessary. It would be insurance against a U.S. failure to act, and insurance against increasing doubts, both European and Soviet, that we would act—doubts which might encourage Soviet aggression.

Yet the fact remains that, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. deterrent will remain a far greater threat in Soviet eyes than any French or European deterrent. The best purpose our nuclear weapons can serve is to *deter* an attack. The assumption is that the very existence of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the *faith* in U.S. willingness to use it, if necessary, will render its use unnecessary. In short, belief in the probability or even the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation is the basic deterrent against Soviet aggression in Europe. Yet the building of a French or European nuclear force, at immense cost and sacrifice, *can only be justified by the belief that the use of American nuclear power on Europe's behalf will become increasingly doubtful. Will not this "crisis of confidence" inevitably serve further to weaken faith in the American deterrent which, militarily speaking, is what really matters?*

There is another, unspoken French argument. It holds that the use of a French or European nuclear deterrent to defend Europe in the event of a Soviet ground attack would compel the U.S. to use its deterrent. In other words, the French deterrent would automatically trigger the U.S. deterrent. But this argument has three drawbacks. In the first place, it would increase the number of powers in a position to start a nuclear war, and therefore would increase the possibility of nuclear war either by recklessness or by accident. The political uncertainty connected with the succession to De Gaulle enhances these misgivings.

In the second place, since an independent French or European force, at least in its earlier stages, would be capable of wiping out only a few Soviet cities with their entire populations (if it could penetrate Soviet defenses at all), such a force would invite similar murderous retaliation by the Soviets against Western targets whether in Europe or America. In the third place, even if a proper use of the European deterrent in response to a Soviet attack did force the U.S. to use its nuclear power on Europe's side, it could only do so *after* a Soviet ground or nuclear attack on Europe

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had actually started. Yet the whole purpose of the nuclear force is to prevent such an attack from ever being launched.

The question also arises whether the existence of a European nuclear force would not provide an excuse, however flimsy, for the U.S. to stay out of a Soviet-European nuclear war—if we should ever seek such an excuse. If we would not defend Europe because of our treaty pledges and because the defense of Europe is part of the defense of the United States, why should we enter a war simply because a small European nuclear force is already involved —and probably already wiped out? There might even be real American doubts as to whether the use of European nuclear weapons had been unavoidable or premature.

Either the Soviets would turn their nuclear weapons on the U.S. at the start, bringing us into the war automatically, or the European nuclear force would draw the first Soviet strikes against Europe rather than against America. Thus the United States might have some hope of staying out of it, and Europe, not the U.S., might become the number one Soviet target in either a sneak or a wartime attack.

For these reasons the effect of a French-European nuclear force might reduce, rather than increase, the *credibility* of the U.S. deterrent. Therefore, the defensive value of the European nuclear force depends entirely on whether it would be large enough in itself to deter a Soviet attack on Europe.

A French or European force only large enough, perhaps, to wipe out two or three Soviet cities and their millions of inhabitants would not appear adequate to deter a Soviet attack; moreover, it would appear to invite the Soviets to wipe out many more European cities. For Europe to achieve an adequate independent deterrent would require an astronomical expenditure of resources to try to build a force at least remotely equivalent to that of the Soviets, and partly duplicating the immense twenty-year American nuclear effort. Surely a NATO force under multilateral NATO control in which the Europeans would have a majority voice would be infinitely preferable.

Relation of Conventional Forces to the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

In the meantime, since some Europeans fear that the United States would not invite the destruction of American cities by using its strategic nuclear weapons against a Soviet invasion of Europe by conventional forces, the best way to increase confidence

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is to strengthen the NATO conventional forces, as the U.S. and all the NATO commanders have urged.

Most Europeans do not believe that it is politically feasible to raise enough troops to defend Europe by conventional forces alone, hence they are convinced that any war in Europe must become nuclear. However, even if this is true, the more American troops there are in Europe to become engaged in battle with the Soviets in the event of a conventional attack, the more certain the U.S. would be to use its nuclear weapons if the U.S. forces were in danger of capture or destruction. On the other hand, if perchance the NATO conventional forces can hold their own there would be no need for U.S. nuclear support.

An additional important political reason for increasing conventional forces in Europe was mentioned by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in his recent *Foreign Affairs* article:

> The removal of Soviet dominance on the eastern front would also have important political effects. The stability of the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe rests upon this dominance. Present Soviet policy toward East Germany and Berlin would be much more difficult without it. Much of allied hesitations and doubts stems directly from it. The essence of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe is to take action supported by force, as in Hungary and East Germany, confident that no counterforce exists capable of supporting local opposition and that "massive retaliation" by nuclear weapons would be regarded as too hazardous. If the Soviet Union were confronted on its western front with equal conventional forces, and in some localities with superior forces, calculations of actions and risks both in the Soviet Union and in Europe would be very different. Calculations of actions and risks make governmental policy.[6]

Europeans forget that the United States cannot be expected indefinitely to maintain, still less increase, its present manpower in Europe unless the Europeans increase their own manpower contributions to NATO. Nor is it enough for the Germans alone to meet their quotas if the others fail, for there are political dangers in a further increase in the proportion of German troops in NATO.

The key factor in this dilemma is France. General de Gaulle refuses to assign more divisions to NATO and is drastically reducing the French Army to save money for his *force de frappe*. Recently he announced plans to remove his Channel fleet from NATO control. These are the very moves best calculated to force

[6] "The Practice of Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1963, p. 255.

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NATO and the United States to abandon their efforts to create an adequate conventional defense.*

By the same token, these moves are best calculated to increase the risk and the fear that the U.S. nuclear deterrent would not be used to defend Europe. For once it becomes clear that there is no hope of building up NATO's conventional forces for at least a preliminary forward defense in Germany, then NATO will have to fall back on the token or "trip-wire" theory, which would require fewer NATO divisions than are currently available. If that decision is taken, the U.S. might take this opportunity to narrow its balance of payments deficit by removing some of its troops from Europe and falling back on the old strategy of "massive retaliation." Yet without the present prospect of hundreds of thousands of American troops being locked in battle with Soviet troops, if war comes, the Europeans and perhaps the Soviets may believe even less in U.S. nuclear retaliation than they do now.

Thus a vicious circle is being created by the neglect of the European ground forces and by General de Gaulle's *force de frappe,* which is being developed at the expense of his nation's ground forces. Since French policy is unlikely to change in the near future, the best way to break this vicious circle, while awaiting the development of the multilateral nuclear deterrent, is for other members of NATO to increase the number of their NATO divisions, or at least bring them up to full strength. If this is done it will probably be enough to keep U.S. divisions in Europe, since French divisions can be counted upon to join with NATO in time of war, even if De Gaulle does reduce his army.

The inadequacy of the number of NATO divisions would also be partly compensated for by providing them with the improved U.S. tactical nuclear weapons now available. During the first two years of the Kennedy Administration there were misgivings among European defense authorities over Secretary McNamara's allegedly negative attitude toward tactical nuclear weapons. Although there is as yet no agreed doctrine on the use of these weapons, the misgivings have been largely allayed by the reinforcement of our tactical nuclear arsenal in Germany. As Secretary McNamara pointed out to the Society of American Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1963, the firepower of NATO's tactical nuclear forces in Western Europe has been increased by 60 per cent in the last two years.

[**Editor's Note:* For a French point of view on nuclear and conventional forces, see the article by Pierre M. Gallois in this issue.]

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Conclusion

A truly multilateral NATO nuclear deterrent would now be preferable to a purely European one, if it can be built. Therefore, it is important to know if those who call for a European deterrent really speak for European opinion, or if they are yielding to De Gaulle's insistence on excluding the U.S. There is also the question whether the Monnet compromise is the best possible formula to keep France in NATO and to ease Britain into the Common Market. It seems probable that Monnet's plans for a European deterrent will not satisfy De Gaulle; to make him more tractable on NATO and the Common Market we may have to assist him to build the *force de frappe*.

On the other hand, the mounting costs of the French deterrent, including the transfer of French tests from the Sahara to the Pacific, may force the General or his successors to make greater concessions in order to secure American aid, or abandon their national deterrent plans altogether, as the British probably will. However, if the Congress should refuse to share our secrets and give up U.S. control over a NATO deterrent, then a European deterrent would be the only alternative. If it is the only compromise, we must accept it.

All we can achieve now is to design a political compromise formula. This formula, however technically inadequate it may be today, offers reassurance to those who fear that the present trend will soon place nuclear weapons in independent German hands, and goes far to mollify the Germans who naturally refuse to be second-class allies. It will also provide eventually for a sharing among the NATO allies of the control of the nuclear deterrent. To still these fears and give the Europeans some voice in nuclear strategy are matters of great urgency. The Administration's plan is the only one which deals adequately with them now, and still permits a degree of flexibility to meet the contingencies of tomorrow.

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THE COMMON MARKET DEBATE IN BRITAIN

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

SELDOM in Britain's long history has a governmental decision produced a debate of the magnitude of that touched off by Prime Minister Macmillan's announcement that the United Kingdom would apply for membership in the Common Market. In the eighteen months between the Prime Minister's historic speech of July 31, 1961, and General de Gaulle's veto of Britain's application in January 1963, Britishers of all walks of life debated what to them quite rightly was an issue of transcending importance. The Common Market debate in Britain produced divisions within each of the political parties and in the press, as well as among industrialists, economists and trade unionists. The debate had several major focal points: the impact of Common Market membership upon British industry, agriculture, the Commonwealth and Britain's freedom of action in economic policy and foreign relations. It is the purpose of this article to assess the nature of the debate and to trace its course over the period between Britain's application and her exclusion by France.

If Britons devoted much of their time to a consideration of the pros and cons of Common Market membership after July 1961, such was not the case in the preceding year, when the Cabinet was making up its collective mind to join or not to join. Relatively few Britons knew anything about the Common Market. Only in the summer of 1961, immediately preceding the Government's announcement, did British newspapers publish special articles designed to introduce a mass readership to the intricacies of the Treaty of Rome. Nor did the British radio and television media concentrate upon the Common Market in their public affairs programs prior to the Government's announcement. The first major program on the European Economic Community was viewed by the British public on October 18, 1961.[1] In the period before the Government's announcement of July 31, many of Britain's leading newspapers and journals espoused the cause of membership in the Common Market. However, few informed a mass audience about the issues involved in the Common Market question. There were advocates also within trade unions and the

[1]This broadcast was entitled "The Common Market and You," and was produced by Britain's "commercial" television network, Associated-Rediffusion.

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political parties. Numerous supporters could be found in industry and in the civil service.

By and large, knowledge about, and interest in, the Common Market remained the preserve of the few. It was between these groups and the Government that the dialogue on the Common Market took place in the months preceding the British application to join. Those who opposed Britain's signing the Treaty of Rome did not actively promote their cause during this period. The opposition, with the notable exception of the Beaverbrook press, did not muster its forces to present its case until after the Government's application had been made.

I

Those who ranked themselves among the proponents of British membership in the Common Market did so for a variety of reasons. For several years the idea of freer trade in Europe had found favor with a broad segment of Britain's industrialists. As early as 1957, a survey of its members conducted jointly by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the National Union of Manufacturers, and the Federation of British Industries had revealed considerable support for the proposed European Free Trade Area.[2] The failure of the Free Trade Area talks in December 1958, together with the impressive growth of the economies of the Six in comparison with Britain's own laggard performance, had led businessmen to urge the Government to end the rift with the Common Market. Industrial support for the Free Trade Area was transferred without perceptible difficulty to the Common Market despite its more exacting requirements for Britain. In short, businessmen saw in the Common Market gains for themselves and for Britain similar to those they had envisaged from a free trade area. But they did not examine carefully the political implications of Britain signing the Treaty of Rome.

Industrial supporters saw in the European Economic Community a means whereby Britain could benefit from economies of scale. Furthermore, some British businessmen viewed with alarm the prospect that they might lose markets in the Six to Continental competitors, should Britain be placed at a competitive disadvantage by a rising Common Market external tariff.

[2] *A Joint Report on the European Free Trade Area* (London), September 1957.

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Moreover, as the President of the Federation of British Industries suggested, in the European Economic Community

> there will certainly be much greater opportunities for specialization in the larger market; and for concentrating our energies intensively on the things we do best in the knowledge that a really substantial market exists for them. But tariff barriers tend to give rise to excess capacity, and as the barriers disappear, so also will the excess capacity under the sheer pressure of competition. But this is all part of the general pressure towards efficiency which competition exerts, in ensuring that resources are employed where they are most profitable, and production concentrated where it is cheapest.[3]

Thus, in addition to economies of scale and mass markets, British proponents of the Common Market saw advantages resulting from the exposure of Britain's industries to Continental competition.

In the months after the Government's announcement, scores of meetings and study groups of businessmen under the aegis of trade associations, chambers of commerce, and such Europe-oriented organizations as the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement, examined the problems which might confront industries and individual British companies in the Common Market. The proliferation of such informative efforts led one commentator to assert that:

> If any British businessman has not yet attended a Common Market conference, it can hardly have been because of a lack of an invitation. Scarcely a day passes without news of some fresh gathering to discuss the effects of "going into Europe," whether it is a mass jamboree by the seaside or a select house-party of two dozen industrialists in a provincial city.[4]

British business leaders took comfort from the fact that most studies conducted by individual companies, industries or other organizations had concluded that British industry as a whole stood to gain from Britain's membership in the EEC. Moreover, businessmen were quick to observe that in the year preceding Britain's Common Market application, British exports to the Six had risen rapidly. They continued to rise during 1962 as the Common Market debate unfolded.

Undoubtedly, the Government derived satisfaction from the support which its Common Market policy enjoyed among business leaders. Reassuring to the Government also were the activities of

[3]Introductory Address by Sir Norman Kipping at the British Institute of Management Convention (London: Federation of British Industries, May 2, 1962).
[4]Samuel Brittan, "The Nation's Business," The *Observer* (London), May 6, 1962.

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groups such as the Common Market Campaign, whose goal was to generate support for British membership in the EEC. Founded in May 1961 with the backing of Britons whose goal was a "federal" Europe, the Common Market Campaign, by October 1962, had arranged over 200 speaking engagements, had distributed thousands of copies of leaflets and booklets espousing British membership in the Common Market, and had arranged numerous meetings with Members of Parliament.[5] The Campaign's activities ranged from contacts with MP's and Commonwealth Prime Ministers to efforts to form local action groups throughout Britain. In addition to its chairman, Lord Gladwyn, former British Ambassador to France, the Common Market Campaign counted among its membership MP's from all parties.

Literature distributed by the Common Market Campaign stressed several points: that a "medium-sized nation" such as Britain could not stand alone; that British exports to Europe were growing far more rapidly than those to the Commonwealth; that the Six, because of possibilities for economic specialization, would cut their costs and reduce British trade even with Commonwealth countries.[6] The Campaign attempted also to convince Britons that Commonwealth members no longer supported Britain, save when the former metropolitan's policies coincided with their own. But the Campaign's leaders envisaged the growth, over the next decade, of a federal structure in the Six. The Six, with their own foreign policy and nuclear capabilities, would constitute a far greater power than Britain. Therefore, warned the Campaign, using an argument adopted by many other pro-Europeans in Britain, the United States would turn to the Six rather than to Britain as the major American ally in Europe.

II

Each of Britain's political parties contained ardent supporters of Common Market membership even before the Government's announcement of July 31. The Liberal Party, as early as 1960, had placed itself on record officially as favoring a British application to join the EEC. In the Conservative and Labor parties a few MP's counted themselves "Europeans." Officially, however, both parties, with the tacit support of most members in and out

[5]Common Market Campaign, *Report for the Period Ending 18th October 1962*, pp. 2-3.

[6]Common Market Campaign, *Common Market Broadsheet*, No. 7 (August 1962).

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of Parliament, accepted the view which prevailed in Britain before 1961, namely, that Commonwealth obligations prevented the United Kingdom from joining a customs union with her Continental neighbors.

After the Government's decision to apply for membership, however, differences of opinion developed within both major parties. Not a few Conservatives had viewed with misgivings the development of the once predominantly white Commonwealth into an increasingly unwieldy, heterogeneous "club" in which the newer African, together with Asian, members formed a majority. As Britain's grip upon the Commonwealth loosened, she turned elsewhere for friends and markets. Such may have been one of the motivations which led the Conservative Government to apply for membership in the Common Market.

Nevertheless, other Conservatives, as well as Labor Party members, albeit usually for different reasons, viewed with pride Britain's achievements in the Commonwealth. To Conservatives the Commonwealth was the product of an orderly transformation of an empire into self-governing units which retained much of their British heritage and contributed thereby to the stature of Britain in world affairs. No mean achievement, the Commonwealth symbolized Britain's governing genius. Labor Party members, often disdainful of "imperialism," nevertheless took pride in having presided, in the postwar years, over the dissolution of much of the Empire and in their part in the creation, in its place, of a "multi-racial" Commonwealth. For Britain to enter the Common Market would, in the estimation of members of both parties, place in jeopardy much, if not all, of this heritage. Thus, motivations of finance, patriotism and evangelism mingled in the ranks of the Common Market opposition in Britain.

Members of Parliament from all parties led in the setting up of groups with the specific objective of advancing or hindering Britain's bid for membership in the Common Market. The Common Market Campaign counted among its officers Peter Kirk and Roy Jenkins, leaders respectively in the Conservative and Labor parties of factions actively in support of the EEC. Shortly after the formation of the Common Market Campaign, its Labor members assisted in the creation of Labor's own pro-European organization. Both groups worked closely with each other in an effort to gain wider acceptance of a common cause.

Within the Conservative Party itself, however, there was no

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organization comparable to the Labor Common Market Campaign. Cabinet members, including the Prime Minister himself, met with the Conservative Parliamentary Party in efforts to arouse support among wavering backbenchers. Ministers toured the provinces of Britain to make speeches on the merits of Common Market membership, and the issue evoked several full-scale Parliamentary debates, as well as written and oral questions in the House of Commons. Nevertheless, an air of mystery surrounded many of the Government's activities during the tedious and protracted Brussels negotiations. On occasion the press, not without justification, complained that information was being withheld even from Commonwealth governments. The *Times,* for example, rebuked the Government editorially for not making available to fellow Commonwealth members the text of Edward Heath's statement of October 10, 1962 to the Common Market in Brussels. According to British press reports, the same statement, in which Britain declared her readiness "fully to subscribe to the aims and objectives of the (European Economic) Community," had already been leaked by France or another member of the Six to the United States government.[7]

If the Macmillan Cabinet chose deliberately a policy of obfuscation, such a course of action was not without foundation. The Government foresaw considerable difficulty in reconciling its obligations to the Commonwealth and to domestic British interests with the Treaty of Rome. The Government perceived a similar problem with respect to British public opinion. Its policy appears to have been to attempt to keep the Common Market debate in Britain well modulated until the terms of entry became clear, and until Britain was about to sign the Treaty of Rome. Such a strategy, it may have been reasoned, might enhance Britain's bargaining position in Brussels. Otherwise, the Six might raise the entry fee, should the British electorate appear overly eager to join. In any event, the Conservatives waited until the autumn of 1962 to initiate a massive effort designed to place their case for Common Market membership before the electorate. This campaign appears to have had but a small effect upon public opinion in the period immediately preceding the failure of the negotiations in January 1963.

The Common Market debate failed to produce a sizable increase in the percentage of those who favored British membership

[7]The *Times* (London), November 25, 1961.

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in the EEC.[8] Public opinion polls conducted on the eve of the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations did not register a sharp increase in support over that revealed in polls taken at the time of Macmillan's announcement of July 31, 1961. To be sure, the total number of those persons favoring the Common Market increased during the Common Market debate. However, as more and more Britons formed views on this issue, they appear to have ranged themselves in greater numbers on the side of the opponents of British entry into the EEC, rather than joining the ranks of the Common Marketeers.

III

Into the void left by the Government's decision not to stir the electorate prematurely stepped the numerous anti-Common Market groups which formed shortly after Macmillan's announcement of July 31. Participation in such organizations included Conservatives as well as Liberals and members of the Labor Party. One such Conservative, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, a former Minister of Health, spoke out against the Government not only in the House of Commons, but at the first public meeting of the newly formed Anti-Common Market League on October 4, 1961.[9] Several months later, Walker-Smith, together with two other Conservative backbenchers, tabled an amendment to change a House motion. The amendment, which some forty other Conservative Members of Parliament signed, called upon the Government to seek an expansion of Commonwealth trade and not to enter the Common Market without "special arrangements to protect vital interests in the countries of our Commonwealth partnership."[10]

During the spring and summer of 1962 this "Commonwealth Group" within the Parliamentary Conservative Party gained in numbers and took additional steps to publicize its views. One

[8]Polls conducted in Britain by Social Surveys Limited (Gallup Poll) produced responses in which 40 per cent of those questioned on July 31, 1961 favored a British application to join the Common Market. By mid-November 1962, affirmative responses to the same question numbered 42 per cent of those queried. During the debate on the Common Market in Britain support had risen to a high point of 55 per cent in December 1961. In another survey, conducted by National Polls Limited, of those questioned on October 6, 1961, a total of 45.9 per cent favored and 22.6 per cent opposed British membership in the Common Market. On this date 31.5 per cent registered answers of "don't know." When the most recent of this research organization's polls was taken on September 24, 1962, the percentage of respondents favoring Common Market membership had fallen to 40.8, with the percentage in opposition rising to 45.9, and those without opinions declining to 13.3. As in the aforementioned Gallup Poll, National Opinion Polls also registered a high mark (52.8) in mid-December 1961 in terms of British support for the Common Market.

[9]The *Times* (London), October 5, 1961.

[10]*Daily Telegraph* (London), March 26, 1962.

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Conservative MP embarked upon a tour of Commonwealth countries to alert business and political leaders to the dangers which he foresaw from British membership in the EEC. His objective was to arouse opposition to the Common Market on the grounds of Commonwealth interests before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, scheduled to take place in London in September. Another such measure included an open letter to the press, signed by fourteen Conservative Members of Parliament, expressing their displeasure with the terms agreed upon in Brussels for exports of Commonwealth manufactures to Britain, should she join the Common Market. This group feared that such agreements, ending preferences accorded by Britain to these imports, represented a "continual whittling away of the Commonwealth position [which] may in due course break Commonwealth trade on which 40 out of every 100 people in this country depend for their employment."[11] On July 30, moreover, a group of dissident Conservative MP's, many of whom had signed the earlier petition of March 1962, introduced in the House of Commons a motion urging the Government "to insist on definite assurances for Commonwealth trade and on the continuance of the power of sovereign decisions by the British Parliament for our agricultural and horticultural policies."[12]

Such dissension within the Conservative Party as well as among the electorate at large, the Government attempted to counteract. During the debate on the EEC in the House of Commons on June 6, 1962, Edward Heath had expressed the view that, far from becoming a lesser force as a Common Market member, Britain had "an enormous amount to contribute to the Community," in terms of political skills and industrial strength.[13] Later in the month the Lord Privy Seal, together with the Prime Minister, discussed on television the proceedings in Brussels and stressed Britain's potential contribution to a united Europe as well as the economic and political gains which might accrue from membership in the Common Market.

By mid-1962 several anti-Common Market organizations, with such descriptive titles as the "Keep Britain Out Campaign," the "Forward Britain Movement," and the "True Tories," dis-

[11]The *Guardian* (Manchester), June 6, 1962.

[12]The *Times* (London), July 31, 1962.

[13]Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 661 (June 6, 1962), p. 489.

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seminated propaganda, written as well as oral, which countered the Government's efforts. In addition, some British newspapers, including such strange bedfellows as the Beaverbrook press and the *New Statesman and Nation,* inveighed against the Common Market. One of Lord Beaverbrook's papers, the *Daily Express,* proclaimed that Britain was negotiating with the Six as a result of U.S. pressure.[14] The appeals of Beaverbrook's newspapers included repeated references to such terms as the British Empire, rather than the Commonwealth, and "Empire free trade," a cause which has few supporters in the present-day Commonwealth. Undoubtedly, such references to the past helped to preserve in the minds of patriotic Britons the vision of an era which is history, but they hardly contributed to the resolution of the problems facing Britain in the world today.

Like members of the political parties, newspapers usually in opposition to one another on other political issues found themselves in agreement in the Common Market debate. The *New Statesman and Nation,* although fearful that Britain was about to abandon the Commonwealth, used one argument fashionable among the British Left, namely, that the Common Market was an iniquitous device for perpetuating capitalism and large-scale economic units. According to this viewpoint, moreover, "the Tories can permit Britain to collapse into Europe because they accept the economic assumption on which the Community is based: they believe that the function of government is to create the conditions in which big business can flourish."[15]

Throughout the Common Market debate, however, the bulk of the British press remained committed, as it had in the months preceding the Government's decision, to Britain's membership in the EEC. Newspapers whose sympathies lay with one or another of the political parties lent their support to the British application. Their editorial columns voiced expectations of economic gain, greater industrial efficiency, a new voice for London in European affairs, and as a result of the foregoing a new stature for Britain in the world.

The press did not confine its support to British participation in economic integration. Most newspapers, if not prepared to

[14] *Daily Express* (London), January 6, 1962. Another of the many appeals which this newspaper made to British chauvinism came in the form of a rhetorical question: "Do you want to be British? Or are you willing that you and your children should belong to some British-French-German-Italian hotch-potch?" *Ibid.* This article did not remind its readers that such a description fits many Americans.

[15] The *New Statesman and Nation, May* 4, 1962.

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advocate Britain's membership in a "federal" Europe, nevertheless urged the Government to consider political links with the Six. For the most part, British newspapers favored membership in the Common Market with the proviso that Britain's negotiators in Brussels should obtain favorable terms for Commonwealth exports, EFTA and domestic agriculture. Such a warning came from the *Times:* "Britain's insistence on safeguarding the Commonwealth interest must be seen as no mere form of words. Individual items [in the Brussels talks] must be negotiable. The Commonwealth as a whole cannot be."[16] The terms for Commonwealth trade which emerged from Brussels led to a perceptible cooling in the editorial support of some newspapers for the Common Market and, in the case of the *Guardian,* a switch from support to opposition. One of the first British newspapers to call for Britain's membership in the Common Market, the *Guardian* found unacceptable the provisions negotiated for EFTA, British agriculture and the Commonwealth.[17]

The anti-Common Market forces counted among their numbers others who gave their cause a sophistication which newspaper publishers and politicians by themselves could not have supplied. Some of Britain's leading economists questioned a premise which guided the thinking of many proponents of British membership in the Common Market: that Britain stood to make economic gains by the exposure of her industries to competition from the Six. One such critic, Sir Donald MacDougall, deputy director and chief economist of the National Economic Development Council, declared that Britain might lose more exports than she would gain from membership in the Common Market. Additional trade with the EEC would not compensate for greater losses in exports to Commonwealth countries. Entry into the Common Market might harm rather than help the British balance of payments. Furthermore, contrary to the expectations of certain Common Market advocates, Britain would not experience new economies of scale in the EEC. "The British market of over 50 million people, living at our high standard, together with our large export markets, throughout the world, already made possible most of the economies of scale in most industries."[18]

Other writers criticized the Common Market because of its

[16]The *Times* (London), June 15, 1962.
[17]The *Guardian* (Manchester), October 4, 1962.
[18]*Reynolds News* (London), April 22, 1962.

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alleged political implications. Some questioned whether widely differing British and Continental assumptions about political systems could produce the consensus required for Britain and the Six to work in harmony. One articulate and active opponent of the Common Market warned: "Multi-party systems produce political habits of mind vastly different from those engendered by our two-party set-up. So do concepts of democracy based on interpretations of Rousseau, instead of, as in Britain, the ideas of Locke. Written constitutions create rigidities and ways of getting around them unknown to pragmatic Britons."[19] Furthermore, reasoned such critics, Britain would find herself in a minority in the Common Market, her ideas and her identity submerged eventually in an alien system.

One of the most important political arguments against the Common Market held that the EEC was the wrong international grouping for Britain to join. Not only would British membership in the Common Market place in jeopardy the Commonwealth, but it also might aggravate East-West tensions by "perpetuating the Cold War in the military alliances by trying to work them up into a political and economic union as well, which of course would be dominated by the United States."[20] If not controlled by the United States, reasoned some opponents of the Common Market, Britain as a member of the EEC faced the prospect of domination by De Gaulle and Adenauer. The Common Market, therefore, represented a provocative "ganging up" by the West against the Soviet Union. Instead of perpetuating existing tensions, the West, according to such views, should "seek a *modus vivendi* with the communist world," while also directing its efforts to the "greatest and most urgent job awaiting the world today," the economic development of the poor nations.[21] Such arguments led logically to proposals to strengthen the Commonwealth by measures including increased imports from underdeveloped countries, new payments unions, more economic assistance, and programs for regional development.

IV

It was the official policy of the Labor Party not to commit itself either to support or to oppose British entry into the

[19]William Pickles, *Not with Europe: The Political Case for Staying Out* (London: Fabian International Bureau, 1962), p. 8.

[20]*Britain Should Stay Out.* Proceedings of the Britain-Commonwealth-EFTA Conference held in the House of Commons, July 16-19, 1962, under the auspices of the Forward Britain Movement, p. 144.

[21]Pickles, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

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Common Market until the terms for membership were known. Such a policy had several advantages. Should the negotiations either fail or produce terms disadvantageous to certain groups in Britain, the Labor Party might stand to make political gains. Furthermore, a policy of wait-and-see commended itself to members of the Labor Party who had genuine doubts about the Common Market. Finally, not the least of the reasons for such a policy lay in the division of opinion within the party on this issue among those who had already decided either to support or to oppose British entry into the Common Market.

The cleavage within the Labor Party on the Common Market question revealed itself shortly after the Government's announcement of July 31. When pro-European Labor Members of Parliament sponsored a motion which would have expressed Labor's support for the Common Market, they met with opposition. Although this Labor Common Market motion attracted some thirty signatories, its opponents claimed, not without justification, that at least as many Labor Members of Parliament were prepared to sign a counter-motion against Britain's adherence to the Treaty of Rome.[22] The latter group included in its number Douglas Jay, the Parliamentary Labor Party's leading specialist on international trade and economics. In December 1961, however, Labor Party members opposed to the Common Market confined their Parliamentary action to the formation of a committee to watch and review critically the Brussels negotiations.

Labor opponents of the Treaty of Rome stepped up their campaign during the early months of 1962. The left-wing Victory for Socialism group, whose members had failed in their efforts to commit the party to an anti-Common Market stance at its annual conference the previous autumn, issued a statement on January 18, 1962.[23] The group expressed the view which British socialists had voiced in opposing British membership in other European organizations: that such a course of action would restrict the power of a Labor Government to engage in nationalization of industry and economic planning. The same statement condemned the EEC as an instrument of American policy in Europe. Moreover, it expressed the framers' fears that membership in the Common Market would result in a sharp rise in Britain's cost of living.

The alternative to membership in the Common Market, accord-

[22] *Daily Telegraph* (London), December 11, 1961.
[23] The *Times* (London), January 19, 1962.

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ing to other members of the Labor left, was the revision of Britain's links with the Commonwealth. Left-wing British socialists expressed such a view in a communiqué following a meeting with colleagues from Norway and Denmark in February 1962: "We believe that a better alternative [to the Common Market] would be to combine the Commonwealth and EFTA systems of mutual tariff preferences into a comprehensive, up-to-date agreement."[24] In yet another statement, Douglas Jay proposed that Britain take advantage of the Trade Expansion Act to preserve EFTA and Commonwealth preferences, while also gaining the benefits of tariff reductions on agreements between the Six and the United States.[25]

Hugh Gaitskell had as his immediate task to avert a split such as had convulsed the party in 1960 when opposing factions clashed on the issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Gaitskell and his deputy, George Brown, held several meetings with dissident groups on the Common Market question during the early months of 1962 in an effort to prevent a new breach within the party. Their aim was the difficult one of devising a position acceptable to most, if not all, members. Gaitskell wished also to keep the party officially uncommitted on the Common Market issue until the terms of British entry were known. On March 7, 1962, therefore, the Labor Party's leadership, after consultations with rival factions, produced a compromise statement which fulfilled the aforementioned conditions. The Labor Party stipulated five requirements to be met before it would support British membership in the Common Market. They included: guarantees for domestic agriculture; safeguards for Commonwealth trade; agreements for EFTA trade; retention by Britain of her present freedom in the conduct of foreign relations and in the formulation of her social policies and economic planning; and assurances that the products of underdeveloped countries would be given free entry into the Common Market.[26] These conditions resolved the dilemma in which Gaitskell and his colleagues found themselves. But they undoubtedly weakened Labor's pro-Common Market forces, since they placed the party on record as favoring entry into the EEC on terms which Britain could not expect to extract from the Six. The Common Market negotiators at Brus-

[24]The *Guardian* (Manchester), February 15, 1962.
[25]Douglas Jay, *The Truth about the Common Market* (London: Forward Britain Movement, 1962), pp. 11-12.
[26]The *Times* (London), March 8, 1962.

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sels were more intent upon preserving the integrity of the Treaty of Rome than meeting Labor's various objections.

If any individual could have committed the Labor Party to membership in the Common Market, it was Hugh Gaitskell. But he did not make up his mind on this issue until the autumn of 1962. Aside from the tactical considerations which must influence the behavior of a political leader, especially in a party with so diverse a membership as that of the Labor Party, Gaitskell had genuine misgivings about the EEC. In his speech replying to the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons on August 2, 1961, Gaitskell had attached great importance to Britain retaining her economic links with Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as with the newer members who formed the "multi-racial" Commonwealth.[27] Subsequently, he expressed the fear that European integration might lead the United States to revert to its "traditional isolationism," and that Africans and Asians might look upon a united Europe as a "new, formidable colonial-type power."[28]

Gaitskell believed that British membership in the Common Market would not be an unmitigated blessing. In his estimation much of the EEC's vaunted economic growth, as compared with Britain's economic sluggishness, was illusory. France, he suggested, had experienced high growth rates in the Common Market, in part at least, because her wage levels were lower than those of Britain. He held that as the labor costs of Common Market members approached those of Britain, whatever competitive disadvantage British goods currently faced would diminish. Moreover, the Labor Party's leader viewed with considerable alarm the prospect of damage to British agriculture and the substitution of agricultural imports from the Six for those from Commonwealth countries.[29]

Gaitskell's fear for the future of the Commonwealth shaped his attitude toward European political unity. A "federal" Europe, he held, meant the end of the Commonwealth. Gaitskell's anti-federal bent and his fears for the future of the Commonwealth led him into a clash with socialist leaders from the Six at a meeting in Brussels in July 1962. Gaitskell had placed, in the estimation of such European socialists as Paul-Henri Spaak, far

[27]Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 645 (August 2, 1961), pp. 1504-1507.
[28]The *Guardian* (Manchester), February 19, 1962.
[29]*New York Times,* May 9, 1962.

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more emphasis upon safeguards for the Commonwealth than upon the contribution Britain might make to the Community. The Belgian foreign minister, a leading European proponent of Britain's membership in the Common Market and a "federalist," could not accept Gaitskell's views. In particular, Gaitskell's declaration that Britain could not consider, for at least a generation, acceding to a European federation deeply disturbed Spaak and other members of socialist parties in the Six.[30]

As the summer of 1962 drew to a close, Gaitskell moved toward his final position in the Common Market debate. He, together with many other Britons whose loyalties lay with the Commonwealth, found unacceptable the terms which emerged from the Brussels negotiations. On the eve of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, scheduled to convene in London on September 10, Gaitskell met at Transport House, Labor Party headquarters, with Labor leaders from Commonwealth countries. The conferees had before them the White Paper which the Government had issued in August summarizing the state of the Common Market negotiations just prior to their recess on August 5. After their conference the Labor delegates declared that they could not

> regard the provisional outline of agreements so far reached at Brussels as safeguarding the relation of Britain with the Commonwealth and as adequately fulfilling the Prime Minister's pledge. . . . The essence of our objection is that while there appears to be a firm commitment to end Commonwealth preferences not later than 1970, and to give European exports a preference in Britain against the Commonwealth, no precise agreements which offer compensating advantages to Commonwealth countries have been reached.[31]

The Commonwealth Labor delegates did not see in the "vague promises of comprehensive trade agreements" between the Common Market and Commonwealth countries a satisfactory alternative to existing arrangements with Britain. Moreover, the delegates objected to the proposed application of the Common Market's agricultural policy to British agricultural imports. Finally, the conferees did not derive satisfaction from the offer of associated territory status to African and Caribbean Commonwealth members. Instead, the Labor delegates proposed, Commonwealth members should be offered free entry into the Common Market for most, if not all, of their tropical products.

[30] *Financial Times* (London), July 17, 1962.
[31] The *Times* (London), September 10, 1962.

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It was this meeting, together with the Government's White Paper of August, which brought Gaitskell down firmly in the Common Market debate on the side of those who opposed the Government's policy. However, it was the terms of entry, not the principle of Common Market membership, which were decisive in determining his position and, thus, in influencing the course which the Labor Party chose at its 1962 Annual Conference.[32]

Although Commonwealth Prime Ministers individually expressed objections to certain features of the Common Market, they refrained, in the final communiqué of the conference, from condemning the principle of British entry. Their communiqué stressed the fact that "the responsibility for the final decision would rest with the British Government." After reviewing the conference, the Labor Common Market Committee, perhaps to answer the anti-European statements generated by the aforementioned meeting between Gaitskell and Commonwealth Labor leaders, issued a declaration expressing its collective conviction of "the importance for this country, Europe, and the Commonwealth of Britain's entry" into the EEC.[33] The group urged the Government to find special arrangements for New Zealand and to conclude commodity agreements in the interest of other Commonwealth countries. However, the declaration stressed a viewpoint held by a considerable number of Britons who favored the Common Market: that Britain as a member of the EEC "could exercise decisive influence, both on her own behalf and on that of the Commonwealth." Outside the Common Market,

[32]The Labor Party Conference approved the statement on the Common Market prepared by its National Executive Committee. This statement reiterated the conditions set forth in the compromise agreement of the previous March of the Parliamentary Labor Party for Britain's membership in the Common Market. According to the National Executive Committee's statement, "The Labor Party regards the European Community as a great and imaginative conception. It believes that the coming together of the six nations which have in the past so often been torn by war and economic rivalry is, in the context of Western Europe, a step of great significance. It is aware that the influence of this new Community on the world will grow and that it will be able to play—for good or for ill—a far larger part in the shaping of events in the 1960's and the 1970's than its individual member states could hope to play alone. It is these considerations, together with the influence that Britain as a member could exercise upon the Community—and not the uncertain balance of economic advantage—that constitute the real case for Britain's entry." While Gaitskell's speech to the Labor Party Annual Conference stressed the dangers of membership in the EEC to the Commonwealth and other British interests, the National Executive Committee's statement emphasized also the political and economic gains which might accrue to Britain from membership in the Common Market. To this extent at least, Labor Common Marketeers may have reduced the harshness of the party's position against the EEC.

[33]*Newsbrief of the Labour Common Market Committee,* No. 11 (London, October 1962), p. 1.

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however, Britain would face the "loss both of influence and of prosperity for this country and the Commonwealth, coupled with the real possibility of Europe developing in the way we least want to see." The declaration contained 60 signatories, of whom 36 were Members of Parliament. The Committee, whose members also favored British participation in European political integration, did not express the viewpoint either of the leadership or the rank-and-file of the Labor Party.

V

Like the parties, the British trade union movement did not speak with one voice on the Common Market question. The Trades Union Congress' General Council, the official voice of the vast majority of the British labor movement, had given its qualified support, subject to written safeguards for full employment, first to the projected Free Trade Area and later to the British application to join the Common Market. Like many others in Britain, the TUC expressed agreement with the principle of Common Market membership, subject to safeguards for vital British interests. According to the Report to the TUC Annual Conference in 1961, in addition to provisions for full employment, "The General Council . . . agree in principle with the Government's decision to open negotiations with the EEC with a view to joining the Community, but insist that satisfactory arrangements must be made to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of EFTA."[34] One year later, the General Council retained its position of guarded support, awaiting the outcome of the negotiations. Unlike the Labor Party, the TUC did not condemn the agreements concluded in Brussels. Although not entirely satisfied that the Government had succeeded by August 1962 in protecting its interests, the General Council accepted assurances from Edward Heath, with whom its members had met, that as a signatory Britain could work within the Community to achieve the TUC's objectives.[35] Thus, the TUC, in autumn of 1962, found itself in disagreement with the official position of the Labor Party on the Common Market question.

Although the General Council received the approval of a majority of the TUC membership for its EEC policy, there remained a sizable minority which was skeptical about, or op-

[34] *Trades Union Congress Report, 1961*, p. 468.
[35] *Trades Union Congress, Supplementary Report B* (1962), p. 9.

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posed to, Britain's membership in the Common Market. Some feared that Britain would come under the control of conservative groups and regimes in Europe. Others opposed the Common Market because of its agricultural policy and its alleged disastrous effects upon trade with the Commonwealth, and consequent loss of jobs in Britain. Still other trade unionists, perhaps giving evidence of their insularity, feared that EEC membership meant the sacrifice of hard-won social and economic benefits. Some trade unionists, moreover, had visions of an influx of unemployed Italians and other Europeans to fill jobs, bringing with them lower wages and undesired changes in the British way of life.[36] It was the formidable task of pro-European groups such as the Labor Common Market Committee to alter such misconceptions.

VI

With their party having registered officially its opposition to the terms at Brussels, Labor Party opponents of the Common Market stepped up their campaign against the Government's policy in the autumn of 1962. Douglas Jay, speaking to a Labor Party gathering on October 20, 1962, declared that an agreement between the British government and the EEC would have no "moral basis unless it is first submitted to the electorate to decide."[37] If the Government should try to sign the Treaty of Rome without first holding an election, Jay suggested, "certainly a future Labor Government would not be morally bound by it." Gaitskell himself had declared on September 21 that a general election should precede Britain's entry into the Common Market, and others had expressed such a viewpoint during the summer of 1962. Such statements from the Labor Party did not help to scatter the doubts of the French and others in the Six about Britain's qualifications to join the Common Market.

With this as well as other features of Labor's anti-European arguments, the Labor Common Market Committee took issue. The Committee, in a widely circulated newsletter, held that it was impossible to conduct a general election on a single specific issue.

> The fact is that our electoral system provides for people voting for Parties or individuals, but not for particular issues. Only a referendum could decide an issue such as Common Market entry, and this is some-

[36] *Trades Union Congress Report, 1962,* pp. 403-421.
[37] *New York Times,* October 21, 1962.

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thing which has never yet found its way into British political or constitutional practice.[38]

The Committee admonished its Labor colleagues who opposed the Common Market for using this issue to "stampede the Labor Movement into an official stand against the Common Market, in the hope of snatching a quick electoral victory." Such tactics, according to the Committee, might lead to Labor's defeat, rather than victory in the next election, since in many constituencies the Liberals and Conservatives, both committed to the Common Market, were receiving together more votes in by-elections than was Labor.

The Government took the occasion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting and the Conservative Party's Annual Conference to mount a campaign to arouse support for the Common Market. Prime Minister Macmillan, in a television broadcast following the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, attempted to answer charges about the impact upon the Commonwealth of Britain joining the Common Market. To those critics who held that the Commonwealth "would never be quite the same again," should Britain sign the Treaty of Rome, he replied that regardless of British policy the Commonwealth was bound to experience profound change.[39] Updating an explanation of foreign policy popular with Britons, the Prime Minister declared, in another pamphlet published on October 7, 1962, that as a member of the Common Market "Britain would be the chief spokesman of the Commonwealth in Europe, and the interpreter of Europe to the Commonwealth, reconciling the interests of these very different systems and acting as a bridge between them."[40] These points the Prime Minister pressed also at the Conservative Party's Annual Conference. Submerging earlier differences of opinion by turning down demands for stringent guarantees for the Commonwealth and British agriculture, the Conference voted almost unanimously in effect to join the Common Market on terms the Government deemed suitable.

In the autumn of 1962, moreover, the Government's case for joining the Common Market stressed the contribution which

[38]*Newsbrief of the Labour Common Market Committee,* No. 8 (London, July 1962), p. 1.

[39]Conservative and Unionist Central Office, *Commonwealth and Common Market.* Reprint of Prime Minister Macmillan's Television Broadcast following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, September 10-19, 1962.

[40]Harold Macmillan, *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe* (London: Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1962), p. 5.

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Britain could make to the reduction of international tensions. Such a theme had played a prominent part in the Conservative campaign in the election of 1959. Now the Prime Minister declared that this was a function which Britain could perform most effectively as a member of the EEC. With respect to economic gains, the Conservatives emphasized the impressive growth of British trade with the Six even in the first half of 1962, during which time British exports to the Common Market were 18 per cent higher than in 1961, and 35 per cent above the 1960 figure. Such figures gave substance to the Government's case for the Common Market.[41]

Perhaps as a result of promptings from the anti-Common Market forces within and oustide the Conservative Party, the Government, in November, felt constrained to warn that Britain was not prepared to make concession after concession to the Six. The Chairman of the Conservative Party, Iain Macleod, declared on November 3 that there is a price that Britain "cannot and will not pay" for entry into the EEC.[42] Perhaps to placate its domestic opponents and to impress the Six, Britain suggested that her farmers be permitted to retain their system of subsidy payments until the end of the transitional period for the Common Market's agricultural policy. This the Six refused to accept, and the negotiations did not progress satisfactorily as 1962 drew to a close. In short, the British negotiators were unable to gain from the Six the concessions necessary to clinch the Common Market debate in Britain.

VII

When President de Gaulle announced, in his celebrated press conference of January 14, 1963, that "the nature, structure and economic context of Britain differ profoundly from those of the states of the Continent," he was expressing the viewpoint also of many British who opposed taking Britain into the Common Market. Those Britons who debated the wisdom of their Government's policy held, as De Gaulle did, that Britain was, "in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade, markets and food supply to very diverse and often very distant countries" in the Commonwealth and in the New World. Yet each of the Six, with the exception of tiny Luxembourg, had its own links with, and interests in, regions outside the Common Market. Britain, however, because her external economic relations and

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
[42] *New York Times,* November 4, 1962.

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political affinities were infinitely more complex than those of the Six, found herself penalized for having not joined the Community as a founding member.

Given the strength of the anti-Common Market forces in 1962-63, a British decision as early as 1955 to join the negotiations at Messina (which did preparatory work on the EEC) would undoubtedly have been premature. In 1957 and 1958 Britain had been engaged in negotiations for a free trade area embracing most of Western Europe and including also the Common Market. This abortive project, as well as the formation of EFTA, the so-called Outer Seven, had generated interest in Britain in European unity. That the Common Market had not gone the way of the ill-fated European Defense Community had also convinced skeptical Britons of the need to come to terms with the new Europe. Yet, even in 1962, most Britons were unprepared to forsake relationships of consanguinity and loyalties tested on the battlefields of Vimy Ridge and El Alamein.

Nevertheless, Britain had moved far closer to unity with the Continent than at any time in her modern history. Her negotiators at Brussels had accepted tariff discrimination against industrial exports from Commonwealth countries, the principle of weighted-majority voting in European institutions, and implicitly the notion that increasingly decisions affecting the economic and political future of Britain would be taken not in London but in Brussels. To be sure, many outstanding issues remained, including the precise formula for voting rights in the enlarged Community, tariff levels on certain raw materials, the terms for special provisions to meet the particular needs of New Zealand, the question of Commonwealth sugar exports, the details of a common agricultural policy, and the future of EFTA countries. Britain had pledged not to enter the Common Market until her partners in the Outer Seven had resolved their differences with the EEC. Yet, had the British government yielded on these points, it might have eroded its already weakened domestic position. Given the division of opinion in Britain, the electorate at the next general election might have repudiated an agreement which appeared to be a "sell-out" to the Six.

Their European policy having failed, the Conservatives sought alternative courses of action to revive their waning prestige at home and abroad. The Government took new interest in cooperation with Britain's EFTA partners "to preserve and strengthen

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the fabric of European trade until such time as the obstacles preventing the establishment of a [European] market, fully integrated, are removed."[43] The Government began to explore possible ways of increasing trade within the Commonwealth, a partial concession at least to the viewpoint so vehemently expressed by anti-Common Market groups. Moreover, Britain looked to the forthcoming "Kennedy Round" of tariff negotiations, made possible by the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, to gain many of the benefits denied her by the failure of the Common Market negotiations. Finally, the Government turned its attention to a point stressed so often by the Common Marketeers, namely, the modernization and expansion of Britain's domestic economy. Prime Minister Macmillan called upon British industry to place itself in a position to compete with the industrial giants of Europe.

With the failure of the Brussels negotiations the Common Market debate in Britain subsided, for it was unlikely that the British government would make another application in the near future. As Prime Minister Macmillan explained:

> This is not the kind of business deal that, if it fails one week, can be taken up the next. It is, for good or ill, a great historic event. It cannot be disregarded; but its importance and perhaps its permanence must not be exaggerated. While it would be absurd not to recognize with our heads that Britain's entry is not capable of early realization, we should strive to keep the vision in our hearts.[44]

If Britain turned away from Europe, it was for the moment, not forever.

Another application, however, awaited at least the coming of a general election. Should the electorate return the Labor Party to office, the new Government would probably not rush to reopen negotiations with the EEC. Yet the new leader of the Labor Party, Harold Wilson, did not rule out the renewal of Britain's Common Market bid "at the right time and under the right auspices."[45] Regardless of the policies which future British governments adopt with respect to European unity, they will have to grapple with the fundamental issues which stirred those who engaged in the Common Market debate: Britain's place in the new Europe and in a world paced by political, economic and technological change.

[43]Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 671 (February 11, 1963), p. 949.
[44]*Ibid.*, p. 961.
[45]*Ibid.*, p. 967.

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AN ATLANTIC COMMISSION

by Livingston Hartley

THE recent breakdown in negotiations regarding Britain's application for entry into the European Economic Community lends an added measure of urgency to efforts to build the institutions of the Atlantic Community. The need for such action was emphasized more than a year ago by the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations which met in Paris in January 1962. This Convention called upon the NATO governments to "draw up plans within two years for the creation of an Atlantic Community suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era."[1]

During the remainder of 1962 the attention of the Atlantic governments was focused on the negotiations between Britain and the EEC. On both sides of the Atlantic there was general agreement that it would be unwise to initiate negotiations on a wider Atlantic scale which might risk prejudicing these negotiations. There are, of course, many influential people in Britain and also in the EEC countries who would have preferred to approach international integration on an Atlantic rather than a European basis.

This obstacle to efforts to develop the Atlantic Community was swept away by President de Gaulle when he broke off the negotiations between Britain and the EEC in January 1963. Now, positive steps toward the creation of the institutions of the Atlantic Community might be an effective means of countering the dangers of Atlantic division inherent in the present situation. In any initiative in this direction, the United States can count upon strong support in almost all the other NATO countries, including the other five EEC countries. Such an initiative has been taken by the United States in its current effort to create a NATO multilateral nuclear deterrent.

I

One practical approach to the development of the Atlantic Community might be the adaptation to its needs of the existing institutions of the EEC. This approach is worth consideration because six NATO nations already belong to the EEC and because

[1] "Declaration of Paris," adopted by the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations on January 19, 1962.

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such a move would conform in some respects to several recommendations of the Atlantic Convention.[2]

One of the EEC institutions is an Assembly, now called the European Parliament, which can make recommendations on matters pertaining to the Community. It also possesses limited powers of control over the Commission, which is the executive body of the EEC. Creation of an Atlantic Assembly, based upon the annual NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, was recommended by the Atlantic Convention. While this body would be only consultative and would not possess any substantive powers comparable to those of the European Parliament, it would "consider, debate and review the work of all Atlantic institutions, and make recommendations to other Atlantic bodies and governments." For those who see the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference as a first step toward an eventual Atlantic legislature, establishment of such an Assembly would represent an impressive second step.

On November 16, 1962, the NATO Parliamentarians unanimously resolved to implement this recommendation by providing for a Special Subcommittee of the Conference to study the constitution and precise powers and functions of such an Assembly. This subcommittee began its meetings in March 1963.

Another EEC institution is the Council, composed of a representative of each government. The Council can, in many cases, make decisions by a weighted, qualified majority vote. The Atlantic Convention proposed, as its first institutional recommendation, the employment of such a majority vote in defined cases in a future Permanent High Council and, pending its establishment, in the North Atlantic Council.[3]

A third EEC institution is the Commission, composed of nine members chosen for their professional competence by agreement among their governments. They serve the general interest of the Community, not their governments, and can act by a majority vote on matters entrusted to them by the Treaty of Rome and in the exercise of powers conferred on them by the EEC Council. The Commission, primarily an executive body, examines measures which will promote the purposes of the Common Market; makes recommendations, which have no binding force, to the

[2]These recommendations are outlined in my article, "On the Political Integration of the Atlantic Community," ORBIS, Winter 1963, pp. 650-651.

[3]Utilization of such a vote in the North Atlantic Council was discussed in my previous article, *ibid.*, pp. 652-655.

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Council; and carries out decisions reached by the Council. It is difficult to see how an executive body of this type could now be fitted into the machinery of NATO. But it does seem possible that a similarly constituted Atlantic Commission could play a valuable *advisory* role.

For this purpose, an Atlantic Commission should be composed of outstanding men whose experience, reputation and prestige would insure respect for their views. Like the members of the EEC Commission, they could be selected by their Atlantic governments on the basis of individual competence for a fixed term and directed to serve the broad interests of the Atlantic Community. A number less than the membership of NATO would be desirable, perhaps seven or nine, in order to avoid representation of each government and a consequent tendency of each member to reflect governmental views. Their function could be to make recommendations, upon the request of the North Atlantic Council or upon their own initiative, on matters of general concern to the Atlantic Community. Such recommendations might be made by a majority or two-thirds vote; the larger the support behind any recommendation, the greater would be its weight.

Serving the Atlantic Community as a whole, as the Secretary General of NATO does now, such an advisory Commission should be able to point the way to policies and actions beneficial to the Community and make it more difficult for any government to frustrate efforts to protect the common interest. Its recommendations might thus facilitate the adoption of concerted policies. Whenever it was deemed desirable that such recommendations be made public, they could be expected to enlist support among the Atlantic legislatures and peoples. If such a Commission were endowed with only an advisory role, it could be created by a resolution of the North Atlantic Council.

II

The proposal for an advisory Atlantic Commission has already been considered by various Atlantic bodies. When the Atlantic Congress met in London in June 1959, it received a "petition" submitted by 156 signers of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity. One of the proposals in this petition stated:

> The North Atlantic Council should appoint a small group of qualified men of wide experience, who would represent the Atlantic Community as a whole instead of their governments, to advise the Council on measures which might advance the common interests of the Atlantic Community.

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After discussion of this proposal, the Political Committee of the Congress suggested in its Report that the Atlantic Convention (which it recommended) "should consider whether the unity of the Atlantic Community and the efficiency of its institutions would or would not be strengthened by the subsequent development of . . . a small advisory committee composed of eminent personalities attached to the Bureau of the General Secretariat" of NATO.

An advisory NATO Commission was considered in one of the background papers distributed in 1961 by the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO to the Atlantic Convention. During the Convention, this matter was discussed favorably and in some detail in the address of Paul Van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium. But it was not included in the final "Declaration of Paris" because it had not been specifically proposed in any of the resolutions submitted to the Convention.[4]

Since then, the establishment of a similar body has been suggested by Lord Franks, former Chairman of Lloyds Bank and former British Ambassador to the United States. He wrote:

> A new way has to be found: a new organization, institution or commission, which will have sufficient standing, independence and initiative to formulate common solutions and put them forward to the governments of the several nations of the group, so that they will have to face in argument not merely each other but also and at the same time the solution proposed for the partnership as a whole as best realizing its common good.[5]

III

An Atlantic Commission, even as a purely advisory body, could play a valuable role in recommending solutions to problems affecting the Community. Moreover, there might be additional functions which could be entrusted to the Commission.

For example, there is one function of the EEC Commission which, despite its executive character, might prove suitable for an Atlantic Commission. This is to "exercise the competence conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of rules laid down by the latter."[6] Under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the North Atlantic Council can "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary." This authority would appear to cover the delegation of functions which it possesses to bodies

[4]In the opinion of the author who was present, this omission was due to the purely advisory nature of this body which made it appear less important than the other institutional developments proposed.

[5]"Cooperation is Not Enough," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1962, p. 33.

[6]Article 155, Treaty of Rome.

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which it or its member governments might establish. But exercise of this power to confer any *executive* functions on an Atlantic Commission would appear to require the agreement of all the NATO governments. This could be expressed in a resolution of the North Atlantic Council. In so doing, the Council might also instruct the Commission to perform, in accordance with its delegated functions, a "watch dog" role to insure that whatever action the Council might request these governments or institutions to undertake was actually carried out.

In addition to functions which an Atlantic Commission might be authorized to perform by virtue of a resolution of the North Atlantic Council, other functions might be conferred by treaty upon such a Commission. This, of course, is a complex question. Such functions must not be so radical as to preclude their acceptance by members of NATO. One function which might be given to the Commission is treated below. While to some it may appear at first to be a sharp departure from existing procedures, its actual scope could be circumscribed by a number of limitations.

The nations of the Atlantic Community have long been in need of some method of effectively concerting their policies. Each nation has the necessary governmental machinery for implementing policies which have been adopted. They also have in the North Atlantic Council and in their foreign offices instruments for coordinating these policies. What they lack are adequate means of reaching agreements on policy decisions.

This critical gap might be filled by some body competent to formulate policy directives addressed to the Atlantic governments on questions of common concern. These directives could be defined, and limited as far as necessary, in specific provisions of a treaty or convention between these governments. The Atlantic Commission might perform this role.

A more difficult requirement would be a provision in such a treaty obligating the Atlantic governments to take action on the basis of the policy directives drawn up by the Commission. The solution might be to require each government to agree to take individually and in concert with other governments, in accordance with its constitutional processes, such action as it deemed necessary to carry out the policy directives formulated by the Commission, acting within its competence.

Whether this function could be given to an Atlantic Commission would seem to depend largely upon the limitations which

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might be placed on its scope. Four possible limitations will be mentioned here.

It is conceivable that a certain policy directive of the Commission might prove to be so repugnant to a large majority of the people of one or more of the Atlantic nations as to be unacceptable to them. To meet this contingency, a nation might be exempted from its obligation to carry out the policy directives of the Commission under extraordinary circumstances and when its national legislature specifically opposed such action.

Another limitation which could be imposed might require the concurrence of the North Atlantic Council, acting by less than a unanimous vote, in the policy directives of the Commission. At this point in the evolution of the EEC, a similar procedure for decision-making is applied under the Treaty of Rome. For example, Article 20 authorizes the EEC Council, acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, to fix duties on certain products under the common customs tariff if no agreement has been reached upon them.

Under this procedure, the policy directives of an Atlantic Commission addressed to the Atlantic governments would, after formulation by the Commission, be submitted initially to the North Atlantic Council. If the Council should agree to them by some form of qualified majority vote, they would then represent the collective judgment of the Commission, speaking for the Atlantic Community as a whole, and of a majority of these governments. Such broad support would go far toward insuring that these directives would be acceptable to the governments to whom they were addressed.

A third limitation might be similar to that in Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome, which states "Directives shall bind any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means." Likewise, the policy directives of an Atlantic Commission might be binding on the Atlantic governments only with regard to the results to be achieved while permitting those governments to determine the best means of carrying them out. The means could then be coordinated in the North Atlantic Council.

A fourth limitation, which would serve to keep the actions of the Commission within bounds acceptable to the Atlantic peoples and their governments, might be a provision that the Commission

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should, like the EEC Commission, be subject to the control of a parliamentary assembly empowered, by a qualified majority vote, to force its members to resign in a body. This limitation would not be immediately practicable; its use would depend upon the establishment and the development of the proposed Atlantic Assembly.

Even with these limitations, the function outlined above would have wide implications. This raises the question whether any precedents exist where governments have assumed treaty commitments to abide by decisions with which these governments might not be in agreement. Under the Treaty of Rome, many decisions can be made by a qualified majority vote; for example the French government, although it might be opposed to a certain decision of the Council, would nevertheless be committed to its implementation. The Council of the Western European Union can also make some decisions by a two-thirds or a majority vote.

In the case of the United States, there is a precedent which appears pertinent. Under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, the United States undertook to carry out against any member nation which committed aggression any non-military sanctions decided upon by two-thirds of the American Republics, Although the United States might oppose such a decision, it would nevertheless be obligated to implement it. While this obligation involves only one kind of action, that action could be very far-reaching, extending to a complete interruption of economic relations.

IV

The possible functions of an Atlantic Commission vary widely: from a merely advisory role, which could be provided for in a resolution of the North Atlantic Council, to a central role in the formulation of concerted Atlantic policies based upon a formal treaty or convention.

During the last fifteen years, the Atlantic nations have developed their most important new institutions in an evolutionary manner, starting with a modest first step which has led to other steps. Thus, in Europe, the Coal and Steel Community led subsequently to the much more comprehensive European Economic Community. And the development of EEC itself is proceeding by carefully designed stages.

On the wider Atlantic scale, the North Atlantic Treaty provided in 1949 only a skeleton framework for later developments: the

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Supreme Allied Command, the common infrastructure, the elaborate structure of commands and committees, and continuous consultation within a Council which is permanently in session.

If we follow this time-honored procedure in creating an Atlantic Commission, the first step would be to establish it on a purely advisory basis through a resolution of the North Atlantic Council, leaving it to experiment and experience to determine the proper tasks and the actual worth of this new body. If the Commission proved to be successful in its advisory role, its prestige and the influence of its recommendations would progressively increase. At some stage in this process, the broadening of the functions of the Commission, by a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty or by a convention, might become an effective means of promoting the institutional development and cooperative spirit of the Atlantic Community.

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WALTER LIPPMANN ON EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

by Anwar Syed

EVERY now and then through the centuries, individual Europeans have proclaimed the cultural and spiritual unity of Europe and have called for its political unification. But the spirit, the religion, the culture and the socio-political traditions and institutions of Europe have long since broken the demarcation lines of geography and spread far and wide. Europe is spiritually linked with lands and peoples thousands of miles away. Though it is the source and the fountain of Western civilization, it is not the whole but only a part of what is now the Western world. Then what shall be the political relationship of Europe, if any, to these other communities which share with it a common way of life? Should they all organize themselves into a larger community? If so, should it be a super-state or a loose and flexible organization? In either case, should the several states of Europe enter this larger community independently or should they join it as an organically united whole? Should they join it at all? Might they not unite themselves but make no binding commitments with the non-European parts of the Western world, and lead their lives competing or cooperating with the latter as the occasion and their own vital interests may demand? Finally, should all or some of the states of Europe unite even among themselves?

For one-half century these questions have engaged Walter Lippmann, an eminent political theorist and one of America's foremost writers on international politics. During his long career, Mr. Lippmann has addressed himself not only to topical issues of policy confronting the West but also to the larger and eternal question of its destiny. He has contemplated the role which the liberal Western democracies may play in bringing about the "good society" on earth. Among scholars and commentators he is a controversial figure. His influence with governments is admittedly difficult to measure. But his prestige is phenomenal. He is known, read and respected all over the world. Even the Kremlin refers to him as a "wise man."

Without doubt Walter Lippmann is the greatest publicist, if not the most consistent champion, of the concept of the Atlantic Community. He called attention to this Community's existence

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and to its vital importance for the peoples of the West at the start of World War I. Since the beginning of World War II, he has written a number of books and countless magazine and newspaper articles discussing its nature and composition, its past, present and future. He has also been the greatest proponent, on this side of the Atlantic, of Europe's rise to the position of a great and independent center of world power. To an examination of Lippmann's views over the last two decades, concerning relations among European states, Europe's place in the Atlantic Community, and its relationship to the "Anglo-Saxons," this study is devoted.

Postwar Europe

In *U.S. War Aims* (1944), Lippmann wrote that even though the idea of European unity had much to commend it, it would not be furthered by the political unification of the Continent, which "in our time certainly . . . would be a great evil."[1] In the first place, Europe could not be federated because it was not a clearly definable geographic and strategic entity. No one could say categorically what the boundaries of this federation would be. But more importantly, argued Lippmann, Europe *should not* form a federation or a separate strategic system. For if it did, it would fall under German domination. Germany would inevitably be the strongest military state. the strategic center and the hard core of a European federation. Could anyone doubt that the Germans, who were industrially advanced, militarily seasoned and by far the most highly disciplined and industrious people on the Continent, would "dominate the federation as Prussia dominated the federal German Reich after 1871? No blueprint can provide against the very nature of things in Europe."[2] The proponents of a European federation were bound to end up with precisely what the war was being fought to prevent— a German Europe. They must not talk of federating Europe until Germany had become thoroughly pacified and ceased to menace the freedom and independence of her non-German neighbors. First and foremost, Europe needed security against the recurrence of German aggression, which could be provided only by organizing the

[1] *U.S. War Aims* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944), p. 125.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 126. The fear of German domination in postwar Europe was voiced by other writers during and after the war. However, some writers hinted at the unwisdom of overemphasizing the postwar German menace, and suggested that greater threats to the peace and security of Europe would emanate from another quarter—a victorious Russia. Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), p. 266.

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Atlantic Community and the Soviet orbit.[3] Then, while the peoples of Europe were secure, they could form an economic and cultural "federation."

> Then the other agencies of government that are concerned with commerce and welfare can and should bind the civilian life of the Continent together in matters affecting tariffs, commercial policy, money, transportation, public utilities, social security and the like.[4]

After the war the Soviet Union, rejecting the "good neighbor" principle, established an outright dictatorship in its own orbit. The Cold War, which began while World War II was still on, precluded Soviet-American cooperation in protecting Europe against future German aggression and in sponsoring its economic and cultural unity. Lippmann agreed that under the circumstances the states of Eastern Europe would do well to leave the Soviet orbit. But obviously the Soviet Union would not let go of them. Moreover, they could not regain their independence merely by detaching themselves. They could not return to a Europe where they might once again groan under the heel of German domination. The only way to liberate them was to provide a place where they could go, to create "something else to which they can attach themselves. That something . . . can be only a framework for continental Europe."[5]

In 1947, Lippmann proposed that the United States should request the governments of Europe to draw up a general program of production and exchange, imports and exports, so as to arrive at a consolidated deficit for as much of Europe as would agree to a common plan. Not only would this amount to less than the total of individual deficits, it would be a "refreshing innovation" for the United States to aid not this or that government, but Europe. The proposed *modus operandi,* said Lippmann, would also serve as an "inducement to the unification of Europe."[6] Repeatedly, he urged the resumption of trade between Western and Eastern

[3]Lippmann argued that if Great Britain and the United States were to aid the states of Western Europe in containing Germany, then they must all coordinate their military systems so as to organize the Atlantic Community. Similarly, the states of Eastern Europe must coordinate their military systems with that of the Soviet Union in order to check Germany from the East. *U.S. War Aims,* p. 128.

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]"A Year of Peacemaking," *The Atlantic Monthly,* December 1946, p. 38.

[6]*Today and Tomorrow,* May 1, 1947. (*Today and Tomorrow,* hereinafter referred to as *T and T,* is the title of Lippmann's syndicated column.) About two weeks earlier, Lippmann had advocated a European economic union to save the Continent from the economic and financial collapse for which it was heading. *Ibid.,* April 12, 1947. According to Herbert Luethy, this was "the first public premonition of things to come." *France Against Herself* (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 352.

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Europe, suggesting that it would speed European recovery, help end its economic division, and keep the door open for its unification.

Lippmann emphasized that Europe must be "independent" and master of its own destiny. Its people could not rehabilitate their economic and political life unless they were able to talk out their differences and work out their common problems without first having to seek the approval of Washington or Moscow. "The family life of Europe is not likely to be restored if mother-in-law Russia and Uncle Sam are all over the house all the time."[7] He also noted that Europeans were becoming increasingly opposed to policies which sought to make them the stakes of Soviet-American diplomacy and their homes the battlefield of another war. They were determined, indeed "destined," to align themselves neither with the Soviet Union nor with America, but to mediate between them and prevent the catastrophe of a third world war.[8]

Germany: The Heart of Europe

Germany was the heart of the European problem. Lippmann maintained that Europe could neither unite nor regain its independence so long as the Red Army was encamped at the Elbe. That army would not retire behind its frontiers until a German peace treaty had been agreed upon and signed. Washington should, therefore, seek a settlement of the war, providing for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Continent and for the decentralization of Germany, which, having been neutralized as between the United States and the Soviet Union, should take its place in an independent and uncommitted European system.

The decentralization and the neutralization of Germany were both prerequisite to European unity. Europeans, Eastern and Western alike, would dread and shun a system in which Germany had become united under a centralized government. Therefore, Germany must be decentralized so that the individual German states would not be big enough to overawe and dominate their non-German neighbors. There were also other reasons which dictated this policy. Poland would be loath to leave the Soviet orbit and become the next door neighbor, in a European system, of a revitalized, reunited and centralized Germany whose government must demand and press for the return of the eastern prov-

[7] *T and T*, June 24, 1947.
[8] *Ibid.*, June 19, 1947.

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inces or lose the confidence of its electorate. The institution of a centralized government in a united Germany was thus incompatible with and inimical to the unification of Europe. Lippmann wrote:

> there can be no German settlement, which is tolerable, by reestablishing the sovereign power of a central German government in a truncated area and dedicated to the unity of Germany. The annexations in the east of Germany demand a radical decentralization of Western Germany.
>
> The truncated area will have to be decentralized, not unified, and German states which are in it will have to take their places within a larger European system and a European economy. Not German unity, but European unity, not German self-sufficiency but European self-sufficiency, not a Germany to contain Russia but a Germany neutralized as between Russia and the West . . . should be the aims of our German policy.[9]

What did Lippmann mean by the "decentralization" of Germany? His insistence that Germany should not be unified, and that the separate German states should individually enter a European system, would indicate that he opposed not only the recreation of a centralized Reich but even a federal structure of government for that country. Since the proposed "European system" was not to be a federation of Europe, one must conclude that Lippmann meant to vest the separate German states with the customary attributes of national sovereignty. He proposed, then, to abolish Germany, as such, and to create instead a dozen or so Germanys. In sum, he recommended, as the German Social Democrats called it, the dismemberment of Germany.[10]

During the war, and also in the early postwar period, there were many who, like Lippmann, wished to see Germany dismembered. At the Teheran Conference in November 1943, President Roosevelt proposed, to the delight of Marshal Stalin, that after the war Germany should be divided into seven regions, five of which should be self-governing and autonomous, and two—Kiel and its canal and Hamburg; the Ruhr and the Saar— should be administered in "trust" by the United Nations.[11] Sumner Welles, to mention only one distinguished American writer and statesman, consistently opposed the reconstitution of a united Germany under a central government which, in his opinion, would certainly make a deal with the Soviet Union and thus extend the border

[9] *The Cold War* (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 49-50.

[10] See, for instance, Carlo Schmid, "Germany and Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1952, p. 532. It may be noted that the Social Democrats denounced political decentralization per se, and equated it with dismemberment.

[11] Cited in Winston Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), pp. 400-403.

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of the Soviet system to the shores of the Atlantic.[12] In France, General de Gaulle and his followers took a position which closely paralleled that of Lippmann. Giving the "Gaullist view" on the German question, Jacques Soustelle wrote:

> After 1945 there was but one possible policy to be followed toward Germany—the one advocated by the Provisional French Government under the leadership of General de Gaulle. It favored the rebirth of the German states—Baden, Wurtemberg, the Palatinate, etc.—and sought to make it possible for each of them to develop its own political and economic existence so that they could be incorporated in a federated Europe as distinct states, not as 'Germany.'[13]

The common denominator of these proposals was the underlying desire to weaken Germany. It was born of the conviction that Germans were possessed of an irresistible and incorrigible urge to dominate Europe, and that given the opportunity, which reunification under a central government might provide, they would make still another attempt to establish their hegemony. Even though the fear of German domination was widespread, certain sections of European opinion rejected the thesis that the principal task confronting postwar Europe was to "contain" Germany, or that the best way to do it was to dismember her. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom favored a decentralized Germany. But to them, as to the Popular Republicans in France, decentralization meant federation. The French Socialists went further, and would give Germany a strong rather than a weak central government. They argued that the imposition of an unpopular regime on the people of Germany would eventually arouse them to rebel and create a government of their own choosing.[14] They maintained that after the war the Soviet Union, not Germany, posed the real threat to the independence of Europe.[15]

Lippmann wanted Germany not only dismembered but also neutralized, for neither the West nor the Soviets would countenance its inclusion in the rival coalition. Its alliance with either side would close the door on European unity. In *The Cold War* (1947), Lippmann denounced the Administration's attempt to arouse the sentiment of German unity in order to turn the Ger-

[12]Sumner Welles, "Justice for Peace," *Washington Post,* January 8, 1947; "German Policy: Dangers in Unification Now," *ibid.,* November 4, 1947; "Western Germany: Shadow of Rearmament," *ibid.,* November 16, 1948.

[13]Jacques Soustelle, "France and Europe: A Gaullist View," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1952, p. 546.

[14]René Courtin, "French Views on European Union," *International Affairs,* January 1949, pp. 19-20.

[15]Cited in Robert Strausz-Hupé, "France and the Future German State," *The Yale Review,* December 1948, pp. 323-324.

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man people against the Soviet Union and to win them over to the West. He warned the policymakers in Washington that they would lose Germany to Stalin if they incited her to want something which only the Soviet dictator could give. The Western powers would not use force to liberate Eastern Germany and the lost provinces in order to restore German national unity.[16] Neither would they pay the price of a war with the Soviet orbit for a West German alliance. The Germans would then see no gain in allying themselves with the West; they would turn to the communists. The West should therefore try not to make an ally of the Western part of a divided Germany but to neutralize the whole of Germany in order to forestall the catastrophe of a Soviet-German alliance.

> For if Germany is to become allied on either side of the diplomatic conflict, the precedents of history and the logic of the situation tell us that when she is strong enough to be a useful ally to anyone, she will become the ally of Russia.[17]

Lippmann concluded that if the Soviet Union agreed to evacuate Europe on the aforementioned conditions—the neutralization of a decentralized Germany and the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Continent—the division of Europe would end, and Eastern Europe would be enabled to take its natural and rightful place in a European system. But if the Kremlin rejected these terms, the United States would gain immensely in popularity and prestige by advocating them.

> For having made ourselves the champions of the unity of Europe, the unity of Germany, the liberators of the continent from the burden and oppression of alien armies, all the elemental forces of nationalism, pride and hope, all the deep instincts of all peoples against foreign domination, will gather in our cause. Time will work for our diplomacy.[18]

On the Unification of Europe

Lippmann's opposition to a "United States of Europe," which found expression in *U.S. War Aims,* persisted through 1947. It is true that he repeatedly called for the "unification" of Europe,

[16]Lippmann clearly stated this point in several articles. In 1950 he wrote that Germans would not go back to the army except to fight for "German perspectives," to liberate Eastern Germany and regain the lost provinces. *T and T,* December 4, 1950. Also see, *ibid.,* October 27, 1953.

Many Frenchmen would verify Lippmann's testimony. Members of the Socialist Party (SFIO) and an active minority of the MRP feared that Germany's admission to NATO would bring a new "dynamism" into that organization and might turn it into an instrument of conquest. See International Relations Group Committee, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, "United States-European Tensions," unpublished manuscript, 1952, pp. 106-107.

[17]*The Cold War,* p. 48.

[18]*T and T,* November 17, 1947.

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and supported or opposed policies as they seemed to help or hinder the project of "European unity." But on closer examination it became apparent that by such phrases as "a united Europe," "a unified Europe," and "an all-European system," he did not mean political unification. He meant that the states of Europe should trade and cooperate with one another, as they saw fit, unhampered and unrestrained by the non-European great powers, especially the Soviet Union; that the Red Army should go home and, since it would not go until and unless the other occupation forces also left, they should all leave Europe, restoring it to the Europeans; that in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the Red Army, and eventually to break up the Soviet orbit, without at the same time exposing the people of Europe to a renewed threat of German domination, Germany should be neutralized and decentralized; and finally that Europe thus "united" should pull itself out of the Cold War to develop and perfect its "unity." One might say that up to about the end of 1947, Lippmann's concept of European unity lacked positive content. It meant, essentially, the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* in Eastern Europe—the nullification of Soviet control over Europe east of the Elbe.

In 1948, Lippmann reversed his earlier position and declared that only the political unification of Europe, not mere cooperation between its separate states, could bring about a settlement of the war and the rehabilitation of its dislocated and devastated economies. Commenting on Winston Churchill's suggestion in January 1948, that the West bring matters to a head with the Soviet Union and negotiate, through the channels of secret diplomacy, a settlement, Lippmann observed that the disorder and the disunity of the Western democracies made it impossible for them to negotiate with the Kremlin from a position of strength. In order to bring matters to a head successfully, it was indispensable that

> the unity of Europe should not be a mere aspiration but should be effectively begun and growing. It is after, not before Western Europe has agreed to unite—after, not before Britain and America have made up their minds about Germany—after, not before the adoption of the Marshall Plan is assured—that matters can be brought to a head with the Soviet Union. To bring them to a head before there is unity would merely destroy the chance of attaining unity. Yet without European unity neither the European recovery program nor a settlement [with Russia] can be achieved. Let us hope then that Mr. Churchill will use his great influence to persuade the British Government to take a bold constructive initiative *in forming the United States of Europe.*[19] (Italics added.)

[19] *Ibid.*, January 27, 1948.

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This time Lippmann was undoubtedly advocating the political unification, a federation, of Europe. He explained that even though the work of unification would have to begin in the West, the "United States of Europe" must eventually include the whole of Europe. Germany should enter the proposed federation as a decentralized state. The Soviet Union would oppose the federation of Europe, and would bar the states of Eastern Europe from joining it. But after the threat of a reunited and centralized Germany had been removed, the satellites would not cling to the Soviet Union. As trade and cultural relations with the West increased, their political ties would once again become European, and not exclusively Russian.[20] In the end, no matter what the Soviet Union desired, they would find the "United States of Europe" irresistible.

In February 1948, Lippmann wrote an article which knocked the bottom out of his own earlier argument that it was both possible and desirable to effect economic collaboration between the countries of Europe without establishing their political unity. Commenting on a proposal of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the creation of a European Customs Union, he observed that in the absence of a common government, the proposed Union would mean the certain opposition of deeply entrenched vested interests which had long benefited from the existing tariff walls. Even if it survived the attack of these protectionists, it could not overcome the indifference or the hostility of national governments preoccupied with their sovereignty and security.[21]

Taking note of Ernest Bevin's call for a united Europe, Lippmann wrote, in February 1948, that the work of unification should begin with the political union of Britain, France and the Benelux countries. They were highly civilized and politically mature democracies, possessing vast and rich territories in Africa. Their union would constitute the hard core, the nucleus, around which a larger union of Europe must be built.[22]

A European System or an Atlantic Community

This was the last of a series of articles supporting the political union of Europe which flowed from Lippmann's pen. Two months later, we would find him wavering between a united and independent Europe on the one hand, and the Atlantic Community

[20] *Ibid.*, February 2, 1948.
[21] *Ibid.*, February 16, 1948.
[22] *Ibid.*, February 26, 1948.

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on the other. In April 1948, he saw that the project of a European federation was likely to collapse on the rock of British unwillingness to join it. This complication reminded him once again of the Atlantic Community. The old nation-state system, he wrote, was breaking up under the pressure of changes and problems which the war had brought in its train. The new relationships which the logic of necessity had forged between the United States and the nations of Western Europe pointed to a "new order of things," to the coming of a "new political society" comprising Europe, the British Commonwealth and the Americas. In a passage which merits lengthy quotation, he said:

> The [British] dilemma can be resolved only by the construction of a large political community which includes the British Commonwealth, the inter-American system, and a European federation with its African dependencies and colonies. In this larger community, it would be unnecessary for the British to choose between Europe and the Commonwealth. In this community, Great Britain and France could at long last become united in peace, not merely allied in war. In this community alone is there hope of solving the German problem, which is becoming progressively more snarled up. . . .
>
> Dire necessity and extreme peril compel and invite us to undertake the formation of this great Western political society. . . . Everywhere men are asking to what high and useful project they may dedicate themselves. . . . The union of the peoples of the Western tradition is this project, this idea, and this purpose. Free and civilized men cannot quiver and quake forever about Communism . . . or degrade themselves in witch-hunting and a morbid concern with the demonology of Moscow. Nor can they live forever and exclusively on the calculations of dollar deficits, and predictions about long-range bombers and atomic bombs, and resounding declarations about how much better liberty is than tyranny. They need also great constructive ideas which enlist their energies and give meaning to their lives.[23]

Was Lippmann in this impassioned statement urging the forty-two states of the Atlantic Community to merge themselves into a super-state? One might think that in calling for the "construction of a large political community," for "the formation of a great political society," Lippmann was referring to something more than a loose and formless system of cooperation among the governments of the West. The new political society was to replace the old nation-state system. Thus, it must provide itself with the customary institutions and apparatus of government—perhaps a federal government with limited functional jurisdiction, but government nevertheless.

[23] *Ibid.*, April 26, 1948.

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But even if it is true that on April 26, 1948, Lippmann did advocate the political union of the nations in the Atlantic Community, the fact is that three days later he reversed himself. On April 29, 1948, he advised the White House to tell the Kremlin that Americans wanted to negotiate a settlement in which Europe would become a buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union.[24]

Thus, the first quarter of 1948 saw a radical, albeit temporary, change in Lippmann's views on some of the major problems of American foreign policy. In the period under review he came to accept the official American position that the West must build up a position of strength before it could negotiate with the Soviets with some hope of success. He altered his view of the "destiny" of Germany and of Europe. By advocating Britain's participation in a United States of Europe, he implied that Western Europe, and eventually the whole of Europe, would become an active partner of the United States in the Atlantic Community. Again, by saying that only in the larger political community of the West could the German problem be solved, he inevitably implied that, far from being neutralized, Germany would become an integral part of a Western coalition. By implication again, he also accepted the possibility that Europe might remain divided indefinitely.

During 1948 and 1949 an independent Europe, detached from the Soviet-American tussle, and the Atlantic Community, comprising Western civilization, continued to compete for Lippmann's allegiance and support.[25] He occasionally attempted to reconcile such a Europe with the Atlantic Community, but he seemed to prefer a neutral and independent Europe. Gradually the concept of the Atlantic Community descended from the high pedestal of a super-state back to the position of a shapeless, formless, yet ultimate reality.

A Buffer Zone in Europe

During 1949-50, Lippmann advocated the establishment of a neutral belt to interpose between the Western and Soviet coalitions. It would keep the two camps physically separated and thus reduce the danger of war between them. On the other hand, its inclusion in one or the other coalition would bring them into dangerously close contact with each other and thus increase the possibility of conflict.[26] The proposed buffer might also enable

[24] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1948.
[25] *Ibid.*, May 11 and October 28, 1948.
[26] *Ibid.*, January 18 and March 10, 1949.

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the satellites to detach themselves from the Soviet Union without having to join an anti-Soviet coalition. Most importantly, it would provide a place for Germany. For "the only solution of the German problem," wrote Lippmann, "is to invite her to take her place in a widening zone of buffer nations not actively participating in the world-wide conflict of great powers."[27] In 1950, he predicted that in the years to come an increasing number of states from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean would want to keep out of the struggle between the U.S. and the USSR, since both were equally capable of devastating them in the event of war. These countries could not become the "frontier posts" of a military system which could not guarantee their security in the event of war.[28]

With Germany as its core, the proposed buffer would include Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia and Greece. The prospect of neutrality would meet the true wishes of these nations. By promoting it "we would make ourselves convincingly, as alas we are not today, the champions of peace and national freedom" in Europe.[29]

In recommending the creation of a large neutral borderland revolving around a reunited Germany, Lippmann apparently brushed aside the thesis that history had endowed the Germans with a domineering disposition and those other qualities—military experience, industrial skill, diligence and discipline—which made their domination of Europe inevitable. Alternatively, he reconciled himself to the prospect of German domination—economic and cultural, if not military—of the proposed buffer belt.

The Schuman Plan

In the Schuman Plan, Lippmann saw the cure for the seemingly irreconcilable dissensions between France and Germany, and the means by which Europe could achieve and retain the position of a great and independent power. If the Plan materialized, he said, "then in the Franco-German partnership there will come into existence the nucleus of a European power—of that 'third force' which is so indispensable to the stabilization of Europe and to peace in the world."[30] The Franco-German partnership envisaged in the Schuman Plan would be the nucleus of more than a West

[27] *Ibid.*, February 15, 1949.
[28] *Ibid.*, January 12, 1950.
[29] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1950. Also April 10, 11 and 17, 1950.
[30] *Ibid.*, May 11, 1950. The "Third Force" was a favorite slogan of French neutralists. They denounced the Atlantic Pact as "a total renunciation of the policy that France adopted at the time of the liberation—to be the arbiter, a meeting ground for conciliation, an intermediary zone placed between the two blocs. The

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European system. For Germany could never relinquish "her national unity or her organic connections with Eastern Europe." The virtue of this partnership lay precisely in its potential to stir up and hasten the movements for German and European unity.[31] Lippmann explained that, allied with each other, Germany and France would gain enormously in stature and prestige among the nations of Europe. Their combination would acquire a tremendous negotiating power, and Germany, as a result, would find it much easier to arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement with Eastern Europe.[32] If these two leading nations of Europe did not cooperate, the Continent would have to get along without a full postwar reconstruction. Lippmann went on to advise that, acting independently and separately, France and Germany could exercise little influence in a world where the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth were the leading powers.

> The fourth great power, which is waiting to be born, is the Commonwealth of Europe. It will be born when France and Germany have formed a lasting partnership. . . . To this nucleus will adhere the surrounding countries that are free to do so. The others [Eastern Europe] will know where they can go when they are free again. . . . Because the European Commonwealth opens up to the people of Europe the prospect not only of a material improvement but of their greatness and of their historic mission, it will provide a great reason for their loyalty.[33]

This time Lippmann included even France in his "neutral borderland," leaving only Great Britain and the United States to constitute the Western coalition. For it is clear that if the proposed Commonwealth of Europe were to admit the "surrounding countries," including ultimately the Soviet satellites, then it was none other than the familiar "neutral and independent" Europe referred to above.

NATO, EDC and the Defense of Europe

Lippmann's views regarding the value and significance of Western plans and projects for West European defense further

Pact means the end of what might have been a great French postwar policy." Alexander Werth, "Where the French Score," *New Statesman and Nation,* July 16, 1949, p. 64.

[31] *T and T,* May 15, 1950.

[32] *Ibid.* Far from facilitating the reunification of Germany, the Schuman Plan, according to Carlo Schmid, created a "grave obstacle" to it. The territorial jurisdiction of the Plan could not be extended without the consent of all six members of the Coal and Steel Community. This meant, said Schmid, that a united Germany must either agree to remaining split into two economic systems or else permit the powers represented on the High Authority to dictate the conditions under which Germany will be reunited. Schmid, *op. cit.,* pp. 540-541.

[33] *T and T,* July 6, 1950.

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reveal his commitment to the idea of an "all-European system," and provide valuable insights into his position on the relation of Europe to the rest of the Western world. In his *Isolation and Alliances* (1952), he criticized the decision to incorporate a rearmed Germany into the Atlantic Alliance. It had put Western statesmen in the "wholly untenable position" where their strategic interests and planning seemed to contravene the German desire for national unity. Germany could not be reunited unless the Red Army evacuated East Germany. The Red Army would not go home except as the result of a general agreement between the occupying powers to withdraw. But if the British, French and American forces together with the Red Army did leave Germany, then Western military plans and strategy would have to be radically revised.[34] Lippmann suggested that the United States should agree to withdraw from Germany, simultaneously with the other occupying powers, on the condition that a reunited Germany enter a "European system," which meant:

> first of all, a reconciliation between united Germany and France, a reconciliation which is so thorough that it can be sealed by a Franco-German alliance within which Germany and France would be bound to concert their foreign policy in Europe. Until France and Germany are fully at peace the forces of the Atlantic Community must keep watch on the Rhine. For a European system can exist only if at the heart of it there is Franco-German partnership. Without that partnership Europe cannot be united. With that partnership, a preponderance of the interest and weight of the European continent will be on the side of a European system.[35]

Lippmann went on to propose that France and Germany thus united should then open negotiations with Poland to fix the German-Polish frontier, provide for the relief of the expellees, and conclude an economic treaty. Only when all three of these powers—France, Germany and Poland—had reconciled their differences and reached an understanding, could one speak "with any seriousness about the unity of Europe or, as I should prefer to call it, a European system."[36]

Lippmann warned that if NATO, which was a military alliance directed at the Soviet Union, became identified in the public mind in America and abroad with European unity, then Europe would never be united. One could not exclude Austria and East Germany from a united Europe. And yet there was no doubt

[34] *Isolation and Alliances* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), p. 52.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

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that the Soviet Union would never permit them to join an anti-Soviet coalition. The Western powers should, therefore, aim at creating an all-European system, which must be sufficiently loose to accommodate nations with different social systems. The development of such a system would show the Europeans what Europe could be "if it were no longer partitioned, no longer occupied, no longer helpless and satellite—and yet were not once again to fall under the threat of domination by the most dynamic of the European nations."[37]

This was the beginning of Lippmann's battle against the European Defense Community (EDC). He carried it on with increasing vigor in the following months and years on the grounds, first, that it would freeze the division of Europe at the Elbe,[38] and second, that by imposing on the unwilling French a German army within a larger West European military establishment it would sharpen rather than mitigate Franco-German differences. In other words, it would defeat the two indispensable conditions of European unity. He advised the United States to undertake "a great diplomatic effort" for reviving the movement toward Franco-German reconciliation and partnership in the affairs of Europe.[39] If necessary in order to achieve this objective, EDC and NATO should be scrapped. For "while there may be alternatives to EDC, there is none to Franco-German partnership."[40] Lippmann even suggested that the West European economic, political and military system should be converted into an all-European system.[41] The United States, on its part, should concentrate on the Atlantic Community, which was a "far greater thing, more reliable and more deeply founded than any of the hastily contrived pacts of recent times."[42]

In 1955, Lippmann wrote that the Soviets were moving to-

[37]*T and T,* December 24, 1951; also January 3, 1952.

[38]German socialists took the very same position. In the article cited above, Carlo Schmid argued that the integration of West Germany in the Western military system would certainly jeopardize German reunification. It was futile, he observed, to expect the Russians "to renounce the East German potential in order that this potential may be fitted into a political and military pact which the Russians must feel is directed against them." Schmid, *op. cit.,* p. 544. In this thesis, the German Social Democrats had the support of Bevanite Laborites in Britain. See "Paved with Good Intentions," in the *New Statesman and Nation,* December 22, 1951, pp. 723-724.

[39]*T and T,* January 8, 1953.

[40]*Ibid.,* December 17, 1953. The Gaullists shared Lippmann's view on the importance, and also on the ways and means, of mending Franco-German relations. See Soustelle, *op. cit.,* pp. 547-548.

[41]*T and T,* September 15, 1953.

[42]*Ibid.,* February 16, 1953.

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ward the position that the issue of German unification could be solved only within the framework of a general security system in which both Eastern and Western Europe could participate. They seemed to favor negotiations for the creation of a neutral belt which should include some if not all of the satellites. He commented:

> There is no good reason why we should shrink from the negotiation, why we should not seek such a negotiation. . . . The idea is of capital importance to those who want to free Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe cannot be freed by war, and the Kremlin would not release [its countries] to go and join NATO. The only way is that they should be able to enter a community of neutrals. Our reaction should not be to reject it but to ask that it should be widened.[43]

It would seem incredible that Lippmann has been willing to barter away the EDC and a strong alliance such as NATO for a vague and loose entity—the European system. However, his readiness to dispense with these organizations makes sense when we consider it alongside his conviction that the security of Western Europe from Soviet aggression depends not upon its own military power but upon the nuclear deterrent power of the United States, upon the maintenance of an overall balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Western Europe does not and cannot make a significant contribution to the Western side of this balance. The Atlantic Pact, according to Lippmann, had merely legalized an existing reality, to wit, that an attack on any nation west of the Soviet orbit would be deemed an attack on the United States. The physical presence of American troops on the Continent gave Europeans the needed assurance that America's promise to defend them would be honored the moment they were attacked. Its principal objective was then to bolster the morale of Europe and to give it that sense of security which it needed to work constructively for its unity and independence "as a new great power" on the basis of equality with the United States and the Soviet Union.[44]

[43] *Ibid.*, May 17, 1955.

[44] *Ibid.*, January 3, April 14, May 3, 1949. See also, *ibid.*, August 10 and 24, 1950; December 18, 1951; June 3, 1952. It is interesting to note here that Lippmann's view of the Atlantic Pact as a North American guarantee to defend Western Europe was almost literally adopted by the *New Statesman and Nation* in its issue of July 14, 1951. It noted, on page 32, "what has deterred the Kremlin from launching war during the last two years when it had overwhelming military superiority? . . . It is clear that the deterrent must have been the threat of a long war with the West in which, as Stalin once remarked to Roosevelt, America's vast industrial potential would always win. In short, insofar as a military deterrent is important, the Atlantic Pact, which is in fact an American guarantee of Western Europe, is the effective force, not the size of any particular European country's armaments."

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The essence of NATO lay in

> a North American guarantee to go to war if there is a Soviet military aggression across the frontiers of the members of the NATO alliance . . . . There is not the slightest reason for thinking that this fundamental guarantee is any less firm today than it ever was before. . . . Upon the assumption that if the Soviet Union decided for a war of aggression it would use the Red Army to invade and conquer [Western Europe] . . . the NATO powers decided to build up a large European army which was to include strong West German forces. The troubles of NATO have been wholly concerned with this army superstructure. Neither the French nor the Germans, the nations presumably most interested in the NATO army, seem to be taking it very seriously.[45]

Lippmann went on to explain that no one in France and Germany, or for that matter anywhere else, believed that, despite the abundance of nuclear weapons on both sides, the next great war would begin with the invasion of Western Europe by the Red Army.

The German Problem Revisited

In the early 1960's Lippmann is still concerned with the problems of Germany's place in Europe. He tends to the view that these problems can be solved best by creating a "European system." The Common Market has always rested on the premise that "West Germany must be reconciled with France, and that a new political community must be created which controls German sovereignty."[46] The present union in Europe would eventually become a political entity capable of exercising equal influence with the super-powers. If the current prosperity of Western Europe can be combined with a "far-sighted over-all central European arrangement," it will attract and influence the countries of Eastern Europe enormously.[47]

During 1961 and early 1962, Lippmann omitted specific reference to the need for a German-Polish reconciliation. But he seems to believe that an acceptance of the present division of Germany would accomplish the essential objective of a German-Polish reconciliation which he had advocated so often in the past. The policy of German reunification, he says, was always insincere, always a "shabby hoax."[48] The Soviet Union opposed it, and so did the Western powers. "Although it is never openly avowed, the whole of Europe, West and East, from France to Poland and Czechoslovakia, is deeply committed to the partition of Ger-

[45] *T and T*, May, 1956.
[46] *Ibid.*, October 3, 1961.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*, October 31, 1961.

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many."[49] The attitude of West Germany herself toward the question of her national reunification, says Lippmann, is ambiguous. She has learned to live comfortably without reunification. But neither West Germany nor the other Western powers are willing to acknowledge, sign and seal the partition of Germany because they fear that German public opinion will then demand the withdrawal of West Germany from the Atlantic Alliance. "Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle are haunted by the fear that one of Dr. Adenauer's successors may do once again what the Germans have so often done in the past—make a deal with the Russians at the expense of the West."[50]

The possibility of a German-Soviet "deal" is, according to Lippmann, still very real. Recently, he observed:

> We have many reasons for supposing that the German nation will move in some variant of its historic national policy. It will move, that is to say, toward one of those accommodations with Russia which have for two centuries followed its many wars with Russia. Recent events in West Germany support this hypothesis. The Free Democratic Party, which is conservative and nationalist. . . has never lost sight of Germany's interest in the East. The West German ambassador in Moscow, Dr. Kroll, is an avowed believer in a Russo-German *rapprochement*, and that he was scolded by the minor officials in the Foreign Office but upheld by Dr. Adenauer is, to say the least, a straw in the wind.
>
> There is little doubt, it seems to me, that the purely Western policy of Dr. Adenauer is going to give way to a more Bismarckian policy. The problem for the West is how its ties with West Germany can be maintained against an abnormal and dangerous pull towards the East. Reunification, the rectification of the Eastern frontiers, the opening of vast markets in Russia and China will exert a strong pull on German policy.[51]

Lippmann advises the Germans that, while they need not renounce formally their national reunification as an ultimate aim, they will have to wait a long time for it and "a lot will have to be done first in order to make it possible in the end."[52] In the

[49] *Ibid.*, September 12, 1961.
[50] *Ibid.*; also *ibid.*, September 19, 1961.
[51] *Ibid.*, November 21, 1961.
[52] *Ibid.*, September 19, 1961. Lippmann recalls a conversation in 1958 with a high-ranking West German official, who maintained that during the past fifteen years or so the two Germanys had grown so far apart that it was now idle to talk about their reunification. The ideological, religious and political obstacles to uniting the Protestant and socialist East Germany with the conservative and Catholic West were enormous. The subject of reunification should therefore be approached very gradually. The already existing trade relations between the two German states should be expanded and their level raised so that eventually they might form a confederation. Lippmann added that this happened to be also Mr. Khrushchev's proposal, but he had first heard it from this German official, whose record of loyalty to the West is impeccable. "The idea," he noted, "was bound to take hold because it fits so exactly the reality of the German situation." *Ibid.*, September 26, 1961.

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meanwhile, they should reconcile themselves to the fact of partition and forgo unification as an active and immediate objective. The effect of such a policy, he observes, will be profound in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe where "the fear of a revived and rearmed Germany seeking its lost territories is, next to the Red Army, the most powerful fact which binds the satellite empire to Moscow."[53] With the removal, or reduction, of that fear, the tension in Eastern Europe will decline and a spirit of independence may arise.[54]

Connected with the question of German reunification is the issue of Berlin. Lippmann believes that the present Western policies with respect to West Berlin make the future of that city bleak. By raising the wall between East and West Berlin, Khrushchev demolished the hope that the Atlantic Alliance might one day reunify Germany and restore Berlin as its capital.[55] West Berlin is no longer the escape hatch and the show window that it once was. It is now not even a good place for intelligence work. It no longer threatens the security of East Germany; nor does it attract East Germans as a symbol of German unity.[56] The decline in the importance of West Berlin will eventually destroy the morale of its people. In the present atmosphere of uncertainty about its future, West Berlin is a doomed and dying city. In order that young men may plan their careers and others may invest their savings there, they must have some basis for confidence in its future.[57] It is not enough to guarantee access of the West to the city. West Berlin will flourish only if it is free and if it has a function to perform in the coming years. The status quo cannot prevail forever. "Sooner or later, the freedom of West Berlin will have to be guaranteed in an international covenant which makes it an international city under the specific protection of the Great Powers, the general protection of NATO and the Warsaw Alliance, and of the United Nations."[58] Having become an international city, West Berlin should become the headquarters of the organs of the United Nations, and a great international center for the study and pursuit of arts and sciences and sports. This will be a good future for West Berlin, "far better than to be a dying city kept alive by subsidies and by the dubious assumption

[53] *Ibid.*, September 19, 1961.
[54] *Ibid.*; also *ibid.*, January 11, 1962.
[55] *Ibid.*, September 7, 1961.
[56] *Ibid.*, October 17, 1961 and April 3, 1962.
[57] *Ibid.*, September 12, 1961 and January 11, 1962.
[58] *Ibid.*, April 3, 1962.

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that the United States and its allies will always be willing to live on the brink of a thermonuclear war."[59]

De Gaulle and Europe

The Franco-German reconciliation which Lippmann had advocated for years as a prerequisite to European unity, independence and greatness has finally come about. At his press conference on Tuesday, May 15, 1962, President de Gaulle expressed the view that Europe should be organized and led by a Franco-German combination. He maintained also that Britain, being an "island," did not belong to Europe, and that the United States was destined eventually to withdraw from Europe. Europe should become a great power in its own right, strong enough to come to terms with the Soviet Union. It would extend from the Atlantic to the Urals. In Paris on January 22, 1963, President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer signed a Franco-German treaty of friendship, committing the two countries to consult with each other on all important matters of foreign policy. Lippmann interprets the treaty to mean also that West Germany will contribute money, technology and manpower to the creation of a military force which would be under French leadership and control and would be independent not only of NATO but also of the other states in the West European community.[60]

De Gaulle's design for Europe, says Lippmann, is a "formidable conception of policy." In the Common Market, France and Germany have created a rich and dynamic economy which is superior to that of Britain and the Commonwealth and at least equal to that of the United States. Politically, these two countries are the core of a new great world power. While Germany is forbidden by treaty from making nuclear weapons, she can aid France in developing her nuclear deterrent. But Lippmann is now far from pleased with these developments. He has criticized De Gaulle's policy in *Western Unity and the Common Market* (1962) and in a number of subsequent articles in the *New York Herald Tribune.*

De Gaulle does not fear Soviet aggression against Western Europe. He knows that the United States has achieved, and will do her best to maintain, a decisively favorable balance of nuclear power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He takes it for granted that the United States will continue its commitment to defend Western Europe until the latter is strong enough to deal with the Soviet

[59] *Ibid.,* October 10, 1961.
[60] *Ibid.,* January 24, 1963.

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Union on equal terms, regardless of what France may do. In the meantime, De Gaulle feels that there is no need to "woo us" or "to reward us for doing what we have to do."[61] Western Europe is already robust economically. Prophetically, De Gaulle envisions the day when it will not need American military protection. He is acting "as if the future, which is probably coming, has already arrived."[62]

Lippmann argues that the United States cannot welcome a "Gaullist Europe," which means a restrictive and exclusive Franco-German community, whose aim will be to establish a Franco-German, or just French, hegemony over Europe.[63] Moreover, De Gaulle's ambition to assume the leadership of Europe is irreconcilable with the American need to "retain the ultimate power in nuclear affairs."[64]

A Franco-German Europe, says Lippmann, is an "optical illusion," which will disappear when the two "old kings" who have authored it depart from the scene. For a closed Franco-German community not only violates the vital interests of the United States but also contravenes the vital interests of West Germany. The Gaullist design is based on the premise that the division of Germany will continue. De Gaulle does not want the Germans to stray away from the Franco-German combination either to work with the Americans and the British in seeking a solution to the problem of Berlin or to follow Dr. Kroll toward a larger Soviet-German deal.

> The hard line that France takes about Berlin and the Soviet Union is founded, we must be sure to understand, on a basic French national determination not to have to live with a large reunited Germany. At bottom the hard policy is directed not against the Russians but against those Germans who want to make an opening to the East. Its purpose is to make any departure from the present position seem un-German and unpatriotic.[65]

A restricted Franco-German Europe hurts German interests also because it jeopardizes the American military commitment in Europe. The United States cannot concede to France a leading position in making decisions about war and peace so long as the United States carries ultimate responsibility for Western defense. Secondly, the United States needs a large low-tariff trading area

[61] *Ibid.*, February 14, 1963.
[62] *Ibid.*, January 31, 1963.
[63] *Western Unity and the Common Market* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), *passim*. Also *T and T*, January 17, 1963.
[64] *T and T*, May 24, 1962; February 14 and 21, 1963.
[65] *Western Unity and the Common Market*, p. 32.

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in order to earn the foreign exchange for financing its military and civilian commitments abroad. If the European Economic Community becomes a "close, restrictive and exclusive society, then this country cannot earn the cost of defending that community on the ground in Europe."[66] Then this restrictive society must pay for its own defense. Americans, with their dollar deficits and with their increasing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere, Asia and Africa, cannot go on "subsidizing the local and tactical defense of the European continent."[67] It is not without reason that many European leaders and governments—Jean Monnet, M. Spaak, Dr. Hallstein, Dr. Erhard, the Netherlands government, leading German industrialists, the Free Democratic Party and also the Social Democrats in Germany, "the leading spirits of the present Italian coalition"—oppose a Franco-German Europe.[68]

Lippmann urges the Germans to abjure the idea of a Gaullist Europe. They can do so by insisting that the Common Market should include Britain and by finding a way to accommodate the Commonwealth. The Common Market should also include other European states and it should establish a partnership with the United States. This "grand project" of building an enlarged Common Market is in "the manifest destiny of the West." The real interests of Germany do not lie in promoting Gaullist grandeur. They run

> with the Atlantic Community and with a wider European society, open enough to be an attraction to the European peoples on the other side of the Iron Curtain. To promote this wider community is the way to save Berlin, it is the way to reunite Germany, it is the way to unite Europe, it is the way to confront peaceably and successfully the Soviet Union.[69]

Lippmann's criticism of the so-called Gaullist Europe is difficult to understand. The objective which he attributes to De Gaulle—the creation of a Europe which extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, which is independent of both "Uncle Sam" and "mother-in-law Russia," which is strong enough to be the master of its own destiny, and of which the core and the leading force is a Franco-German combination—is the very same which Lippmann himself has endorsed and advocated times without number throughout the post-World War II period. It may be that France does not want to have to live with a reunited Germany and that, therefore, De Gaulle does not want West Germany to "stray away" looking

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[67] *Ibid.* Also *T and T*, May 22, 1962.
[68] *Western Unity and the Common Market*, p. 25.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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for "openings to the East." But then, according to Lippmann himself, no country in Western or Eastern Europe wants to live with a reunited Germany. Certainly, the Western policy of German reunification has always been a "shabby hoax." De Gaulle wants the "Anglo-Saxons" to leave Europe to the Europeans. Lippmann, too, has advocated such a course of action many times in the past. De Gaulle wants to develop a nuclear force which is independent of the American nuclear power. In the nuclear age, how can Europe become a great power equal to the United States and the Soviet Union, which Lippmann has so often urged it to become, without developing an independent nuclear force?

There is merit in Lippmann's argument that an independent French nuclear deterrent will be both useless and dangerous for the West because it will be inadequate to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union and unable to finish a war it had started. It would have been in keeping with Lippmann's advocacy of an independent and united Europe to propose that the United States help France—or an organically united Western Europe of which the "core" is a Franco-German combination—become a great nuclear power capable of deterring aggression, and then withdraw from the responsibility of defending Western Europe. But such a proposal Lippmann has not made.

De Gaulle does not want a federated Europe. He would rather have a loose system of cooperating sovereign states. Barring one or two occasions, Lippman himself has not advocated a federated Europe. His own European system is a loose arrangement. Indeed, De Gaulle's design for the Europe of tomorrow is almost an exact replica of Lippmann's "European system."

Lippmann objects that Gaullist Europe is restrictive. In *Western Unity and the Common Market,* he himself observes that De Gaulle is thinking of a Europe which extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then in what way is it restrictive? Lippmann considers it restrictive because De Gaulle does not welcome Britain into the Common Market; he does not welcome the Commonwealth which consists not only of countries belonging to the Western civilization but also countries of Asia and Africa. But above all, De Gaulle wants to seize from the United States the position of leadership in Europe and the power of deciding its fate, the power of directing its destiny. These are Lippmann's objections to De Gaulle's Europe.

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The European System: A Summary

The connotation of Lippmann's "European system" has not remained constant. Sometimes he has represented it as an ever-widening neutral belt with Germany as its core. He has sometimes included France in this neutral belt, on other occasions excluded her. At times he has conceived his European system as a United States of Europe—a genuine European federation. At other times, he has looked upon it as a loosely connected group of sovereign states, well-disposed toward one another and cooperating as their common needs and interests may require.

But these are occasional deviations from a standard pattern in which the following are the distinguishing features: a pacification of Germany which convincingly removes the danger of a German-dominated Europe; the withdrawal of foreign armies, especially the Red Army, from Europe; the emergence of Europe as a great and independent power of equal rank with the United States and the Soviet Union.

The pacification of Germany is the central and the controlling part of this pattern: Her reconciliation with Poland means her reconciliation to the loss of her eastern territories to that country. Her reconciliation with France is necessary so that France may restrain her domineering propensities, so that France and Germany together, and not Germany alone, may negotiate with Poland and the Soviet Union, so that Germany may not make a "deal" with the Soviet Union. At one time, Britain's participation in a European system was necessary because France would not hold hands with Germany except in the reassuring presence of Britain. The European system must eventually be an "all-European" rather than a West European system because, whereas the latter may be established without a thorough pacification of Germany, the former cannot be. Western Europe cannot or should not be federated because West Germans, unsublimated by pacification, can enter the armed forces of a federated Europe and West German businessmen and industrialists may become the leaders of a West European economy. A federated Europe will be a German Europe.

Lippmann's concept of a European system, insofar as it revolves around the pacification of Germany, is essentially a negative concept. His relative indifference to the effective political unity of Western Europe—let us say in the form of a federation which might eventually include a part or the whole of Eastern Europe—

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constitutes a weakness in his blueprint for the Europe of tomorrow. There was a time when Eastern Europe was free, when the Iron Curtain did not divide Europe at the Elbe, when the German menace did not exist, and when there was no NATO. What was Europe then? Was it, in the power-political sense, anything more than a conglomeration of great and small sovereign states, which spent their lives fearing, fighting and weakening one another? Spain, France, Austria, Prussia, Britain and all the rest were great powers in their turn and time. But history has not known a great politico-military power called Europe. Then how can we expect that Europe as such will become a great power, on a par with the United States and the Soviet Union, merely by recreating the past with respect to its "independence?" To seek the greatness of Europe without seeking to weld its separate states into a single political unit may be a slogan: it cannot be the objective of rational policy.

The positive content of Lippmann's concept of a European system may be summarized as follows: Europe bled white in the last war. Its decline became all the more conspicuous by the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union to unprecedented heights of power. For the first time in centuries, the great powers of Europe found themselves virtually excluded from the controlling position in world affairs which they had hitherto occupied. Ironically enough, the states of Europe became the stakes of Soviet-American diplomacy. Europe's weakness threatened to plunge mankind into the disaster of another war. Europe must rise to its feet again and fill with its own power the vacuum which threatened to make it the battlefield of the great non-European states. Western policy should therefore aim at restoring Europe to the position of a great power. Only a united Europe could fill this position, for no single state in it was even potentially a power comparable to the United States or the Soviet Union.

In order to encourage the movement for independence in Eastern Europe, and also to embarrass the Soviet Union, Anglo-America should free the European allies of their commitments and obligations to the NATO alliance, promote Franco-German reconciliation and friendship, and thus help to create a united and independent West European system, which, hopefully, would one day become an all-European system. Britain and America could well afford to undertake this program, because they did not need the assistance of Western Europe in balancing the power of the Soviet Union.

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Once Europe, or just Western Europe, had achieved unity and the status of a great power, it could decide the question of its relationship with the rest of the Western world. It might join a "League of the West," or a political union of the Atlantic Community. But even if it chose to retain its "neutral and independent" position, it could never become indifferent to the fate of the American and British nations. The Wilsons and Roosevelts of Europe must answer the call if, in a crisis, Anglo-America should need Europe's assistance. To preserve its own existence and to rescue the outlying segments of its civilization, the "Old World" must come to redress the balance of the New—the balance which since 1945 had guarded its own independence and security. In this frame of reference, Lippmann's independent Europe still belonged to the Atlantic Community.

Lippmann's *Western Unity and the Common Market* would appear to be a repudiation of his earlier position with respect to a "European system." However, such a judgment should be tempered with the following considerations: His arguments in favor of a European system were made during a period when the possibility of a European power challenging the position of the United States as the leader of the West was remote. Western Europe then did not have the military power to support an independent negotiating position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. For a position of strength in negotiation, it depended on the United States. With the prosperity that the Common Market has brought to France and Germany and the development of French nuclear power supported by the alliance with Germany, the possibility of that challenge has become real and imminent. Lippmann does not like it.

In his advocacy of a European system, Lippmann had assumed that his united, independent and great Europe would become part of the Atlantic Community and would hasten in any crisis to the support of Anglo-America. In Lippmann's present view, Anglo-America now does need Europe, especially the Common Market. The case of Britain's need is patent. The United States needs access to the markets of Western Europe to bolster its "fading economic pre-eminence."

Lippmann's opposition to a "Gaullist Europe" may be due also to his fear that the Franco-German combination is aiming really at the hegemony of Europe. This fear stems probably from his assessment that the present French and German governments are

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both authoritarian rather than liberal and democratic.[70] It seems that in Lippmann's mind there lurks also the fear that in a Franco-German combination, Germany, and not France, may emerge as the more dynamic power; Western Europe may get not Franco-German, but rather German, leadership.

The Atlantic Community in 1963

It is now the Atlantic Community, and not the old familiar European system, which will solve the problem of Berlin, reunite Germany, and unite Europe. Lippmann has returned to the position which he had taken briefly in 1948. The problems of German and European unity can be solved only by negotiating these issues with the Soviet Union. The West should conduct these negotiations from a position of strength, which is supplied principally by the United States. The actual reunification of Germany and of Europe may take a long time, perhaps a generation or two. During this period, there may occur developments which dictate a change from present Soviet policy. The exact nature of these developments cannot be foreseen at present. The West will be able to take advantage of favorable situations as and when they arise and will survive this era of transition only if it stands united and maintains its position of strength. This can best be done through the Atlantic Community.

The primary responsibility for Western defense should continue to rest with the United States. The leading role in planning the strategy of war and peace should therefore also remain with the United States. The Atlantic Community, consisting of the entire Western world associated in a friendly way with the non-communist Asians and Africans, should strive to contain the communist world, reduce its influence, disrupt it, reform it, or convert it to a liberal way of life.[71] Over this grand coalition for the defense of the noncommunist world and for the uplift of

[70] *Ibid., passim.*

[71] More than once, Lippmann has expressed the hope that Communist Russia may one day become liberal and democratic. According to him, Mr. Khrushchev leads the forces of moderization in Russia, forces which are changing the character of the Soviet state, "changing it from a Byzantine despotism into what might be described as a Western state in the very early phases of its development . . . . The same practical circumstances which brought the West its liberty . . . are present in the Soviet Union. A complex society cannot be made to work without a large measure of personal liberty and personal incentive and popular consent. . . . Although everything moves faster than it used to move, we must not forget how long it took for our free institutions to grow from their beginnings in the Middle Ages." *T and T,* February 13, 1962.

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mankind, the United States should preside with Great Britain as the next ranking member.

It appears that the decisive reason which has swung Lippmann away from his European system and returned him to the Atlantic Community is the prospect of active rivalry between a European center of power and the United States. In advocating a great, independent and united Europe, built around the core of a Franco-German partnership, he should have foreseen such rivalry. Perhaps he did. Now that the rivalry threatens to become real and significant, he finds it to be detrimental to both the United States and the West as a whole. It is clear that in his mind the idea of a unified and independent Europe is feasible and desirable only in the context of a basic harmony of interests among the Western powers. When the independence of Europe, which in the final analysis must mean its right to go its separate way, becomes incompatible with the essential unity of the Western world then, in Lippmann's view, the concept of a "European system" must yield to the larger concept of the Atlantic Community. In short, his forceful and continuous advocacy of a "European system" over the last decade and a half would appear to have been misplaced.

Lippmann would like to see the Western world, under liberal Anglo-American leadership, establish and maintain a clearly favorable balance of power vis-à-vis the communist world. Under the aegis of this liberal and preponderant Western power, mankind may march toward creating the "good life" on earth. Such, in sum, is his conception of the Atlantic Community. We must note that, although he has been one of its greatest proponents, he has for the most part neglected it during the post-World War II period in favor of his "European system." Now that he has returned to it, one hopes that in the years to come he will use his influence with his readers and with the statesmen of the West for advancing the Atlantic Community from the status of an idea to that of an institution, and that he will do so more boldly and more consistently than he has during the last two decades.

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INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA: CONFRONTATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

by Donald E. Weatherbee

THE January announcement of the Indonesian government's "policy of confrontation" toward Malaya opened a new chapter in the long and often bitter history of relations between the archipelago and the peninsula. The boundary of strife in Southeast Asia was perceptibly enlarged when the Indonesian Foreign Minister told his nation and the world that Indonesia "must carry out a policy of confrontation towards Malaya, because Malaya is now the accomplice of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, and is pursuing an attitude of enmity towards the Indonesian people."[1]

While American attention was primarily concentrated on the nagging war in Vietnam and the frailties of the Laos agreements, those concerned with the problems of political stability and economic development in the region glanced uneasily over their shoulders at this latest specter of conflict, a specter which was clothed with more substance at every forward step in the "confrontation." Suddenly, as if by some political alchemy, the "confrontation" was transmuted into "consultation," and appeals to Malay unity were substituted for threats of war. In June 1963, a flurry of diplomatic activity brought the Indonesian President and the Malayan Prime Minister together in Tokyo, followed by a high-level conference in Manila. For the time being, at least, the tensions in the area seem to have been reduced.

The *New York Times,* in an editorial, wrote: "The Manila meeting has thus not only launched a Malay unity movement but also resolved differences over Malaysia that threatened warfare between Indonesia and the federation [of Malaya]."[2] An examination of those differences is warranted, not only to determine whether this sanguine statement is an accurate appraisal of recent events, but more importantly because the outcome of the contest between Indonesia and Malaya will profoundly influence the

*Although the author is currently carrying out research under a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, the contents of this paper are not directly related to that research, nor does it reflect the opinions or conclusions of anyone but the author.

[1]Dr. Subandrio, as reported in *Tanah Air, Mingguan Indonesia Diluar Negeri,* February 10, 1963, p. 11.

[2]*New York Times* (International Edition), June 17, 1963, p. 4.

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course of future political and economic development in the region, particularly when viewed against the background of the virulent societal ills of Indonesia.

Both Indonesia and Malaya fall within the popular category of "newly-independent" or "emerging" states. A whole new political literature has arisen, attempting to provide analytical models of the new nationalisms. Although the conduct of the new states deviates somewhat from traditional patterns, we should not lose sight of its basic similarity, at least with respect to foreign policy, to the behavior of the states belonging, to borrow a current Indonesian term, to the "Old Established Order." Rupert Emerson has noted this similarity: "The nation has been taken as the measure of the state, in Asia and Africa as in the West. Once that premise has been established the goal of policy inevitably becomes the promotion of national interest, however that uncertain concept may come to be defined."[3]

I

The armed rebellion of the "Revolutionary Government of North Borneo" in the last days of 1962 brought the friction between Indonesia and Malaya to a head. Although the armed rebellion was promptly suppressed by British and Malayan forces, the Jakarta government made no effort to hide its sympathies. Its propaganda and, probably, matériel assisted the rebels of Inche A. M. Azahari. For good measure, Indonesia threatened to send "volunteers," and pronounced itself, in ideologically respectable terms, in favor of the "self-determination" and "liberation" of the 85,000 inhabitants of Brunei. But the Indonesian goal was not the creation of an independent Brunei. The real object, unambiguously declared by Indonesia, was to prevent the creation of the state of Malaysia. Indonesia is categorically opposed to the Malaysia concept—the incorporation of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo into a state governed from Malaya, with Singapore its great commercial window on the world. Jakarta's eyes were not fixed on Brunei-town, but on the federal capital, Kuala Lumpur.

To the Kuala Lumpur authorities the creation of the new state is deemed essential for a number of reasons. The principal attraction of the projected state is that it offers a vehicle for bringing Singapore into the national structure, while at the same time

[3]Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 418.

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preserving the favorable racial balance for the Malays. Furthermore, the withdrawal of British rule bares some unpleasant realities for the future of the Borneo dependencies. An independent existence for the separate territories does not appear to be feasible. Azahari himself thinks in terms of a larger unit. From the Malayan point of view, a state fashioned from the federation or amalgamation of the three North Borneo territories, even if it could surmount internal problems, would probably fall prey to Chinese or Indonesian ambitions. To many, the Malaysia concept is a natural and logical continuation of the process of liquidating British colonial holdings in Southeast Asia.

Of course, the proposed Malaysian state would not be without its own problems. The hoped-for racial solution may prove to be illusory. Furthermore, Singapore, Malaya and the three Borneo colonies stand at different levels of economic and political development.[4] Finally, there will be the difficulties of communication with, and defense of, the Borneo component of the new state. Despite the demonstrable weaknesses, the Malayan government, convinced that the advantages of Malaysia far outweigh possible disadvantages, is determined to bring the scheme to fruition.

The Malayans seem not to have been intimidated by the Indonesian objections. The plans for Malaysia went forward on schedule. The Indonesian threat was taken seriously, and the government prepared its citizens for the direst eventualities. Defense expenditures were increased. Of great importance in stiffening the Malayan stand were the guarantees of support from Britain and the Pacific Commonwealth powers. It is almost certain that it was Commonwealth diplomatic efforts, especially on the part of Australia, which deterred the Indonesians from precipitate action.

Indonesia, in its turn, did not lag behind in securing the support of other parties. Not unexpectedly, the firmest professions of assistance came from the nations of the communist bloc. Both the Soviet Minister of Defense and the Chinese President were Indonesian state guests in April 1963. The lines were drawn, and they had a familiar look. But the dispute cannot be examined solely within the Indonesian-created framework of the "New Emerging Forces" versus the "Old Established Order." The issues dividing Indonesia and Malaya in the Malaysia dispute reflect a

[4]The economic differences became particularly apparent in the June breakdown of negotiations concerning financial arrangements between Malaya, Singapore and Sarawak.

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basic conflict between these two states, the roots of which are to be found in the antagonisms of divergent political and economic ideals. Despite the cultural and religious affinities linking the peninsula and archipelago, dissimilar organizations, methods and goals have led to mutual suspicion. This suspicion is exacerbated by history and geography.

II

One method of getting a better insight into the mutual antipathy of Indonesia and Malaya is to examine the images they have of one another. The Indonesian nationalist thinks that Malayan independence, being tainted by a continued British connection, is far from genuine. Intensely proud of his own struggle against the Dutch, he derides the Federation as a counterfeit designed to hide the perpetuation of colonial rule. He views the bitter fight waged against the communist insurgents in Malaya not as the defense of Malayan integrity, but as the suppression of a revolutionary national movement. The relative prosperity of the Federation is a façade hiding the rottenness of the inequalities fostered by capitalistic, imperialistic exploitation. Malayan strides toward stability are bought by the prostitution of the innermost significance of freedom and independence. The foreign policy of the Kuala Lumpur government is a betrayal of the single-minded devotion to anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism, anti-Western nonalignment, and the extreme nationalism which is demanded of the "progressive" members of the Afro-Asian grouping. The government of Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman is not representative of the real interests of the Malayan people. On the contrary, it is a front for British imperial interests. The Jakarta appellation for the Tengku is *boněka,* puppet! The Indonesians claim that the Tengku's Malaysia policy is a hysterical attempt to prop up his shaky regime. This cannot be tolerated, since the grab in Borneo is a plot against the Indonesian people. When viewed this way, the Malayan state is almost by definition an affront to Indonesia.

The Malayans, on the other hand, eye the ramshackle edifice of the Indonesian state with poorly concealed horror. Aware of the rich natural endowments of the archipelago, they see the Indonesian future being squandered by inefficiency, corruption, irresponsibility and authoritarianism. They believe that it is the Indonesians themselves who have created their own current problems. The quickening disintegration of the economic infrastructure, the rampant inflation and consequent impoverishment of

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the city dweller, the destruction of a democratic opposition, all of these manifestations of the Indonesian malaise are watched apprehensively from Kuala Lumpur as harbingers of a more critical threat: the succession to power of an openly communist government, an event which would have grave implications for the neighboring states. One of the functions of Malaysia would be to keep the infection from spreading. "Guided Democracy," "Guided Economy," NASAKOM (Nationalism-Religion-Communism), and the other movements and slogans of Indonesian political life are interpreted in Kuala Lumpur as maneuvers to accommodate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In short, the Indonesian experience provides the Malayan government with an instructive example of how not to run a country.

In a sense the differences between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta are epitomized in the characters of Tengku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno. The former is in the British tradition, wearer of the Western mantle, business-minded and realistic. He has been described by an admirer as the most experienced of all of the new Afro-Asian leaders.[5] Sukarno, by contrast, seems chained to his ego and charisma, impatient with reality and the demands of government. The self-styled "mouthpiece" of the people, he still appears to be more interested in the prerogatives of statehood than the tasks of nation-building. To one another, the one is a *bonéka,* the other a communist sympathizer.

It is not surprising to learn that the relations between the two states have often taken the form of unfriendly acts and that their exchanges have been marked by invective. The Brunei affair is but the latest of a long series of incidents which have brought charges of intervention and violation of sovereignty. On the larger stage of world politics their policies have often been diametrically opposed. On the so-called "cold war" issues, Indonesia, more often than not, is to be counted with the Soviet-leaning countries, while Malaya finds itself in the Western camp. This does not necessarily mean that either can be termed a satellite. It does demonstrate, however, their widely different approaches to the problems of world peace and security.

III

The geographic contiguity of the two states serves to heighten the tension. "Lying as they did between the Indian Ocean and

[5]Harry Miller, *Putera di-Raja dan Perdana Menteri* (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications Ltd., no date), p. 301.

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the China Seas. . . the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago had been destined from time immemorial to play an important role as a transition area."[6]

Bordering the Straits of Malacca and the southern fringes of the South China Sea, the region has a history of struggle for control by the hegemonic powers of the mainland and the islands. Funan, the earliest of the empires; the Shrivijayan thalassocracy; the Sukhotai who wrested away the peninsula; the courts of Java and their imperial pretensions; the emporium of Malacca: all of these indigenous political entities strove for supremacy. From the sixteenth century the actors were foreigners: the Portuguese, Dutch, British and Japanese. Now the struggle has again reverted to indigenous states. In very general terms, the object of this struggle, extending over eighteen centuries, has been the control of the passage by dominating both sides of it. Although the goal was achieved in differing degrees of effectiveness, it has meant that only one strong state has been able to exist in the area at a time.

Naturally, conditions have changed since the days of the spice trade, but the economic and political function of the region is still important. The Indonesians, reviving an old project, propose to build a port in northern Sumatra to divert trade from Singapore, and have stepped up naval activities in the area of the Anambas Islands, on the route from Singapore to northern Borneo. The lesson of history and its strategic implications are still relevant: possession of this region signifies control over the exchange and communication between the Asian littorals, as well as restricting access to the Southeast Asian hinterland.

IV

One astute observer of the Indonesian scene wrote concerning the Brunei affair: "This new episode adds a new and disturbing dimension to Indonesia's short but turbulent history; namely the possibility that her radical nationalism is turning into expansionism."[7] Territorial aggrandizement in the name of the expulsion of colonialists or the pre-emption of the positions of the neo-colonialists has already received the approbation of the Asian and African nationalists—Goa being the best example. The revisionist fervor of Indonesian nationalism can be detected in Indonesian

[6]M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 13.

[7]Guy Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Expansion," *Asian Survey*, February 1963, p. 75.

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support of the Moroccan claims to Mauritania and Iraqi claims to Kuwait, in her defense of China in Tibet, and in her silence on the subject of the Indian border.[8] Such expansive nationalism may take the form not only of territorial claims, but more importantly of a drive for exaggerated international political influence. Official disclaimers notwithstanding, both forms can be distinguished in Indonesian nationalism and are now being translated into policy. The anti-colonial justification can mask or rationalize a good many other and not always creditable motives. An exhaustive analysis of the forces behind this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this discussion. Here, we need consider only two factors which, upon closer inspection, turn out to be myths.

According to Sukarno, nationalism is promoted in three ways: "First we point out to the people that they have a glorious past, secondly we intensify the notion among the people that the present time is dark, and the third way is to show them the promising, pure and luminous future and how to get there."[9] The first part of this formula, the reconstruction of a glorious past, has as one aspect the idea of empire—Greater Indonesia. If we turn to the literature of the Indonesian "golden age," the product of the Majapahit court (East Java, *ca.* 1300-1500), we read that the states of the Malay Peninsula and the coasts of Borneo were tributaries of Majapahit; subject states "in the guardianship of the Javanese Royal Compound"; "submissive"; "obedient"; and faithful in "executing any orders of the honoured Prince."[10] This tradition, fact and fancy, has been embellished and forms part of the state myth which has been assiduously fostered by nationalist ideologues like Muhammed Yamin.[11] Yamin, who as early as 1955 was laying claim to non-Indonesian Borneo, wrote: "Greater Indonesia without Malaya is an illusion," and "Pan-Malaya is dead, while Pan-Indonesia is flourishing!"[12] Although no one would argue that modern Indonesia is trying to re-create the Majapahit empire, still, what nationalist would dare to denigrate the alluring

[8]One assumes that such support will be reciprocated when Indonesia decides to take Portuguese Timor—possibly in the context of sanctions directed against Portugal in Angola.

[9]Sukarno, as quoted in Bambang Oetomo, "Some Remarks on Modern Indonesian Historiography," in D.G.E. Hall, editor, *Historians of South-East Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 75.

[10]T. G. Th. Pigeaud, *Java in the 14th Century—The Nagara-Kertagama* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), Vol. III, Canto 14, 16, 1. Vol. IV, Commentary, pp. 31 ff.

[11]Yamin died on October 17, 1962.

[12]Muhammed Yamin, *Sumpah Indonesia Raya* (Djakarta: N. V. Nusantara, no date, probably 1956), pp. 34, 39.

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idea of a past, or future, Indonesian sphere of influence stretching from Madagascar to China? The function of the myth of empire is to reinforce tendencies already present in Indonesian politics and to lend an aura of reality to the second of the myths, the Indonesian image of themselves.

On the international stage, the Indonesians see their role as one of power, leadership and importance, not only in Southeast Asia, but among the "progressive" forces of the Afro-Asian constellation. "Indonesia at present is being watched by the whole world," says Sukarno. "Not only are we interested in ourselves, the whole world is."[13]

The Indonesian estimate of Indonesian power is partly based on the calculation of traditional measures, e.g., size, population, geography. The potentialities of the archipelago's natural resources are often cited. "If we have exploited it, then with the strong will to become a nation that is strong, just and prosperous, no country will be able to compete with us."[14] A dispassionate observer might conclude that these elements now contribute to national weakness, but the Indonesians do not rest their case at this point. The building up of the largest military machine in the area is a substantial element in their estimate, because "in this 20th century a nation which does not possess strong armed forces is not respected by other nations, and his voice or opinion does not count."[15]

Indonesia is sure that its voice counts, since much more important than these quantitative factors is Indonesia's regional monopoly of the spirit of revolution. The Indonesians are convinced that theirs is the proper nationalist vision: "The world of the 'New Emerging Forces' follows with astonishment and rejoicing Indonesian consolidation and progress, for now it is clear that the Indonesian Revolution truly has a voice which reverberates throughout the world . . . everywhere men listen to the Universal Voice of the Indonesian Revolution."[16]

And the Indonesians, using all of the devices suitable for the projection of an image of power and leadership, make sure that this voice is heard: for example, Sukarno's world peregrinations, the multitude of state guests, radical positions in the councils of

[13]Sukarno, *Moluccas Speeches of President Soekarno* (Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia; Special Issue 34, 1959), p. 9.
[14]*Ibid.*, p. 19.
[15]*Ibid.*, p. 42.
[16]Sukarno, *Tahun Kemenangan* (*Year of Victory!*). Pidato Presiden Sukarno, 17 Augustus 1962. (Sukarno's Independence Day speech, 1962.)

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the United Nations, a strident voice in the gatherings of the "non-aligned," the frantic effort to convene a second Bandung Conference, and the avoidance of roles in which their leadership would not be clearly apparent or uncontested—as in the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), composed of Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines. When the International Olympic Committee banned Indonesia from the forthcoming 1964 games, a consequence of the political discrimination practiced by the Indonesian organizers of the last Asian games, Jakarta promptly characterized the Olympic Games as an institution of the "Old Established Order," and announced the intention to organize competing games for the "New Emerging Forces" and their socialist friends.

The creation of Malaysia poses a twofold threat to the Indonesian myths. In the first place, it would tend to rule out the Borneo territories as a field for possible Indonesian expansion. More importantly, it strikes at the heart of the Indonesian image of leadership in Asia, and puts in doubt the universality of the Indonesian values of revolution and nationalism. This casts Malaya, as far as Indonesia is concerned, in the role of a heretic. Jakarta, in advancing its own conception of the national interest, interprets resistance as a sellout to the imperialists. The peculiar vehemence of Indonesian hostility toward Malaya becomes more understandable in this light.

V

Textbooks tell us that one of the basic national interests of a state is the preservation of its political and territorial integrity. This particular interest has preoccupied the Indonesian Republic from its birth. Attacks on its integrity have marred Indonesian unity from the communist rebellion at Madiun in 1948 to the still functioning Republic of the South Moluccas. These attacks have represented two main disintegrative forces at work in the Indonesian state, i.e., the lack of a consensus on the organization and goals of politics (the two extremes are represented by the PKI and the terroristic theocrats, Darul Islam), and the problem of regional autonomy, which has resulted in various separatist movements. When these two currents join, the threat to the state becomes acute. This was the case between 1958-1960 during the Sumatra revolt of the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia).

Dissidence is still rife, and if the present political course is

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followed the separatist and anti-communist pot will boil again. The danger is that a strong, stable, prosperous and democratic Malaysia might prove to be an attraction to the disaffected Sumatrans and others. In many ways the Sumatrans have more in common with the Malays of the peninsula than with the dominant Javanese of the archipelago. It is this similarity of interest which prompted Yamin's denunciation of Pan-Malaya. Indonesian leaders have long charged that Malaya harbored designs on Sumatra. They accused Malaya of having intervened in the Sumatran revolt, and now assert that Sumitro, a leader of the PRRI, has masterminded the plans to create Malaysia. Whether or not the danger is real, the Indonesian leadership must consider the possibility that Malaysia will provide to some a desirable alternative to the Indonesian state. At the least it will assist in wringing concessions from the central government on Java, and if the PKI should emerge victorious from some future power struggle, the Malaysia magnet might become irresistible.

VI

The invocation of the colonial issue by Indonesia has served to cover a number of other interests, the congruence of which led to the Indonesian assertion of power expressed as "confrontation" with Malaya. The methods of Indonesia's political warfare included a propaganda barrage directed against Tengku Abdul Rahman and his government, the rallying of the more radical Afro-Asian countries to Indonesia's side, assistance to the rebels in northern Borneo (if not outright intervention), interference with navigation in Malaysian waters, and alliance with domestic forces in Singapore and the Borneo territories which for reasons of their own oppose the Malaysia concept.

The Indonesians originally put the dispute in simple and politically compelling terms: "If we are to remain true to our principles we must oppose Malaysia, because Malaysia is a tool of colonialism."[17] Now, following the consultations of June 1963, we are asked to believe that this opposition has evaporated; that Indonesia has reappraised the nature of Malaysia; and that Indonesian principles have been transformed.

In the relief which was generally felt as a result of the Manila meeting, certain features of the agreement reached have been exaggerated while others have been overlooked. The Manila accord takes the form of recommendations to the respective heads

[17]Sukarno, as reported by the Associated Press, April 12, 1963.

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of state, and as such are merely tentative. More indicative of the real Indonesian position, perhaps, is the fact that in the Tokyo talks between Sukarno and Rahman, which preceded the Manila meeting, Sukarno apparently maintained his opposition to Malaysia.[18] Another factor which makes caution necessary in considering the June developments is that there is often little correspondence between the statements of Indonesian leaders when abroad and their statements and actions when they return to Indonesia. The apparent Indonesian *volte-face* occurred during one of Sukarno's global circuits, and by the end of June he had not yet returned to Jakarta. Another disturbing element is the fact that the Manila meeting was accompanied by new difficulties along the Borneo border.

Varying interpretations of the new Indonesian position have been given, ranging from anti-Sinicism to a desire to seek cover under the American nuclear umbrella without concomitant obligations. The key to the new Indonesian position, this writer believes, is not to be found in revised Indonesian policy goals. Rather, it appears to be a change in tactics. The Manila meeting did not remove the differences between Indonesia and Malaya. It signified Indonesian recognition of its failure to obstruct the creation of Malaysia by the policy of "confrontation." Short of an Indonesian invasion of non-Indonesian Borneo, an alternative which politically and militarily had to be ruled out, Jakarta would have found itself faced with a *fait accompli*. However, by its belated adoption of an attitude of reasonableness the Indonesians have won a singular diplomatic victory. Malaya has now accepted, albeit tacitly, an Indonesian interest and voice in the future of the Borneo territories. In a vague and general way the Malayans have promised some kind of international determination of the wishes of the Borneo population with respect to Malaysia.[19] Jakarta has finally got its foot in the door. Furthermore, the Indonesian advancement of the idea of a Malay confederation, termed by Subandrio "Mafilindo," lays the basis for continued Indonesian participation in Malaysian affairs. It is even conceivable that Indonesia could further its efforts to detach the Borneo territories from Malaysia within the framework of "Mafilindo" and thus escape the charge of expansionism or imperialism.

[18]A. M. Rosenthal, *New York Times* (International Edition), June 4, 1963, p. 6.

[19]According to the *New York Times*, June 12, p. 2, U Thant is to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Borneo dependencies. The *Times* of London of the same date, p. 11, says a referendum is to be held.

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It seems premature to conclude that the differences between Malaya and Indonesia have been resolved.[20] The Malayans themselves do not seem to have been lulled into a false sense of security. Despite the seeming reversal of Indonesian policy the Malayan government in June again increased its defense expenditures, and now, for the first time, they exceed ten per cent of the total budget.[21] To an American, used to the inflated U.S. defense budgets, this does not seem very large. For Malaya, however, the need for a high degree of military preparedness for an indefinite length of time compounds the already knotty problems involved in the creation of Malaysia, and at the same time introduces a different and more subtle threat to the Malayan state. The cost to Indonesia for its military machine has been heavy: an unbalanced economy, huge budget deficits, inflation, critical pressure on foreign exchange reserves, a large external debt, corruption and a dissatisfied military elite. Must Malaya sacrifice its hard-won economic gains to the creation of a large defense establishment? Must the Malayan economy, already precariously balanced on the fluctuations of the world commodity markets, be subjected to the inflationary expenses of a nonproductive military build-up? If this analysis of the Indonesian challenge to Malaya is correct, then the answer must be "yes"; for the basic issue can be phrased as the survival of Malaya as a strong, responsible and independent actor in Southeast Asian politics.

VII

The Malayan-Indonesian conflict has raised some difficult questions for American policymakers. To begin with, we must assume that alterations in the region's international structure are of consequence to American interests, and that the United States' response will be governed by an appreciation of these interests. One thing is clear: the convenient moral principles which have so often cloaked American action, or lack of action, in the affairs of the "newly-independent" world will be difficult to apply in this case. It is hard to place this dispute in a general category from which we can derive a clear and guiding light. Malaysia is not West Irian, and the Malayans are not the Dutch. Unless we accept at face value the interpretation offered by the Indonesians, the dispute cannot be subsumed under the heading "nationalism-

[20]A week after the Manila meeting the author heard an Indonesian official make a public statement about Malaysia which reiterated all of the standard Indonesian charges.

[21]Seth S. King, *New York Times* (International Edition), June 6, 1963, p. 4.

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colonialism." On the other hand, Sukarno is no Ho Chi Minh, and the Rahman Government is not the embattled Diem regime. It is only by the utmost exaggeration that one can view the Malaysia crisis in the sense of "communism versus anti-communism." If Indonesia continues its policy of opposition to Malaysia, we may put the problem for American policy in this way: Is it in the interests of the United States for Malaysia to be destroyed and Malaya to fall under the "greater Indonesia" shadow? The answer, of course, depends on what we conceive United States interests in the area to be.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been an active participant in the politics of Southeast Asia. The destruction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and the subsequent dismantling of the colonial order exposed the weaknesses of the individual units of the region, weaknesses which were soon exploited by communist aggression and subversion. American security interests largely motivated the intrusion of American power into the area to redress the lack of indigenous power. However, that gap has not been filled. Economic assistance, military assistance, bilateral mutual security pacts and the multilateral engagement, SEATO, are not a substitute for regional, indigenous strength.

The ideal solution is a responsibly governed Southeast Asia, internally stable with a rapid economic growth rate, able and willing to resist any external menace. This kind of regional strength demands association in the form of the development of regional political, economic and defense organizations, linking the communal interests far more meaningfully than mere additive cooperation. Although conditions in Southeast Asia seem, at present, to preclude the development of inclusive regionalism, the nucleus or core of such regionalism does exist in the recognition of common interest on the part of Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines, and their tentative groping for political association. This type of association, if properly encouraged and nourished, could make a significant contribution to regional stability and security. Malaysia shields what otherwise might have become a soft underbelly of the grouping, and removes from contention an area which promised to become fertile ground for the growth of power hostile to the common interest.

Within the scope of American interest, where does Indonesia fit? Taking leave of the myth of Indonesian power and leadership, the United States faces the fact that Indonesia, under its present leadership, does not have an integrative function in world politics, does not contribute to regional stability, does not identify its

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interests with the regional interest, and, if allowed, would pull down any Western-oriented security structure. The U.S. policy of "cuddling up to the Indonesians," as one observer put it, which has achieved so few constructive results, and promises even less in the future, does not furnish the guidelines for a judgment of Malaysia. The question is not one of friendship with Indonesia; it is whether Malaysia fits into the framework of American interest.

The fact that our position has heretofore been ambiguous is mirrored in two widely different reactions to the U.S. role. One side accuses us of complicity in the Indonesian schemes: "Some commentators see something funny in the picture of poverty-stricken Indonesia reaching out for empire in New Guinea and in Borneo; but the dream is being actively encouraged—each for its own diplomatic purposes—by the Communist Powers and the United States."[22] From the other side, we learn that our policy is "anti-Indonesian" and is designed to create "a sort of Formosa on the borders of Indonesia"; "a Western-inspired Malaysia which is not in conformity with the anti-colonial and nationalist aspirations of Asian peoples."[23]

The June developments have not appreciably changed the basic issues for U.S. policy. In its eagerness to maintain a relationship of neutrality or equal friendship with both parties the U.S. runs the risk of undercutting the Malayan position. This danger would become particularly serious if at some future point the United States should, by offering its good offices to both Malaya and Indonesia in an attempt to mediate or compromise the differences, or by supporting Indonesian efforts to internationalize the dispute through the United Nations, indirectly assist Indonesian strides toward hegemony in the area. In the event that Indonesia pursues its overt hostility toward Malaya, the U.S. should unambiguously employ political means, using the leverage of economic assistance, if necessary, to curb Indonesian extremism. We have not hesitated to use the economic tool in Laos or Korea against what was considered an irresponsible Right, and there is no reason why an irresponsible Left should be immune. If the Indonesians should persist, and take actions which lead toward a military collision, then we must be prepared to support nonmilitary sanctions which might be effective, especially in the field of shipping. If necessary, U.S. fleet elements should be moved into

[22]Editorial, *Pacific Islands Monthly*, January 1963, p. 13.
[23]Editorial, *The Eastern World*, March 1963, p. 8.

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this critical maritime region to guarantee freedom of communication between North and South Asian waters. Finally, the possibility of eventual direct American assistance to Malaya, military and other, must be considered.

VIII

The discussion has been focused on Indonesia and Malaya, and the relation of the Malaysia dispute to U.S. interests and policy in Southeast Asia. There are interests of other powers that need also to be considered.

It is to be doubted that the Soviet Union would be a major participant in any conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. From the communist point of view the area falls within the Chinese sphere of influence. This fact is accentuated by the increasingly apparent orientation toward Peking of the Indonesian Communist Party. American support of Malaysia would not lead to a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. Taking its experience in South Vietnam and Laos as a guide, the U.S. might expect fulminations, but no "showdown."

The greatest obstacle to the development of an independent and strong Southeast Asia is expansive Chinese communism. Those familiar with the synchronisms of Asian history note the continuing pattern. The French scholar, Coedès, wrote: "Plus encore, les événements de Chine ont influé d'une manière très nette sur l'histoire de l'Inde extérieure. Les chinois n'ont jamais vu d'un bon oeil la constitution d'Etats puissants dans les mers du Sud."[24] He adds that the periods of indigenous strength in Southeast Asia in general correspond "aux époques d'affaiblissement des grandes dynasties chinoises."[25] In this fashion, we can say that China today is entering a period of new "dynastic" power, and that Chinese pressure on Southeast Asia will increase in the coming years. But the resources which the Chinese can mobilize at this moment in support of the execution of their policy are limited. If American interests are to be firmly secured, and a viable Southeast Asia is to come into being, then the time for action is now, for the military and economic restraints on Chinese policy are not likely to operate forever.

A surprising and complicating factor in the Malaysia problem has been the revival of the Philippines' claim to North Borneo. Actually, as far as American interest is concerned, it makes little

[24]G. Coedès, *Les États Hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1948), p. 6.
[25]*Loc. cit.*

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difference whether North Borneo becomes part of Malaysia or goes to the Philippines. The same purpose is served. Putting aside the question of the merits of the respective claims, Manila's claim is not so much directed against Malaysia as against Indonesia. Ambiguity in American policy and fear of an eventual triumph by Jakarta in the effort to wreck Malaysia may have provoked a pre-emptive reaction from Manila. That the satisfaction of this claim does not appear to be a vital national interest to the Philippine government is suggested by the agreement of the two parties during the Manila meeting to postpone discussion of the claim until *after* Malaysia is created.

IX

American rejection of Indonesia's pretensions vis-à-vis Malaysia, even though rudely received by Jakarta, is not synonymous with being anti-Indonesian, nor does it necessarily mean a diminished concern for the future well-being of the Indonesian state. Indonesia is geographically part of the region, and we must hope that someday it will become a full and sincere partner in regional development. Indonesian efforts to destroy Malaysia are not conducive to regional stability and strength. American policy should be based on its own regional interest and not the fickle friendship of Indonesia. The recent "Humphrey Report"[26] contained a cogent, albeit general, statement of American interests in Indonesia. These interests are: "(1) to help Indonesia gain the strength to maintain its independence; (2) to help it become a politically viable nation; and (3) to assist Indonesia in developing an expanding and self-supporting economy."[27] There is nothing in this statement to suggest that American support for the Malaysia concept is harmful to our interests in Indonesia, nor that the United States must follow uncomplainingly where the vagaries of Jakarta's politics lead. The reverse is true. Both the Humphrey Report and the recent Clay Report on U.S. foreign assistance programs stress the need for Indonesia to put its own house in order. American action to restrain the political adventurism of Indonesia's present leadership would be in the best interests of the Indonesian people themselves. The Indonesian government has been a master of the art of wasting opportunity; it should not be permitted to destroy the opportunities of others.

[26]United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, *Indonesia, Perspective and Proposals for United States Economic Aid* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1963).
[27]*Ibid.*, p. 13.

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THE TAMING OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

by George A. Kelly

WITH the referendum of July 1, 1962 and the transfer of sovereignty from France on the next day, Algeria entered, after seven years of revolution, the international community. The nationalist insurgency against the colonial power had been spurred by a variety of motivations. Some of these continued to shape the conduct of the new nation even after independence had been achieved. Ideology and militarization had created a momentum of their own which now carried "Algerian Algeria" into an eighty days' crisis of bloodshed and anarchy.

Independence was an important way-station, but not a decisive turning point. The war had given Algeria a heroic history, a privilege not granted to most emerging nations. In contrast to many of its neighbors, Algeria was richly endowed with slogans, myths, campaign memoirs, holidays, martyrs and a trenchant nationalism—as well as a number of leaders tested in battle or in the byways of revolutionary diplomacy.

Ideology and action combined to accumulate maximum tension. Because of the political background, the present situation is still a revolutionary one. The colonial power contributed its own hesitations and internal troubles to this equation. The pattern of the war was highly confused because it was fought not only over the issue of colonialism but also over the modernization of native society. As a consequence, the heretofore coherent Algerian revolutionary movement split, in 1962, into two movements. Social and ideological aspirations separated from the nationalist movement which had safely reached its goal. Though in the modern history of decolonization there was nothing especially novel about this process, it had never before occurred with such violence nor in a place so close to Europe.

When two or more components of revolution (i.e., against the social order, against foreign domination) contribute to a single phenomenon, motivations are apt to become confused both objectively and in the minds of the revolutionaries. Legitimacy,[1] in

[1]Algeria's struggle for legitimacy has been of two kinds, which should be sharply distinguished. First, there has been the struggle waged by the individual leaders for the right to rule. In doing so they sought to establish their prestige with the important collective elements of revolutionary power: the Army (ALN), the Fédération de France du FLN, the UGEMA (student union), the UGTA (labor organization), and the CNRA (provisional parliament) itself. Secondly, there

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promising to become a fact, now merits little argument or special pleading; the concern is with power and organization. We have traditionally considered some blend of nationalism and universalism to be the formula of the successful modern revolution. The Algerian case appears to fulfill these specifications. But it is not always easy or feasible to fuse the exigencies of the Rights of Man and *raison d'Etat* once the physical conflict has ended. The balance of these exigencies now becomes the problem of leadership and power, and has ceased to be the mere condition of continuing the struggle.

Nationalism, with its patriotic overtones amplified by war experience, is an irresistible rallying cry, especially where few other common denominators exist in a socially heterogeneous territory. Once the concept of the nation has been widely affirmed, it limits that "universalism" which supplied the slogans for launching the revolution. The preoccupation with organizing a specific geographical inheritance will tend to drive out doctrines developed for all times and all places. Yet, to a degree, the universalist view lives on as an earnest of the idea that struggle does not cease with independence, thus, as countless examples have already shown, giving the leadership sufficient cause for continued vigilance and control and permitting the country a wider latitude in foreign relations. In this way the spirit of the conflict receives new injections of life, even though the enemy, once only too real, has now become abstract and historical.

On the other hand, this continuing revolutionary momentum will raise serious problems for any leadership and will permeate any succession crisis. If the regime grows moderate or complacent, some politician of the opposition on the Left will always be able to rise to the attack by recalling the "principles of the Revolution." Or, in a situation of flux—as Algeria experienced from July to September 1962—the contending factions will be sorely tempted to outbid each other in terms of "principle."

Of course, this sort of bargaining is finally pre-empted by the contrary principle of *order* when the contention reaches such a pitch that it creates intolerable chaos. The persistence of universalist elements of revolution in Algeria does not fatally predicate a future of anarchy and uncertainty (Mexico succeeded, over a

was the matter of establishing the Provisional Government (GPRA) as a legitimate institution in the eyes of the chancelleries and world opinion. The best summary of arguments relating to the latter can be found in Mohammed Bedjaoui, *La Révolution algérienne et le droit* (Brussels, 1961). (See especially the preface by Pierre Cot.)

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period of years, in "institutionalizing" its revolution), but it does place the regime in some peril. The regime must combat the anarchic portions of its own revolution by efficient planning and organization, for economic crisis could easily crush the relatively frail structure of the new order.

Population and Personalism

The role of the population itself—so much commented on by both sides while the war was in progress—must be carefully defined in order to understand the relation between the fulfilled nationalist revolution and the incomplete social revolution in Algeria. Algerian doctrine constructed a myth of the political sagacity of the masses to complement the revolutionary war effort. At the time of the 1962 summer crisis it was widely claimed that the people had refused to countenance the bickering for power between the Center and the *willayas* (area military commands) and among the various leaders and pressure groups, and had enforced a pause and a solution.[2] But this is an oversimplification. The "revolutionary consciousness of the masses" does not mean that the people either propose or dispose. It means that they officially (through elections) or unofficially (through meetings and rallies) confirm the decisions which the leadership has made. They are a constitutional monarch whose imprimatur is necessary for the acts of government. Both De Gaulle and Nasser may well have taught the Algerian leaders important lessons. As we shall see, the September crisis was resolved by coalition politics and the mediation of the moderate factions; the people authenticated the solution by their weary approval.

But as in many societies wavering between old-fashioned regionalism and more complex forms of pluralism, the Algerian masses have the power to make centralism work or to reject it. The discipline of war seeped far enough down into the society to give the people, with a little urging, the broad choice between organization and anarchy. The present success of Ahmed Ben Bella is due in large measure to his superior understanding of this condition and his skill—despite some political errors—in personifying the concept of democratic centralism and using the popular will as a decisive force in his coalitions.

The impression has been created abroad that the leaders of the

[2] *Jeune Afrique,* July 30-August 4, 1962, p. 8. See also, the reports of a month later concerning "fraternization" across the boundaries of Willayas IV and V (Algérois and Oranie).

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revolution, the Ben Bellas, the Ben Kheddas, the Boudiafs and the Si Hassans, were simply jealous rivals in pursuit of the glittering prize of power or, even more fancifully, the chieftains of rival clans. To be sure, these men were hardly personifications of distinct political ideas and alternatives. They were in no sense ideologists opposed to one another. They stood rather for a variety of attitudes concerning the future organization of the Algerian state. Neither their personal differences nor the separateness of their various revolutionary experiences can be ignored. But the Algerian power struggle of the summer of 1962 was essentially a tension between the historical momentum of the revolution and the demands of establishing authority. The new political class, if it did not exhibit statesmanship, did not descend to outright vendetta. Behind the factionalism, there were some political ideas at stake.

Behind the Crisis

We shall now examine the background and content of the crisis in terms of its continuity with the past and its lessons for the present.

In June 1962, the CNRA (*Conseil National de la République Algérienne*), then the nominal governing body of the new state, had unanimously adopted a program sketching the broad political lines of the new Algeria: socialist planning, agrarian reform, nationalizations, liquidation of foreign monopolies, neutralism in foreign affairs, "Algerianization" of education and culture (within the boundaries of the Evian agreements with France), and "unity of the people based on the principles of the Revolution."[3] These declaratory aims reflected principally on the contrast between what Algeria had been as part of France and what she was now going to become.

Notably absent, however, was any positive mention of the organization of the future state and its most pressing corollaries: the power of the executive, the manner of representation, the future structure and mission of the National Liberation Army (ALN), the disposition of the problem of regionalism (*willayisme*), and, in particular, any succinct operating definition of what a "democratic and socialist republic" really is.

Logically, these and other urgent concerns—such as the organization of administration and finance—had to be deferred until the Algerian leadership could physically occupy the entire territory of Algeria. The chaotic disturbances caused by the war itself,

[3]See *Le Monde*, July 15-16, 1962; August 9, 1962; September 5, 1962.

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with its massive agricultural damage and displacement of persons, as well as by the Secret Army holocaust and the vacuum created by the departing *pieds noirs* and their capital,[4] could scarcely be measured at a distance. This postponement of the debate over the purposes of the new state was to lead to the ideological divergencies which manifested themselves in the July-September crisis. It seems that the "ideology of means" is more important than the "ideology of goals" as the decisive moment of nation-building approaches.

If the Algerian leaders were reticent with respect to defining the precise means by which they would rule, it is not only because they differed on the assessment of the concrete situation, but also because they had not resolved their personal disagreements. No one yet knew how the power conflict would be resolved or what sort of coalition would emerge victorious. What followed has been widely represented as a clash of ambitions. Those in power were naturally led to preach consolidation; those whose aims had been frustrated wished the revolution to continue, hopefully in their favor.[5]

For all its staying power, the Algerian Revolution had been extremely diffuse, with both internal and external organizations, foreign pressures and numerous petty centers of power. One had to be an exceptionally balanced blend of realist and idealist to prevail. To survive was not enough; the balance of power in the upper echelons was precarious, which meant that many survived politically because their weight in the total equation was necessary. This situation was rationalized under the doctrine of "collective leadership." It was Ben Bella, Khider, Boudiaf and Aït Ahmed who, in 1950, created the *Organisation Spéciale,* which, reconstituted four years later as the *Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action* (CRUA), formed the kernel of the uprising. After a prolonged prison experience and a sudden vault to power, they loomed heavily over the destiny of Algeria. By the end of the July-September crisis the first two, in coalition, had prevailed; the

[4]One observer's comment at the end of July: "For once, the conclusion is simple: the Algerian economy is paralyzed; Algerian finances are less than zero; a good part of the technicians have left the country." (*Jeune Afrique,* July 30-August 4, 1962, p. 14.) Free repatriation of capital within the franc zone was permitted by the Evian agreements (see "Declaration of Principles Regarding Economic and Financial Cooperation," Title III, Article 10).

[5]Mohammed Boudiaf, who came out of the crisis the loser and most unreconciled oppositionist, had bitter words to say about "the race for power and the momentary conjugation of contradictory interests." See his interview by *Le Monde,* September 7, 1962.

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others, in opposition, had survived. Seven months later Khider himself, unpopular with the army and unreconciled to Ben Bella's image of the organization of the state, would be ousted as secretary-general of the FLN.

The prestige of the leaders taken prisoner by the French in 1956 was not diminished by their physical absence from the councils of the FLN. On the contrary, it increased for a number of reasons. The captives of Aunoy managed to stay in close touch with what was going on; they could continually make their weight felt without having to bear any of the responsibility for collective decisions. In the meantime, despite spasmodic French attempts (both during the Fourth Republic[6] and in the early days of De Gaulle) to turn them into negotiators for a cease-fire, the prisoners were able to communicate their revolutionary intransigence to the outside world and to their own people. A capital stroke was Ben Bella's much-publicized hunger strike in the fall of 1961, which resulted in a more liberal regimen of contacts for him and his compatriots.

The physiognomies of these revolutionaries as they prepared to launch their uprising in 1954 are reminiscent of the swarthy, baleful faces of Young Bosnia in 1914.[7] Eight years (of which almost six in prison) had unquestionably ripened them; they had acquired a sophistication of speech and dress that belied their generally humble origins. It also appears that Ben Bella and Boudiaf had cultivated a healthy dislike for each other during the imprisonment. Boudiaf is what the French would call *agissant,* extroverted, a better revolutionary than a politician. Ben Bella, on the other hand, is indrawn, highly self-disciplined, somewhat feline, and intensely realistic while yielding none of his idealism. Both De Gaulle and Ben Bella, it seems, profited greatly from their different kinds of retirement to acquire a mastery of the art of politics. Ben Bella cultivated prudence, while Boudiaf found a great echo among the younger militants of the FLN.

Also in the prison of Aunoy were Mohammed Khider and Hocine Aït Ahmed. The first of these men, politically formed and of an older generation, turned out to be Ben Bella's engineer, the

[6]When first questioned by the French intelligence services, Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Aït Ahmed, and Lacheraf refused all interest in any Franco-Algerian agreement that might have been negotiable. Khider, older and politically more seasoned (he had been an MTLD deputy in the French National Assembly), delivered a more realistic analysis of the situation and hinted at the possibility of a Maghrebian federation sponsored by the King of Morocco and linked to France. See J.-R. Tournoux, *Secrets d'Etat* (Paris, 1960), pp. 464-468.

[7]A revealing photograph of the founders of the CRUA accompanies Ferhat Abbas' serialized memoirs (published as *La Nuit Coloniale*, Paris, 1962) in *Jeune Afrique,* May 27-June 2, 1962, p. 11.

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strong man of the "Tlemcen group"; the second, young and articulate but lower-pitched than Boudiaf, after a disapproving abstinence from the July intrigues, later entered the Algerian constituent parliament as one of the pillars of the opposition.[8]

By the time the negotiations with France seemed to be bearing fruit, the active agents of Algerian power were Benyoussef Ben Khedda, the head of the Provisional Government (GPRA), and Belkacem Krim, Vice President of the GPRA and leader of the Evian delegation. Ben Khedda had succeeded the sexagenarian Ferhat Abbas at the helm of the GPRA in August 1961 as a result of the power balances within the CNRA and their relation to the negotiations.[9] Krim, the Kabylian, had had a long history of service to the revolution, first as commander of Willaya III and later in various ministerial capacities with the external organization; he drew his strength from his regional position and his earlier connection with the ALN (Liberation Army).

Although unitary Algerian independence would probably have been inconceivable without Evian (the French would have tried to enforce partition in the last extremity), it was exceedingly unpopular with many of the FLN militants and particularly with the Liberation Army. Evian carried the implication—contrary to official mythology—that independence had been won through diplomatic skill and French concession, and not by force of arms. Furthermore, throughout the Algerian war, the most significant feats of combat had been achieved precisely in Willaya III by Krim and later by his friend and successor, Colonel Mohand Ould El Hadj. The militants turned in frustration to the liberated *chefs historiques,* and especially Ben Bella, who had taken great care to avoid all implication in the Evian talks and hold himself in reserve. Ben Khedda and Krim, tarred with the brush of concessions that testified to their diplomatic skill but not to their revolutionary ardor, struggled to hold the GPRA from splitting apart. Ironically, the Evian agreements barred them from Algiers until the referendum, organized under the joint auspices of the French

[8]"Opposition" is perhaps the improper word: the non-Ben Bellist deputies have scarcely been organized as such. Aït Ahmed himself declared (to *Jeune Afrique,* October 1-6, 1962, p. 10): "In my mind, if there is an opposition, it's between the phase now getting under way and the past, the discords, the personal quarrels, and what I have called 'clanification.' My job is to do all I can to contribute to the re-establishment of unity." In the election of Ferhat Abbas as President of the Assembly there were 36 negative or blank votes; Ben Bella failed to receive 53 votes in his investiture as head of government. But shortly afterward (no longer with secret ballot) the government was winning votes by virtual unanimity. This out of a total of 194 deputies.

[9]See my article, "Prospects for an Algerian Algeria," ORBIS, Summer 1962, p. 321.

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High Commission of Christian Fouchet and the Provisional Executive, headed by Abderrahmane Farès,[10] could give them the country. They sat nervously in Tunis while the Ben Bellists, with Khider as their chief spokesman, and the military reinforcement of Boumedienne stood across the frontier of Morocco. On June 26 Khider resigned from the GPRA.

This was the signal for a long series of moves. The GPRA retaliated against the secessionist activities of the Ben Bellists by firing Colonel Boumedienne and his staff, an ineffective order which proved the impotence of the GPRA. Ben Bella, while not resigning from the Provisional Government, dissociated himself completely from its activity. On July 2, Algeria awoke independent but without an effective central authority (unless it was Farès' lingering Provisional Executive). Minus Ben Bella and Khider, the GPRA regained Algiers, while Ben Khedda, setting himself up as a conciliator, seemed disinterested in assuming authority. A month later, he issued a "political testament" blaming all concerned for the crisis and promising to set the facts straight at some future time. Ben Khedda had incurred too many political debts. Now the deposed Ferhat Abbas saw his chance for revenge and threw his weight to the support of the Ben Bellists. Of Ben Khedda he would later say: "Such men should now keep quiet and make themselves scarce instead of continuing to intrigue, sow division, and throw oil on the fire. . . ."[11]

Quickly the Algerian struggle for power now polarized into two camps: the so-called "group of Tlemcen" rallied around Ben Bella, Khider and Boumedienne; and the "group of Tizi-Ouzou" gathered around Krim, Boudiaf and Colonel Mohand Ould El Hadj. The excuse for the rupture was Ben Bella's creation of a "political bureau" as heir to the authority of the discredited GPRA; and a Ben Bellist *coup de main* in the Constantinois (Willaya II) during the night of July 25. After a series of complicated maneuvers,[12] the first phase of the Algerian internal crisis

[10]M. Farès, in sympathy with Algerian aspirations to independence but never a member of the FLN, had been arrested by the French government the previous November, allegedly for funds collecting. Some suspected it was really to establish him as an *interlocuteur valable* acceptable to the FLN. At any rate, Farès, who had once vowed "never to play the El Glaoui in Algeria," used his shrewd political talent to help preserve what was preservable in the country during the last anguished months of French sovereignty and to maintain some semblance of an administration during the eighty days' crisis. He is now a member of the Algerian Constituent Assembly.

[11]*Le Monde*, September 2-3, 1962.

[12]The recapitulation given here is necessarily quite sketchy; for greater detail and comprehension the reader is directed to the tables of events published in *Le Monde*, August 28, 1962 and November 2, 1962.

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was closed on August 2 with the entry of Boudiaf into Ben Bella's "political bureau."[13]

Willayism

The autonomous troops of Willaya IV (Algérois) under Colonel Si Hassan entered the political vacuum of Algiers and took charge of the city on July 29. To understand this event, we shall have to digress on the phenomenon of *willayisme,* which has had such an important bearing on both political and military problems in the new Algeria.

For purposes of the armed struggle against France, the military effectives of the revolution (ALN) were divided into six commands or *willayas,* each under the authority of a colonel. These areas generally followed the divisions which race and geography impose on the territory. By the time of General Maurice Challe's intensive roll-back operations in 1959, the overwhelmingly superior French Army had reduced the ALN to guerrilla activity and had, to all intents, smashed nationalist military power in Oran, Algiers and the Sahara. Kabylia remained always a tough nut to crack, while ALN operations continued on a limited scale in the more mountainous parts of the Constantinois and Aurès. Severe attrition of leaders and effectives led to swift turnovers of authority in the ALN; factional allegiances and difficulties of communication among the parts of the territory made it necessary to establish several centers of authority, often well below the *willaya* level. At the same time, jurisdictional disputes arose between the ALN and the political agents of the civilian authority (*Organisation politique et administrative*) who were dispersed throughout Algeria. Nominally, internal affairs were regulated by a *conseil des willayas,* which was represented in the governing body of the GPRA, but in the war period intense French military pressure impinged on operational unity. The *willayas* grew accustomed to their role as petty revolutionary states.

In direct contrast to these weaknesses, the gradualism of the transfer of Algeria from French to native administration in the period April-July 1962 left the *willaya* commands as the heirs of French authority, while the FLN chafed beyond the borders. The

[13]In the strict sense, the "political bureau" had only *de facto* legitimacy and the GPRA a delegated and revocable power. Responsibility for order and administration in the territory belonged to M. Farès' Provisional Executive, which was to continue to act until the Constituent Assembly should be elected and form a government (this transfer was ultimately made on September 24). The elusive sovereignty of the FLN was theoretically vested in the National Council (CNRA). Once early in the crisis Ben Bella and later Ben Khedda tried to have this organ called into session, but the appeal was unavailing in both instances.

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Provisional Executive could not extend its grasp much beyond the temporary capital of Rocher-Noir and the cities; the French Army was either overcome with lassitude and disgust or was pouring into Algiers and Oran to deal with the OAS. The fragmented *willayas* remained. This is the situation that confronted both the GPRA and the Ben Bellists when they arrived to claim their legacy.

Doubly complicating was the fact that the Algerians had two armies, the haggard guerrillas of the interior of whom we have spoken and the 40,000 fresh, conventionally equipped soldiers of Colonel Boumedienne[14] held at bay by the French border barriers ("Morice Line") since early 1958. Understandably it was these latter who hated the negotiated settlement at Evian the most.

Thus the lines of political conflict were entangled with military rivalries. Boumedienne, with his superior force, managed to assimilate Willayas I, V and VI and to benefit from the *coup de main* in Willaya II. But Willayas III (Kabylia) and IV (Algérois) still held out against the reconstituted central military power (rechristened *Armée Nationale Populaire*), which was supporting Ben Bella and the "political bureau." In the first phase of crisis, Willaya III joined its regional leader Krim and the outraged Boudiaf in opposition. In the second phase the roles were to be somewhat reversed. As we have mentioned, Si Hassan's troops, on July 29, occupied Algiers city, which was not, strictly speaking, part of their territory.

In operational terms, Algiers had been a case apart, surrounded by Willaya IV but distinguished technically as the Autonomous Zone of Algiers. Some bitter internal battles had been waged over FLN jurisdiction in the city in 1955-56 before it fell to a young militant named Saadi Yacef.[15] Then, between the "cleanout of the Casbah" of General Massu in 1957-58 and the Muslim demonstrations of December 1960, FLN activity in the capital had been severely curtailed by the surveillance of the French Army. Si Hassan's action was a direct and serious challenge to both the authority of Ben Bella and the power of Boumedienne.

[14]Colonel Houari Boumedienne, commander of the National People's Army (ANP) and present military strong man; a tactical ally of Ben Bella, who had the following to say of him recently: "Personally I consider him a patriot, a pure and authentic revolutionary, and I could wish for a lot of Colonel Boumediennes in our Algerian revolution." *Le Monde*, September 14, 1962.

[15]Saadi Yacef was captured by Colonel Yves Godard in early 1958; prior to that he had had secret meetings with the ethnologist Germaine Tillion, which are recorded in her book *Les Ennemis Complémentaires* (Paris, 1960). He was liberated by the Evian agreements, and quickly assumed the leadership of the Ben Bellist power faction in Algiers.

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Now both the problems of regionalism and of the character of the national army were squarely posed. It was, in every way, a curious echo of the troubles which the colonial power had been having with its own army, with Algiers once again the center of intrigue. Si Hassan, representing not only the forces of regionalism but also the young militants who condemned the unseemly struggle for leadership, called for full stop: no drastic changes until the Constituent Assembly could be summoned by election. This was completely unacceptable to the Ben Bellists who wanted to utilize their ascendancy to choose delegates whom they could control.[16] At the same time, Khider demanded the immediate reconversion of the National Liberation Army, in other words, the dissolution of the *willayas*.[17] The fat was in the fire. The "political bureau" adjourned the scheduled September 2 elections, causing Boudiaf to resign from the group. On September 3, Ben Bella gave the National People's Army the order to march on Algiers. Belkacem Krim and the staff of Willaya III, while expressing sympathy with Si Hassan's position, readied themselves for mediation rather than battle. This, despite some serious clashes between the troops of Willaya IV and Boumedienne's ANP, implied that a compromise would be reached which would satisfy the "political bureau" in practically all respects. The independent forces of Willaya IV capitulated on September 5, and four days later Boumedienne and his troops made their long-anticipated entry into Algiers. Despite certain incidents, the crisis had been settled and elections were quickly set for September 20. Two political changes ensued: Ben Khedda was stricken from the new election lists and Boudiaf retired voluntarily, thus assuming the leadership of the intransigent opposition.

The Form of the State

The meaning of these confusing events can probably best be summarized under three headings: 1) the issue of the personal struggle for power; 2) the issue of "democratic centralism"; and 3) the issue of the conversion of the army. In these matrices, the chronology of Algeria's first days of existence takes on a semblance of orderliness.

The struggle for power, as we have suggested, was partly a

[16]The "political bureau" with outside consultation did, in fact, choose the lists for the Assembly. No alternatives or *panachage* were permitted the voters in the election of September 20, and a very large Ben Bellist majority was assured.

[17]See *Le Monde,* August 11, 1962.

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function of role and partly one of personality. Power could be won only by skill in coalition politics. Ben Bella, with his prestige and Spartan mien; Khider, with his political acumen; Boumedienne, with his military experience—these three complemented each other well. Their opponents were condemned to the tactical defensive (though Boudiaf's potential strength could not be taken lightly). The *willayas* reached their zenith in the vacuum created by Evian; yet it was predictable that the central authority would prevail in the long run. If Si Hassan did not realize this, Krim and Boudiaf did: they resorted to regionalism for the purpose of checking Ben Bella. If the roles had been reversed, they might well have been the centralizers. What is striking in retrospect is that, after seven years of war, Ben Bella and his team were able to smother the threat of chaos so quickly.

It is probable that most of the Algerian leaders believed in the "democratic centralism" which Ben Bella has been progressively imposing, but hedged their bets until they were sure *whose* centralism it would be. Now, those who oppose Ben Bella find centralism, carried to its extremes, somewhat oppressive.

The centralism of which we speak is the same type of "control for maximum efficiency" which has characterized the government operations of many of the developing countries. It is neither explicit tyranny nor democracy, but rather the instrumental subordination of all means, public and private, to the service of the state. In such a phase, political disagreement is rarely countenanced, except perhaps in the councils of the single ruling party. The edifice is generally constructed on the triad, Party, Army, Administration, all of them subservient to the directives of the State. This threefold differentiation must be scrupulously maintained, but all other pre-existing pluralist forces have to be neutralized. As one commentator puts it:

> How can we escape the confusion? Prerogatives, functions, and therefore powers must be distinguished. One party must become the political force of the nation, the army must be its protection, the administration must regularize the State's power. Until the FLN is differentiated into these three autonomous sectors nothing positive can be done.[18]

The change of personnel in the directorate, keynoted by Khider's resignation as secretary-general of the FLN and passage into opposition on April 18, 1963, was directly related to this question. Khider preferred the centralizing notion of a strong

[18]Kamal Jawad, "La Révélation de Ben Bella," in *Jeune Afrique*, August 11-17, 1962, p. 6.

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Party with political preferences for the urban sector; Ben Bella, with his personal strength among the peasantry, insisted on the strict subordination of the Party to the State.

Probably "centralism" in Algeria is desirable, if only because the country is shattered, staggering under heavy debts, with its educational program and agricultural production a shambles. But this is easier to say than to accomplish: the French discovered this, and the Algerians are discovering it also. Since Algeria is both a modern and a backward country, the progressive pluralism of the advanced sector will not conform to the overall plan without some pain. Ben Bella experienced trouble in limiting the independence of such potent entities as the metropolitan-based *Fédération de France du FLN* (which includes much of the Algerian migrant labor and is Kabylian-dominated); the UGTA (the monolithic Algerian labor union, which had shown great independent vitality); the UGEMA (student organization), and a variety of other groups.[19] Even the ardent young team who ran the weekly *El Moudjahid* had to be replaced. Needless to say, the Communist Party (PCA) has been officially suppressed, amid some yelping from Moscow. The gravest problem for the future is certainly the youth who, whether students or peasants or workers or unemployed, have assimilated both the idealism and the spirit of anarchy of the revolution. They are little content with the politics-as-usual practiced by their big brothers and might furnish potential troops to Boudiaf or someone cast in the same image, if he should cultivate their use.[20] The problem of power in Algeria is that too many resent it for its own sake after experiences which have made it a hated enemy.

The army is another problem. *Willayisme,* aside from its other effects, led to frequent pillage, freebooting and "settling of scores": more than once the Algerian civilians have hooted the soldiers with cries of "The ALN to the casernes!" The regular army (ANP), though better disciplined, also creates antagonism:

[19]Ben Bella's comment: "We know full well how the leaders of these organisms are 'oriented' and 'teleguided.' In reality, they aren't representative. I'm convinced that all that will change with the establishment of the Algerian state. . . ." Interview with Simon Malley, *Jeune Afrique,* September 10-16, 1962, p. 11. Ben Bella fought the UGTA to a compromise in December and conquered it *by force majeure* in January 1963.

[20]A "Party of the Socialist Revolution," reputedly drawn from military cadres hostile to Ben Bella, announced its formation by distributing tracts at the elections on September 20. At the end of October it had not yet decided whether to operate clandestinely. Its relations with Boudiaf are unproved but suspected. All of this recalls the breakup of the *Istaqlal* in Morocco and the opposition of Mehdi Ben Barka.

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its maintenance is a costly burden on a country that is deep in poverty. The Algerian army is simply too big for any probable military uses, and a profitless drain on national resources. As Ben Bella has put it:

> What on earth can Algeria do with 150,000 soldiers costing her 150,000,000,000 francs [*sic*] not to mention weapons and equipment? We are not an imperialist nation! We simply need a strong army, well equipped to defend our independence and frontiers. A third or a quarter of the present figure would be enough.[21]

But this is to calculate without Boumedienne, up to now his ally. The army is, above all, a capital element of power. Caught in the logic of a mythology that speaks at every turn of an "armée issue du peuple," Ben Bella will be hard-pressed to show that he is not attacking the people in reducing the army to modest size. Five MIG-15's arrived in 1962 from the United Arab Republic and five helicopters from the Soviet Union; the pressure for a guerrilla army to reconvert as speedily as possible to a modernized force is a fundamental axiom of new-nationhood and a costly process. The fate and future of the ANP are still uncertain at this writing, although it remains a vital component of Ben Bella's combination.

The Making of a Nation

We have come to a turning point. The Algerian Revolution is history. Its effects carry into the future, but the task of its leadership now is to concentrate the momentum of the insurgency, to turn it inward to specific purposes, to domesticate it. With what did the revolution begin? With a handful of men, some small arms, rather meager resources—and a very vague idea:

> [We had no precise conception] other than national independence and the desire to make the masses take part in the insurrection. The word revolution . . . pointed especially to the way in which we intended to conquer our independence, against the colonial apparatus, on the one hand, by violence; against the reformist and bureaucratic methods of the [pre-existing] nationalist movement, on the other, by exploding the old structures of the movement.[22]

The experience of the revolution may be expected both to inspire it and retard it. Ben Bella acted effectively in the first few months of his mandate. After getting the political situation in hand, he departed on a tour of selected foreign countries where he made his points well and proved his mettle. Having given more

[21]Interview with Malley, *op. cit.*
[22]Mohammed Boudiaf, interview by *Le Monde,* November 2, 1962.

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sober attention to relations with France during the crisis than many of the other leaders, he took action to revive the confidence of the power on which Algeria depends most of all for aid, investment and technical expertise. Then he attacked specific problems —restoration of finance and administration, utilization of abandoned lands, intensive plowing campaigns, stopgap measures for education. The communists, hoping for a resurgence, found themselves little better off in Algeria than under Gamal Abdul Nasser. Capitalism, as the *gros colons* once knew it, is dead. Ben Bella has given every earnest of wishing to halt the anarchy of his revolution and to channel its remaining energy into concrete enterprises, often with an agrarian bias.

Amid all this, a new Algerian personality is struggling to emerge. The Islamic soul, with a considerable contribution from the colonial experience, is wrenching itself into modern times and is deeply concerned, as in Egypt, lest it become something other than itself. Ben Bella himself is acutely conscious of this tension as he works during the day on agriculture and *planification,* then goes publicly at sunset to say his prayers in the chief mosque of Algiers, formerly the cathedral. He has two Algerias to deal with: one the most modern of all parts of Africa except for the Republic of South Africa, whose potential he cannot afford to abuse in the name of revolutionary principle; the other, vowed to extinction but still close to the reverie of Amrouche:

> Another space, another time than the space and time of the West. A pure and inhuman space: the space which God has reserved for the visible manifestation of his power and glory, the space which God has not conceded to man.[23]

Across this wide gulf, which is as much psychological as economic, bridges must be thrown. Now the revolution, taming itself, channeling its energy, must show the capacity to build them. Otherwise, a time of troubles is in prospect. The noted ethnologist Jacques Berque writes: "Thus [the North Africans] find themselves plunged into the dispute between the authentic and the effective, which probably is the most searching debate in which they have become involved since their conversion to Islam."[24] The Algerian personality, drawing on all its sources, will take time to evolve; but at last there is no doubt that two personalities would be one too many.

[23]Jean Amrouche, *Algérie* (Lausanne, 1956), p. v.
[24]*Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (Paris, 1962), p. 423.

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THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE UN

by Franz B. Gross

THE relationship of U.S. foreign policy and national interest to the purposes of the United Nations has been the subject of debate since the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco. In fact, ever since the earlier League of Nations became a reality, the proper U.S. attitude toward international institutions has been the subject of investigation both by those responsible for policy decisions and by the American public.

The "winds of change" which have blown hard upon the world during this last decade have had their effect on the United Nations. The organization is not the same institution envisaged in 1945; indeed, it would be an indication of sterility were this so. These changes make imperative frequent re-evaluations of the aims and purposes of United States foreign policy and its effect upon policies and trends influencing the United Nations and its organs.

The need to review U.S. policy toward the United Nations was emphasized in a speech by Senator Henry M. Jackson, which was notable for three salient points. The Senator stressed that we need to take another look "at our role in the United Nations, remembering that the UN is not a substitute for national policies wisely conceived to uphold our vital interests"; he questioned whether our "present relations with the United Nations assist the wise definition of our vital interests and the establishment of sound policies"; and he emphasized that the United Nations is "and should continue to be an important avenue of American foreign policy."[1]

A re-evaluation of U.S. policy toward the UN might well begin with an examination of recent changes within the UN and in the methods of multilateral diplomacy.

I

When, on November 30, 1962, Acting Secretary-General U Thant was elected to a full term as Secretary-General of the United Nations, he shared the platform with Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a Pakistani, and C. V. Narasimhan, an Indian. Only a little more than a year before, the same key positions had been held

[1]"The U.S. in the UN: An Independent Audit." Address by Senator Jackson at the National Press Club, March 20, 1962.

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by Dag Hammarskjold, a Swede, F. H. Boland of Ireland, and Andrew Cordier, an American. These changes seem symbolic of trends in the United Nations. It would be mistaken, however, to assume that they are more radical than indeed they are. For a Swedish civil servant has been replaced by a Burmese neutral, ex-British schoolmaster, i.e., one "neutral" by another; an American college professor by an Indian civil servant of long service with the United Nations; and, in the normal process of geographic rotation, an Irish diplomat by a Pakistani who was formerly a Justice of the International Court of Justice.

Essentially, one group of officials of the English-speaking community has been replaced by another group which shares in large part similar ideas and attitudes.[2] Yet, since the latter group comes from former colonies in Asia, it reflects undeniably a change in emphasis in the world which is now mirrored in the United Nations. There seems little doubt that the former dominance of Europeans and Americans in the UN is gradually being replaced by the control of a group of Asians and Africans who, though educated to share many of the principles and aspirations of the former, bring to their tasks minds steeped in the struggle for independence.

If the United Nations has faced the problem of blending Asian and African aspirations into an organization founded on essentially European institutions, United States foreign policy concerning the United Nations has also faced its dilemmas, wavering between isolationism and internationalism, between idealism and realism.

II

In the United Nations, a new dimension of diplomacy challenges United States policy. Formerly, relations between states were, to a large degree, conducted through confidential negotiations between diplomats trained in the centuries-old art of reaching agreements by "playing the game" according to mutually accepted rules and values. In many respects U.S. policy is still geared to bilateral diplomacy, reacting to the exigencies of each crisis and parleying with the parties concerned only as situations arise. The role of U.S. policy in the United Nations often appears to be that of a pained and anxious spectator rather than that of a leading actor.

[2]It was not without pride that Muhammad Zafrulla Khan said to U Thant after his election, "Asia has yielded up one of its best for the service of the United Nations but U Thant does not belong to Asia alone; he belongs to humanity."

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The new dimension of diplomacy might well be called international parliamentary diplomacy since, although no body of the United Nations has true legislative functions, its resolutions have substantial influence on the outcome of important issues, even including some that touch on war and peace. Diplomats often engage in speech-making for the purpose of wooing domestic support; yet the gap between what the negotiator can achieve and what domestic public opinion can accept is frequently widened by public exposure.

A further important aspect of UN multilateral diplomacy is the minute scrutiny to which U.S. policy is subject in the international forum by all states opposed for one reason or another to the United States. Each U.S. statement provides an opportunity for attack by the Soviet bloc, which misses no chance to distort issues and to gain some measure of support from nations basically hostile to the United States or normally "neutral" in most conflicts, or even nations generally friendly to the U.S.

Ideally, the United States should seek to engage the United Nations only in problems where substantial support for its position can be won, and to prevent lengthy debates or resolutions on other questions. Although this ideal objective cannot be reached under all circumstances, the U.S., by careful planning, the development of good diplomatic relations with other delegations, and the seizure of the initiative on all possible occasions, can exercise a more consistent leadership and greater control over the UN agenda.

III

The search for an effective U.S. strategy in the United Nations should also include an examination of the traditional American attitudes toward world affairs, particularly the differing approaches of the realistic and the idealistic schools.

The roots of the realistic and idealistic views of U.S. policy toward the United Nations go back to America's outward development since the turn of the century. President Theodore Roosevelt, a strong proponent of the policy of realism and expansion, addressed Congress, in 1904, as follows:

> All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any nations whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an

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impotence which results in a general lessening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

He further stated that intervention, at least in Latin America, though it should be based on American self-interest, was really a moral duty:

We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.[3]

President Roosevelt advocated a policy of action based on national interest, yet tempered by the moral precepts of American traditions.

Under Woodrow Wilson, self-imposed limitations on U.S. power became the essence of U.S. foreign policy. President Wilson stressed American idealism without, however, losing sight of power realities. In an Independence Day speech delivered just before the outbreak of World War I, he stated:

My dream is that as the years go by and the world knows more and more of America it . . . will turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom . . . and that America will come into the full light of day when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America, but of humanity.[4]

Only three years later Wilson was forced to send a message to Congress asking for a declaration of war.

We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.[5]

However, Woodrow Wilson's dream of a concert of all free peoples was only partially realized. The League of Nations was created; but the United States did not join it.

[3]House Documents (4780), 58th Congress, 3rd Session, No. 1, p. XLI - II.
[4]Ray S. Baker and William E. Dood, *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1927), Vol. III, p. 147.
[5]*Congressional Record,* 65th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 55, Part I, p. 102.

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Nevertheless, the State Department developed a policy toward the international organization. Since the defeat of the Covenant in the Senate counseled prudence, the Department confined itself at first to limiting U.S. intercourse with the League to occasional liaison through Swiss, French or Netherlands channels. From March 4 to August 19, 1921, the State Department did not reply to communications received from the Secretary-General of the League. In the summer of 1921 it even neglected to forward—until that failure was publicized—invitations to the U.S. members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to nominate candidates for the Permanent Court of International Justice. This affront to a large body of American opinion was soon corrected, however, and a more courteous procedure of sending prompt but stereotyped and negative replies was adopted—to continue for many months after unofficial American organizations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, and individual Americans had begun to cooperate wholeheartedly in the work of the League.

During the second stage, when matters of interest to the United States were discussed, a policy of official cooperation issued in the appointment of representatives to attend various permanent committees of the League. Still, the appointments were always carefully camouflaged, conveying the impression that such actions of the United States were not official. This formula served for some years as a bridge between Washington and Geneva, though the bridge was too frail for heavy traffic. The elections of 1924 paved the way to more confident U.S. action. In 1925, the U.S. government was fully represented at two important conferences held in Geneva—the Conference on Opium and the Conference on Arms Traffic. Regular representation at special conferences continued thereafter.

In 1932 a direct line of telephonic communication was installed between the League and the Department of State. The third stage of official cooperation had started, and, in June 1934, Congress formally approved United States membership in the International Labor Organization.

The steady growth of U.S. cooperation declined somewhat in the first term of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who displayed marked indifference toward the League. Although in the second Roosevelt term the State Department tried to cooperate fully with the League, the next test case, the Italo-Abyssinian war, found the United States bound by neutrality legislation. Despite general

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approval in the U.S. of League sanctions, even among supporters of the Neutrality Act, the Secretary of State could reply to the League committees only with expressions of good will, not with firm commitments.

The rising menace of Hitler and Mussolini and the weakness of the League without United States support finally induced President Roosevelt to attempt to educate public opinion to the necessity of a positive attitude toward international organization in order to curb potential aggressors. In his famous Quarantine Speech in Chicago, Roosevelt tried to turn the tide and to convince the American people that

> There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.[6]

The exact intent of the President's speech was not clear, particularly since he was known to look with substantial reservations upon collective security arrangements. His words met with strong opposition which seems to have induced him to maintain a prolonged period of silence.

Roosevelt's warning was therefore not immediately heeded; it took the shock of World War II to arouse public opinion against "world lawlessness." Then, following the precedent of Wilson, and in the highest tradition of American idealism, Roosevelt proclaimed the Four Freedoms, cherished by Americans, to be applicable to everyone, everywhere in the world.

The Second World War wrought a decided change in American attitudes. It had become clear that support of an international organization was a necessity for a peaceful world as well as in the best national interest, and was not merely the fantasy of dreamers and idealists. As early as December 1939 the State Department

[6]President Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech (October 5, 1937), *Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 383-387.

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created a Committee on Peace and Reconstruction. Gradually the President veered to the conviction that a general security organization designed to replace the League of Nations would have to be planned and founded. This position, a blending of idealism and realism, was reflected by U.S. foreign policy at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, and, later by the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations in the summer of 1944 during which the United Nations Charter was devised.

The plans for the United Nations incorporated Woodrow Wilson's idea of a parliament of nations; Theodore Roosevelt's concept of a (U.S.) police force used under international control and based on the moral duty of great powers to keep order; and finally, Franklin Roosevelt's emphasis on common action to preserve the international order as the best safeguard of the United States' vital interest in peace and security.

IV

The Charter of the United Nations was essentially a product of the wartime alliance between the United States and its Western allies and the Soviet Union. It was based on the experiences of the League, although both the United States as a nonmember of the League and the Soviet Union, expelled from the League after the attack on Finland, carefully refrained from any reference to the parent organization.

For the United States, the new international organization was a potential guarantor of permanent peace and the potential controller of an effective international police force. Voices of caution and warning were scarcely heard during the early postwar period. It seemed as though, after years of isolationism, internationalism was to be the bulwark of U.S. policy, and security was to be achieved through collaboration among the Great Powers, particularly the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. This spirit of collaboration preceding the first General Assembly, in January 1946, led to the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission by unanimous vote on January 24. But in that same month, with the introduction of the Iranian complaint into the Security Council, the atmosphere deteriorated, and in March and April of the following year the Cold War came to the surface for the first time.

U.S. foreign policy, based on a commitment to the territorial integrity and political independence of all nations, large or small, had little choice but to insist upon the complete evacuation of

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Soviet troops from Iran. This move was deeply resented by the Soviet Union as unwarranted interference. The United States had previously warned the Soviets that, should the dispute remain unresolved, it would feel compelled to support the Iranian complaint.[7] The way the case was handled convinced the Kremlin that, two days after the inauguration of the Security Council, Iran had raised the complaint at the instigation of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. The Soviets were displeased at the breach in the "solidarity" of the Great Powers and felt that their apprehension concerning their minority position in the organization had been justified. Confronted by a hostile majority, they were forced to withdraw from Iran. When the Soviets came to realize that the United States had every intention of performing in the spirit of the Charter, the Cold War began.

Moreover, Stalin considered the concern of the Western powers over Eastern Europe another case of interference in a mutually agreed sphere of Soviet influence. The Western governments were supposed to be tolerant of Soviet interests in this area. Later, a precedent with unfavorable implications for the Soviet Union was established when the West secured action through the United Nations to defend the independence of Greece, where communist influence eventually was eliminated by the British and Americans. The Soviets have always contended that the Yalta agreements had given them a free hand in Eastern Europe; they claim that their extension westward was based on this assumption. Thus, they viewed with concern the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the "hostile capitalist world" which was now considered to be interfering in their "legitimate" sphere of influence. In fact, because of this feeling, even before the San Francisco Conference the Soviets had, in comparison with their businesslike attitude at Dumbarton Oaks, lost interest in the forthcoming negotiations which would establish the UN.

This impasse forced U.S. policy in the United Nations to take a new turn. The assumption of Great Power collaboration had collapsed, and a new working basis for the future had to be found. However, at the time, the American public was still riding the first wave of enthusiasm for the new world body. It was therefore inopportune to inform them of the problems and tribulations ahead.

[7]See James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 119-120.

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V

Up to this period the people of the United States were willing to agree that the principles of the Charter should be regarded in the same order of precedence as they were given at San Francisco. It was assumed that the first duty of the United Nations was to induce all nations to preserve peace (Preamble of the Charter) and that war was outlawed (Article 2, paragraph 4). Second priority was given to the establishment of human rights, and third priority to guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political independence of all states, by sanctions or military force (Chapter VII) if necessary. Fourthly, steps for the attainment of higher standards of living, social progress and cultural cooperation were to be promoted (Chapters IX, X). Finally, colonialism was to be eliminated gradually through the institution of self-government on the basis of the paramount interest of the inhabitants.

These five principles were (and are) in full accord with American aspirations and could be supported without reservation. The United States therefore could, with enthusiasm, assume leadership for the achievement of these ideals. However, with the breakdown of wartime collaboration the United States was forced to shift its position and withdraw its support in many areas. Social and political pressures, and financial limitations, caused a reduction of U.S. support on human rights programs and, later, on humanitarian and social problems as well as economic development plans. The International Bill of Rights, for instance, was still under discussion in 1963, and the proposed Court was no longer even under serious consideration.

Just as the highest hopes of the United Nations in the economic and social spheres were limited partially by lack of U.S. leadership and active support, so also agreements in the Military Staff Committee were prevented by Soviet obstruction. The International Police Force which, according to the Charter, was to have been created to enforce Security Council decisions and to preserve collective security, was abandoned. Nonetheless, through a series of makeshift arrangements, the United Nations did succeed in keeping the peace by its action in preventing any major outbreak of hostilities in Iran, Indonesia, Kashmir, Greece and Palestine. It was in Korea that the United Nations met its first decisive challenge.

At the time of the Korean attack, the major problem confronting the U.S. was to achieve approval for concerted action by the

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United Nations despite the lack of a standing military force. The act of aggression was confirmed by a United Nations Commission already in existence. Since the Soviet Union had decided to leave the Security Council, the United States was able to secure the passage of a resolution declaring North Korea the aggressor. On the basis of that resolution, the Commander of the U.S. forces in Japan was made the Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces in Korea.

The UN action in Korea seemed to indicate that a world body could successfully engage in collective action. In the days of the League, the Abyssinian conflict had dealt a severe jolt to the concept of collective security; in the United Nations era, the first action against an aggressor nation was successful.

Once again, there was a coalescence of realism and idealism in U.S. policy. The idealistic school condemns aggression anywhere in the world as an attack on the territorial integrity and political independence of a nation, while, from a realistic viewpoint, the United States was committed to the support of South Korea for reasons of its own national interest. The sanction of the international organization permitted the United States to fight for the purposes of a concert of nations instead of being unjustly branded as waging a "colonial" war.

VI

As an aftermath to the conflict, two questions arose. First, would the Security Council be able to act in support of U.S. foreign policy in other cases of aggression if the USSR were present and capable of exercising its veto power? Second, how should aggression be defined?

The first issue was resolved with considerable dispatch when the General Assembly in 1950 passed the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," proposed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. This resolution provides that any seven members of the Security Council, by a procedural vote, can take any dispute off the agenda of the Council and move it to the General Assembly. The Assembly can then make recommendations to the countries involved. Like any other proposal, this one may not always operate as its originators intended it should; it may some day work against the interests of its proponents. The "Uniting for Peace Resolution" has been used since 1950 mainly by the Soviet Union against the Western powers, as in the case of Suez and Lebanon. Nevertheless, it still retains its basic justifica-

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tion: In the event of an act of aggression, the Western nations can move the issue to the General Assembly and appeal for military action without the threat of Soviet veto.

The second question, "What is aggression?", is one of the key problems in the interpretation of the Charter. A great many discussions have been held without reaching any agreement on a clearly defined statement. Therefore, we might go back to the definition of aggression accepted by the League in a Committee of the Disarmament Conference, in July 1933, which gave the following five criteria:

(1) Declaration of war upon another State;
(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
(3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.[8]

As a definition, it must be viewed in relation to the current international situation, particularly with respect to the establishment of missile bases in a third country, but it is still our most authoritative definition of aggresssion.

It is of importance, after the events in Suez, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba and Yemen, that the United States should seek agreement with other nations on the establishment of *one* standard for all parties acting in aggressive ways against their neighbors. Unfortunately we have at present essentially three standards —one for the Western nations who cleave to the letter and spirit of the concept of aggression; a second for the USSR and the East European satellites who sometimes follow its letter but rarely its spirit; and finally, a concept for former colonial territories who feel privileged to disregard established principles and attack their neighbors without fear of counteraction by the United Nations. Examples of the latter are India's action in Goa and Indonesia's absorption of West Irian, as well as Egyptian intervention in the civil strife in Yemen.

[8]These criteria were accepted in treaties by the Soviet Union with Afghanistan, Estonia, Finland, Iran, Latvia, Poland, Rumania and Turkey.

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VII

As the UN's activities developed, other divergencies among its member-nations became apparent. While the United States continued to stress questions of peace and security and human rights, a great number of the UN members—particularly from Latin America and Asia—interested themselves primarily in economic development projects for which they hoped to receive support through the creation of new financial institutions (to be financed chiefly by the United States, Great Britain and France).

At the same time the Asian nations, under the leadership of India, emphasized questions of racial conflict and colonialism. India, in particular, in every Assembly, brought to the agenda the issue of the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa—though this question does not lie clearly within the jurisdiction of an international organization and might be considered as "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of South Africa. Previously, the issue of independence for Indonesia, at first considered to be within the realm of United Nations action, was referred back for solution to the parties concerned; in order to act it would have been necessary for the United Nations to assume that peace and security in the rest of the Far East were threatened by the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Nevertheless, the perennial "Indian" issue in the General Assembly led to other attempts to weaken the "domestic jurisdiction" clause. Gradually, colonialism and the treatment of African and Asian peoples by their colonial rulers or white settlers became a major concern of the United Nations. This emphasis was strengthened when, in 1960, 17 African nations were admitted, to be followed by more in 1961 and 1962; by 1963, the African and Asian nations comprised 50 per cent of the membership of the UN.

In 1960, a resolution sponsored by 43 African and Asian nations was adopted by the General Assembly. Called the "Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," it was adopted with 89 in favor, none against, and 9 abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States). The resolution affirms the right of all peoples to self-determination. It reads in part as follows:

Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any

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conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.[9]

The abstention of the United States signified opposition to a resolution which supported immediate—and mostly premature—independence for all countries irrespective of the state of their economic or political development. Yet for lack of a well-planned strategy, the U.S., despite a long tradition of supporting self-determination and freedom for colonial territories, found itself among a small minority in apparent opposition, while the Soviet Union, with widespread dominion over Asia and control over Eastern Europe, could align itself with the Afro-Asian countries, Latin America and most of Western Europe in a loud affirmation. Effective U.S. leadership might have forestalled the situation by initiating wide support, including the more "liberal" governments among those which abstained, for a more concrete and less ill-advised expression of determination to see all men their own masters as rapidly as possible within the framework of international order and assistance.

Since the passing of this resolution in 1960, efforts to focus each successive General Assembly on the issue of colonialism have been successful. The 16th and 17th sessions, in 1961 and 1962, passed resolutions calling for the implementation of the original declaration. The 1962 resolution

> Calls upon the Administering Powers concerned to cease forthwith all armed action and repressive measures directed against peoples who have not yet attained their independence, particularly against the political activities of their rightful leaders;
>
> Urges all Administering Powers to take immediate steps in order that all colonial territories and peoples may accede to independence without delay.[10]

The transition-of-power problems of Great Britain were hauled before the United Nations, although they were essentially questions to be solved by Great Britain and the territorial leaders, and on the whole were solved by them with some success. However, the Soviets did not miss the opportunity to champion the Afro-Asian cause, particularly in the case of Southern Rhodesia. Speaking on this issue in 1962, Platon Morozov of the USSR declared that that territory must receive independence during

[9]GA/RES/1514 (XV), *Official Journal,* December 14, 1960. See also, GA/RES/1654 (XVI), *Official Journal,* November 23, 1961.

[10]GA/RES/1810 (XVII). See the *United Nations Review,* January 1963, p. 91.

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1962, and stated that the 1961 Constitution was "from beginning to end a racist constitution" without provision for universal suffrage or representative administration and government.[11] Coming from a Soviet envoy, such a statement is not without temerity and irony.

The United States position on colonialism—wavering between idealistic support of independence for any people and realistic support of its NATO allies, and seeking proper administrative, economic and military preparation of the ex-colonies so that they will not be subject to communist influence—has created a situation where it has at times been opposed by Africa, Asia, Latin America and part of Western Europe.

The leaders of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations could not have prevented a debate on the colonial issue. There is at present no way to keep an item off the agenda of the General Assembly, except by securing a majority negative vote—an unlikely occurrence, given the present membership of the world body. However, in the future, the United States should attempt to seek support for the establishment of a screening committee whose duty would be to ensure that each subject discussed conforms to the letter and spirit of the Charter, i.e., that each subject is primarily a matter of peace and security and international concern, and not intervention in a domestic affair.

The U.S. and Western position supporting a strict interpretation of the Charter received a near-fatal blow when India decided to occupy Goa, Damao and Diu in December 1961. Ambassador Stevenson solemnly declared that "at this fateful hour in the life of the United Nations" the Security Council should earnestly urge India "to withdraw its armed forces from the territory it has invaded." Mr. C. S. Jha of India countered that this was a colonial question, that India was eliminating the jurisdiction of colonialism, that Goa and other Portuguese enclaves were an integral part of India, and that there could be no question of aggression against one's own "frontiers, against one's own people."[12]

Only seven countries voted in favor of condemning this act of aggression— just enough to pass the resolution had there been no Soviet veto. But the Soviet Union voted against a cease-fire and restoration of normal conditions in Goa and resumption of

[11]"Assembly Considers Proposals on Southern Rhodesia," *United Nations Review*, July 1962, p. 11.
[12]S/PV 988, December 18, 1961, p. 53.

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negotiations between Portugal and India, as did Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic.

The Indian delegate, Mr. Jha, defending his position, stated:

We are criticized here by various delegations which say, "Why have you used force? The Charter absolutely prohibits force"; but the Charter itself does not completely eschew force, in the sense that force can be used in self-defence, for the protection of the people of a country—and the people of Goa are as much Indians as any other people. . . .

I have been misquoted by the representative of Turkey. I have not said that we do not accept international law—we are governed by the tenets of international law—but that we cannot in the twentieth century accept that part of international law which was laid down by European jurists—though great men, great jurists whose contribution to law has been really remarkable—specifying that colonies in Asia and Africa which were acquired by conquest conferred sovereignty on the colonial power. That is no longer acceptable. International law is not a static institution. . . . Just as the process of decolonization is irreversible and irresistible, the embodiment of the principles in resolution 1514, which has been accepted by virtually every member around this table, is irresistible. One cannot go behind that now. That is the new dictum of international law.[13]

Ambassador Stevenson gave expression to the feelings of the majority of the Security Council members in his concluding remarks:

I believe that I am the only representative at this table who was present at the birth of this Organization. Tonight we are witnessing the first act in a drama which could end with its death. The League of Nations died, I remind you, when its members no longer resisted the use of aggressive force. So it is with a most heavy heart that I must add a word of epilogue to this fateful discussion, by far the most important in which I have participated since this Organization was founded sixteen years ago.

The failure of the Security Council to call for a cease-fire tonight in these simple circumstances is a failure of the United Nations. The veto of the Soviet Union is consistent with its long role of obstruction. But I find the attitude of some other members of the Council profoundly disturbing and ominous because we have witnessed tonight an effort to rewrite the Charter, to sanction the use of force in international relations when it suits one's own purposes. This approach can only lead to chaos.[14]

A double standard had been established. Aggression in cases such as Suez and Hungary was to be treated differently from "liberation" of territories by an ex-colony. India proved willing, for the sake of a few square miles, to disregard precedents and

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 52-55.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

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any previously accepted definition of aggression. The United States was powerless to mobilize the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly to ensure Assembly action after the Soviet veto. While it might be said that on issues concerning colonialism the majority of Afro-Asian nations is willing to adhere to a double standard, the situation demonstrates also the lack of leadership of the United States and other nations who have, in the past, supported the principles of international law and order.

The degree to which U.S. leadership has diminished is shown by a General Assembly resolution passed on November 9, 1962 against the policy of "apartheid" in South Africa. This resolution, despite opposition by the United States, Great Britain, France and even Japan, was passed by 67 votes in favor, 16 against, and 23 abstentions.[15] The Charter in Article 41 specifies that it is the duty of the Security Council to "decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to give effect to its decisions" after it has (under Article 39) determined "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." Nevertheless, despite the Charter's clear delegation of these responsibilities to the Security Council and despite the absence of any "threat to the peace" or "aggression," the General Assembly requested member states to take the following measures: to break off diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa; to close all ports to all vessels flying the South African flag; to enact legislation prohibiting the ships of each state from entering South African ports; to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa; and to refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the government and companies registered under the laws of South Africa.[16]

Obviously the General Assembly has the power only to recommend action, but resolutions passed by the majority of Afro-Asian states with Soviet connivance seem to disregard any limitations on the Assembly's authority. However much any state would like to condemn the domestic policies of South Africa's government, this question is hardly a threat to international peace and security.

[15]Besides the United States, Great Britain and France, the following states voted negatively on the resolution: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Turkey. Abstentions were: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela.

[16]*United Nations Review,* December 1962, p .68.

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VIII

As it did in the time of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the United States must assert its active leadership as a world power, not the least in the United Nations. In accordance with American traditions and ideals, U.S. policy should support the newly independent countries in their struggle for full and real independence. But the United States has an even greater interest in seeing that change is effected without violence, i.e., within the provisions of the Charter concerning the use of force. Any sudden dislocation of local administration, such as the events following the abrupt granting of independence to the Congo, is likely to lead to bloodshed and provide an opening for communist intervention. Similarly, in the Cuban missile crisis, the existing balance of power, which the Soviet Union sought suddenly and clandestinely to alter, had to be restored to the *status quo ante* to avoid a conflict. It is in the vital interest of the United States to exert all necessary efforts to uphold international order and provide for evolutionary, not revolutionary, change.

There is general agreement in the United States on the essential function which the United Nations fulfills and on the need to overcome certain weaknesses in the UN caused by the sudden influx of new nations. Therefore, it is to be hoped that the United States will soon re-evaluate and define, in terms of the national interest, the long-term purposes and policies of the U.S. in the UN.

This policy must be a blending of the traditional concern for world peace, and for the enjoyment of freedom and human rights by all men, tempered with a realistic appreciation of the exigencies of the current international situation. Long-term policy aims should include a redefinition of aggression to include situations peculiar to the nuclear age, as well as acceptance of certain minimum standards to designate "aggressive intentions"; renewed interest in the importance of human rights for all persons irrespective of race or color, including the rights of minority groups; and a new emphasis on economic development. The U.S. might also support the creation of a stand-by military force ready to intervene in the face of aggression. While such a force cannot deter major powers bent on aggression, it can intervene to settle or even prevent local conflicts between smaller powers.

Action should be taken immediately to ensure that the United States and other responsible nations are not in the minority

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when resolutions contrary to the spirit and intent of the Charter come to a vote. The first step in this direction should be an effort by the United States, as the leader of a world-wide group of free nations, to consult regularly with various groups and blocs within the UN, and eventually to organize a large caucusing group under U.S. leadership. This group should include Western Europe, Latin America, the Commonwealth and a number of countries in Asia and Africa such as Japan, Iran, the Philippines, Turkey, Lebanon and the Monrovia group in Africa. There is little doubt that such a group would be able to agree on common aims and policies and to exert influence in most areas under consideration.

A second step, for the purpose of preventing the abuse of the voting procedures in the United Nations, would be the reorganization of the General Committee of the General Assembly. This Committee, which by tradition consists of the President of the General Assembly, the Chairmen of the seven main committees, and thirteen elected members, always includes the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Committee could easily be reorganized, granting permanent membership to all countries contributing more than 1 per cent of the budget of the United Nations plus six (or more if it seems necessary) elected members representing the smaller nations of Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth. On the basis of the 1962 scale of contributions, the Committee would be increased from 21 to 24 and would include the five permanent members of the Security Council and 13 others eligible for continuous membership: 4 from Western Europe (Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden) ; 2 each from the Commonwealth (Australia, Canada) , Latin America (Argentina, Brazil) and Asia (India, Japan) ; and finally, 3 members of the Soviet bloc (Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ukraine) . The President of the Assembly and the Chairmen of the seven main committees would automatically be representatives of countries with permanent or elected membership on the Committee. A committee composed in this manner would most likely act to ensure peaceful and orderly change, and to prevent the cluttering of the agenda with items designed mainly to gain domestic support for some specific delegation.

IX

It seems clear that in a rapidly shrinking world which contains an increasing number of national units and potential problem areas, the United Nations has become an instrument essential to

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the interests of the United States. These interests can be advanced through consistent efforts in bilateral and regional diplomacy, combined with global parliamentary diplomacy in the UN. U.S. aims and purposes should be regularly proclaimed, and every effort made to attract friendly and neutral nations to their support.

But however important the formulation of purpose, the execution of strategy, and the mustering of support, these are not the only dynamics of leadership. The essence of leadership goes beyond. The leader in world affairs today must have the self-confidence born of knowing that his own purposes and intentions are those which will attract support across the globe.

Consider the highlights of U.S. policy and strategy in the post-war era: the Marshall Plan, the Point Four program, the decision to fight in Korea, the Open Skies proposal, the offer to pool atomic resources for peaceful purposes. Not all these plans were entirely successful, but all are examples of inspirational leadership based on confidence of purpose. In spite of all Soviet counter efforts, these policies were widely hailed as the fulfillment of a peculiarly American mission. To find and to project this confidence and this purpose is the great challenge to U.S. leadership in the United Nations.

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COMMUNISM'S DISCORDANT LEADERSHIP: MAO AND KHRUSHCHEV

by Slavko N. Bjelajac

DIVERGENCES and disagreements between the leaders of Soviet communism and Chinese communism have frequently disturbed the tranquillity of the world communist movement since 1945. In the first half of 1963, the two communist giants appeared headed for a showdown over the most vital issues which confront communist leadership, e.g., the proper strategy and tactics to be employed against the West. This rift and the possible consequences and opportunities for the West have been interpreted in a variety of ways. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the causes of the communist "split" and reappraise its effect on the Free World.

Each time the West learns of a new debate between Peking and Moscow, there is increased hope that critical differences really exist between these two powers. Western writers and politicians have seen in the reputed differences the solution to the East-West conflict. To some, the differences are a favorable factor which, somehow or other, will ease world tension; to others, the differences will eventually alleviate the West's political and military responsibilities, thereby decreasing its need to maintain a strong defense posture.

The wish has been father to the belief that the two communist giants will sooner or later wage war on one another—leaving the West to sit by and enjoy the spectacle of evil destroying itself. When both have bled to death in an unresolvable conflict, then the ideals of democracy will triumph throughout the world, all the worries of the Free World will be ended, and there will be no need to continue sacrifices to maintain freedom and democracy.

The event in the communist world which led many Western authorities to expect that irreconcilable differences would split the communists into two warring camps, was Khrushchev's condemnation in 1960 of Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Communist Party, and Communist China's decision to champion the Albanian communists. Since then open verbal dueling and not-so-subtle attacks have exacerbated both party and governmental relations between Peking and Moscow. The European satellites and other

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communist parties have been brought into the affair by the Soviets as obedient cohorts to lend support to Moscow and to make the Soviet position appear justified. No communist party has been left out of it. Peking's comrades have even accused Khrushchev of being an opportunist and a weakling, a traitor to the communist cause. Not a few observers feel that the increasing severity of recent exchanges indicates the approach of a head-on collision between Moscow and Peking. While the quarreling among Albanian, Chinese and Yugoslav communists originally seemed to be nothing more serious than a family spat, the subsequent overt Soviet-Chinese dialogue has led many authorities to speculate that a definitive rupture may result.

What has hurt Khrushchev the most, it is widely surmised, was the statement made by Peking officials that he pulled back from the Cuban adventure not from fear of possible U.S. reaction but from fear of what the Russian people would do. "If there is a war, the Soviet Government will be destroyed by the Russian people and not American nuclear bombs."[1] This statement, a reflection of "capitalist" desire, suggests a problem which may well be the Soviets' "Achilles' heel." In any event, the Kremlin refused to remain silent. The Kremlin, primarily by using its satellites and their communist parties as spokesmen, accused Peking of trying to push the Soviet Union into a world war with the United States, a "paper tiger who has nuclear teeth."[2] Chairman Khrushchev, speaking through Tito's mouth, complained that Peking's policy was to provoke mutual extermination of the Soviet Union and the West so that China could inherit the earth. Later, Khrushchev himself, answering the Chinese charge that he "capitulated to imperialism" in Cuba, reminded Peking of the "colonial enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao."[3] Furthermore, Moscow has maintained a relatively noncommittal attitude toward the recent Sino-Indian conflict.

Development of the Discord

Divergences do exist between Mao and Khrushchev. It is necessary, however, to appraise these divergences with dispassion. We must not delude ourselves into believing what we ardently wish:

[1]Roy Essoyan, "China Officials Call K. a Traitor," *Washington Post*, November 14, 1962.

[2]Victor Zorza, "China Prints K. Speech—It Ignored 2 Months," *Washington Post*, February 21, 1963.

[3]Stephen S. Rosenfield, "K's Speech—China is the Troublemaker," *Washington Post*, December 13, 1962.

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that the two principal communist powers of the world will have a falling out which will lead to a war of extermination between them or, at least, to a permanent break-up of the communist empire.

The first axiom which the Free World should bear in mind is that the differences existing between China and the Soviet Union in no way affect the strategy the West must develop to combat communism. What is needed is a positive strategy: an offensive based on the strength, the resources and the philosophy of the Free World. It is not enough to adopt a policy of containment and then hope that the communists will split apart and eliminate themselves. Even if we assume that the Soviets and the Chinese will eventually wage war on one another, this event is most unlikely to occur until both the Chinese and the Soviets are assured that there is no longer any danger to them from the "imperialist bloc."

Not all differences between the Chinese and Soviet communists are necessarily a product of the post-Stalin era. Some causes extend back many centuries and are to be found in the political, economic, cultural, territorial and ideological factors which have influenced the relationships between these two nations. China and Russia have known periods of hostility, friendship, intervention, collaboration and military conflict. Russia has traditionally been aware of the vulnerability of her long frontier with China and Mongolia. From the other side, China has frequently considered the Russians to be as barbaric as any other peoples of the world. However, there has never been irreconcilable enmity. Despite the many issues which divided the two countries, they have managed to maintain reasonably good relations with each other, even in periods when they felt less constrained—than they do today—by outside forces to resolve their differences.

As early as 1949, the Chinese communists recognized the preeminence of the Soviet Union and of Josef Stalin as the leader of world communism. Mao made it clear, however, that the Chinese communists were determined to retain in their own hands complete power over the development of communism in China. The Chinese communists were grateful to Moscow for helping them to seize power in China; they were all the more resolved to be the masters in their own country and eventually to gain for it an appropriate place in the communist camp. That place, the Chinese believed, was an equal partnership with the Soviet Union in extending communism throughout the world.

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While Stalin was still alive, Mao assumed a relatively independent position within the communist camp. With Stalin's death, he became the only communist leader who had passed through the school of protracted revolutionary warfare. Author of volumes of political treatises, an outstanding communist theoretician, ideologist and revolutionist, Mao was already, at the time of Stalin's death, considered by the Chinese communists and by some of the leaders of other communist parties, to be the equal of Marx and Lenin.

Despite his pretension to leadership in the communist movement, Mao continued, throughout the 1950's, to stress to the Chinese people the importance of lending China's full support to the Soviet Union, "the head of the Socialist camp," at all times and in all matters. He has taught the Chinese communists to believe in the unquestioned authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leaders. During his visit to Moscow in 1957, he reiterated the "eternal and indestructible friendship" between China and the USSR.

Nevertheless, an early rift between Mao and Khrushchev resulted from the "great leap forward," a frantic effort by Mao, using "original" Chinese methods, to solve the problems created by the so-called "people's communes." Khrushchev and his Central Committee, benefiting from experiences in the USSR, opposed Mao's policy, and warned him of its inadvisability. Mao, however, turned a deaf ear; he and his Central Committee had better knowledge than Khrushchev of China's needs. This rejection of the Kremlin's advice angered Khrushchev. As a consequence, the Kremlin and its European satellites recalled, in summer of 1960, the majority of their specialists and advisers from Communist China. Since then both the Soviet Union and its European satellites have reduced their collaboration with Red China in the fields of ideology and cultural affairs. The Soviets no longer exhibit their films in China (although they have, paradoxically, increased the number of radio programs beamed to China). The journals *Druzhba,* published in Peking in the Russian language, and *Suchung Yu,* published in Moscow in Chinese, have ceased to appear. Information on Communist China virtually disappeared from the Soviet press; and, in the fall of 1960 and spring of 1961, it was difficult to obtain Soviet newspapers and journals in the bookstores of Peking.[4]

[4]K. Pavlov, "Communist China: A Reluctant Dragon," *Bulletin,* Institute for the Study of the USSR, Vol. IX, April 1962.

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Divergences between Chinese and Soviet communism came to light only after Stalin died and after the internal struggle for power weakened the Kremlin's leadership in the communist world, thus raising Mao's prestige within the bloc and in the communist parties of some of the underdeveloped countries. Nevertheless, during the 1950's it was not possible to detect in the relationship between Moscow and Peking any fundamental problems that might lead to an irrevocable clash.

Nature of the Divergences

The differences between Khrushchev and Mao should be categorized, not so much as a clash between two arbitrary dictators, as a clash between two trends in modern communism and between the different interests of two countries. Mao, who represents in some ways the orthodox Stalinist form of communism, is inclined toward the unrestricted use of crude force, oppression, deceit and military adventure. He has also shown a willingness to digress from communist orthodoxy in respect to the application of communist revolutionary principles to the peasant masses. Khrushchev, on the other hand, favors a more subtle approach. This approach, in Mao's view, is both too "soft" and too slow under present world conditions.

In general, the divergences in the trends of modern communism fall into two broad categories: first, the determination of the correct ideological foundation upon which communism will be based, as well as the selection of the communist leadership which will interpret this ideology and thereby assume the role of spokesman for the communist world; and second, which approach to adopt toward the outside world—that of peaceful coexistence, or "adventurism" and war.

The divergent and clashing interests separating the USSR and China do not involve primarily territorial claims or questions of a political nature. These seem to be less significant. Of much greater impact is the problem of economic relations which, although not emphasized in their quarrel, seems to be a significant factor contributing to their differences.

Divergences on Ideological Philosophy and Leadership

Mao claims for himself and for the Chinese Communist Party full partnership with the USSR and the accompanying right to participate in the ideological leadership of communism. He bases his claim on his accomplishments in China, beginning with his

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astounding victory in 1949 which brought China and its teeming millions into the communist bloc. He is convinced that imaginative leadership is lacking in the Kremlin; Communist China now has the only leader who can be compared to Lenin and Stalin. Furthermore, he asserts that he has not only built a communist machine in China which is more effective and efficient than the Soviet Party, but also that he has assembled a revolutionary, fanatic cadre superior to that which the Soviets could ever create. Mao is not modest in advancing his claim to be a party theoretician, a mass organizer, a revolutionary leader, a military genius, a national hero, and the chief of government. In his view, he has no equal in the Kremlin.

Does Mao have further evidence to support his claim to be the leader and spokesman of world communism? By taking the inflexible and somewhat narrow Marxist-Leninist teachings on world revolution by means of the urban proletariat and adapting them to the special conditions in China with its peasant masses, Mao has contributed more to the communist cause than any living communist. He has proved that the peasantry can and should be utilized by communist parties, even if there is a strong urban proletariat. The peasantry, therefore, can be either the primary or the secondary weapon of revolutionists, depending on the conditions of the area. His imaginative and bold revolutionary movement ended in a full victory for communism in China. His methods for accumulating power were later extended to Indochina, and, more recently, he has given hope to other revolutionaries in Asia and Latin America. His unconventional revolutionary tactics have been followed in almost all communist movements in Asia, including those in Laos and South Vietnam. Castro and "Che" Guevara followed his teachings in Cuba.

Mao believes that because he has demonstrated that the peasant masses can be utilized for the purpose of revolution, there now exist wider possibilities for communist penetration into underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. World communism owes him, Mao believes, recognition as the worthy successor to Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Mao's philosophy and his example have brought the era of colonialism to its end and have awakened national liberation movements in every corner of the colonial world. "Imperialism" is today, Mao contends closer to its death than ever before in the history of mankind. He has been the principal instrument of that downfall.

Mao holds that the doctrinal faithfulness and ingenuity

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of the Chinese communists were directly responsible for the introduction of communism into China. This feat is further proof of China's right to assume the ideological leadership of world communism. Mao also believes that he has clearly demonstrated China's superiority over the Soviet Union in the practical application of communist tenets to government. For example, the establishment of some two hundred thousand communes, including cities as well as villages, is an indication that true communism is closer to attainment in China than in the Soviet Union. The communes, Mao alleges, are developing into a basic social unit in the true communist pattern, thereby hastening the "withering away of the state." According to Mao, the creation of this type of a communist system is still only a remote possibility in the Soviet Union. The creation of the "people's militia" and, more recently, an army of the communes also hastens the "withering away of the state." The development of a people's militia, a real army of the people, has not been duplicated in the Soviet Union.[5]

Mao also claims credit for settling the Kremlin's ideological difficulties with the satellite states in 1956-1957. Gomulka, the Polish communist chief, contended in 1956 that there were paths to socialism different from those espoused by the Kremlin and openly supported the views of Tito's Yugoslav Communist Party.[6] When Moscow seemed unable to settle this serious dispute, Mao stepped into the breach. Aware of the disintegrating effect that the Polish stand would have on communism and certain that Khrushchev was incapable of devising an ideological compromise to bridge the gap between the East European satellite states and the Kremlin, the Chinese communist leader provided the formula to pull the communist world together.[7] He stressed the need for socialist solidarity in the face of the capitalist threat. In order to maintain this solidarity, he stated, recognition of and adherence to Soviet leadership was required. However, because of the different conditions which existed in the several states, it was

[5]Information on the People's Militia is found in the *People's Militia Handbook*, Parts 1 and 2 (People's Publishing House, Chekiang Province, 1958; prepared by the Political Department of the PLA in the Chekiang Military District, Military Service Bureau, Chekiang Province).

[6]According to Gomulka, "The model of socialism can vary; it can be such as created in the Soviet Union, it can be shaped in a manner as we see it in Yugoslavia; it can be different still."

[7]See "International Stability, Problems and Prospects," *TEMPO*, R 60TMP-90 (Santa Barbara, California, February 1961, prepared for the General Electric Company), p. 156.

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necessary to admit that separate paths could lead to the same goal of socialism. Mao's function was that of a mediator. Chou En-lai, who was sent by Mao on the East European fence-mending trip, remarked: "Even if no unanimity can be reached for the time being, it would also be normal to reserve the difference while upholding our solidarity."[8]

The incident demonstrated—to Peking, at least—that the Kremlin needed the assistance of China's Communist Party to resolve differences with the satellite states and to restore the Kremlin to its position of leadership. For the first time in the history of communist relations, Peking's influence had been felt in Eastern Europe.[9] Because of this intercession, Mao gained prestige both as the leading theoretician of international communism and as a harmonizer.

Mao's compromise formula accomplished three things: first, it helped to maintain the Kremlin's primacy; second, it satisfied the satellite states by conceding that different roads to socialism were possible in achieving communist goals; and, third, it saved socialist solidarity in the face of the "capitalist threat." As a reward for this and other contributions to the solidarity of the communist cause, Mao wants the right to participate at the highest levels in communist affairs, including the right to approve or veto those programs and policies which he believes are useful or detrimental to the cause of world communism. This emergence of Communist China poses two questions: Will there be two centers of leadership in the communist bloc? And, if so, might these two centers proceed on opposite courses, in open competition and sometimes hostility to each other, until capitalism is destroyed and the world revolution acccomplished?

Which Philosophy: Peaceful Coexistence or War?

Mao and his communist comrades subscribe to the classical Marxist-Leninist concept that war between the socialist and captialist camps is inevitable. In their view, wars help the cause of communism. World War I made possible the establishment of communist power in the Soviet Union. World War II made possible the rise of communism in China and in the European satellite countries. North Vietnam also fell to the communists in part because the French were unable to cope with the postwar

[8]Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 282.
[9]*TEMPO, loc. cit.*

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conditions which provided fertile soil for the Viet Minh revolt. World War III, the Peking communists claim, will bring communism to the United States and spell the doom of the capitalist world.[10]

Mao openly proclaims that China is not afraid of war, whether nuclear or conventional. He believes that a nuclear holocaust may kill 300 million Chinese, but there will still remain another 300 million Chinese. The effect would not be the same in the industrialized West, because there would not be a 50 per cent survival factor. He believes in the relationship of numbers; therefore, no matter how heavy the losses China may suffer in a war, he contends that China will have more survivors than any other nation in the world. Chou En-lai was quoted as saying that after the next war, there would be "20 million Americans, 5 million Englishmen, 50 million Russians, and 300 million Chinese left."[11]

Mao's attitude toward war and the reliance he places on it is the product of his philosophy. He has a fanatical belief in the efficacy of force and he lacks all respect for human lives when they may be sacrificed for the sacred communist cause. He still maintains this attitude; he continues to be an ardent revolutionary in every respect. Mao believes that China's vast territory and its huge population are the country's greatest assets in the nuclear and missile age. The introduction of communes may also, in Mao's view, be a crucial advantage in wartime, inasmuch as the communes are localized and believed to be capable of independent survival in case of nuclear war.[12] Mao considers any protracted period of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist system to be impossible; war between the capitalist and communist worlds is inevitable.[13]

Mao and his colleagues, possessed by an implacable hatred of the capitalist world and an undiminished revolutionary fervor, seem to have lost their sense of realism. For them, the capitalist world is on the verge of collapse. Mao does not fear the destructive power of modern weapons. He is willing to acknowledge the present technological superiority of the capitalist world, but he scoffs at the military potential of the West by referring to the United States as a "paper tiger." For him, it is the people who are truly omnipotent—when led by devoted communists. Mao

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[11] Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 403.
[12] *TEMPO, op. cit.*
[13] Pavlov, *op. cit.*

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and the Chinese communists believe a more energetic and aggressive policy will spur the development of communism and the destruction of capitalism. They do not completely reject peaceful coexistence, for it will provide them, as well as the Soviets, with many opportunities to undermine and destroy the enemy. But for Mao this policy, by itself, promises too little, too late. He is impatient. He would like to live to attain the goal to which he has dedicated his life.

Khrushchev, like Stalin, believes in preserving the Soviet Union as the base for world communism. From this citadel, moral and material support is available to any group which desires to overthrow the systems of colonialism and capitalism. The USSR must be strong enough not only to resist any imperialist aggression, but also to serve as the supporting base for the conduct of "just wars." China can give support to small revolutionary bands in underdeveloped lands waging liberation wars, but it is still too weak (and unreliable) to become a base on which world communism could depend in the event of a general war.

In fostering communist revolutionary activities in the underdeveloped areas of the world, Moscow and Peking do not necessarily coordinate their efforts but they probably have reached a general understanding. Both are dedicated to the eventual destruction of U.S. influence and power in these areas and replacement by communist regimes like Castro's in Cuba. They would appear to have differences of opinion as to whether Moscow or Peking is better qualified to provide leadership and revolutionary guidance to the underdeveloped areas. "But while broadly agreed on the objectives in Latin America, Moscow and Peking have clearly come into conflict over key issues of Communist strategic and tactical policy, especially with regard to support of national movements and methods of effecting eventual Communist conquest of political power."[14] The Chinese are "sticking to their guns"; they contend that the only sure road to communist victory in areas like Latin America lies in promoting armed revolutionary struggle.

In his address in 1959 to Soviet leaders in the electric power construction industry, Khrushchev enunciated the real meaning of the doctrine of coexistence when he stated that "as far as the relations between socialist and bourgeois ideologies are concerned, there can be no coexistence; and we don't conceal this." Lenin's

[14]Daniel Tretiek, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XII, January-February 1963.

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teachings on this subject are clear: "communists fully recognize the legitimacy and necessity of civil wars; wars of oppressed against its oppressors"; and "for the prevention of wars, the condition *sine qua non* is the annihilation of capitalist states and the installation of Communist governments."

Chairman Khrushchev has warned that war is now too devastating to be inevitable, and that war may kill so many on both sides of the Iron Curtain that the communist victory would be a hollow triumph. He is also a firm believer in the superiority of socialism; in his view, the socialist bloc is capable of producing, in the future, much more than the capitalist camp. These convictions lead him to assert that capitalism can be destroyed by means of "peaceful coexistence," Soviet style. Khrushchev knows that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence is generally acceptable to the West because it abhors war and desires nothing more than fair, peaceful competition with the communists in building a better world. The real meaning of Khrushchev's philosophy is far different. He believes neither in the abolition of wars nor in the type of peaceful coexistence the West wants. To him, peaceful coexistence is a state of professed peace, which permits all manner of covert operations against the capitalist camp wherever a weakness becomes manifest, thus slowly sapping the resources of capitalism, leading eventually to its destruction. For Khrushchev, the communist, there can be no "peace" until capitalism has been abolished.

Two Soviet political ideologists, Arzumanian and Korionev, in an article in *Pravda,* September 1, 1960, stated that "'war can be prevented through the struggle of the working classes and masses of the capitalist countries." Restated from communist jargon, this means the use of infiltration, subversion, uprisings and wars of liberation to replace conventional and nuclear war. Communists accept, by the logic of their dialectic, that the struggle of life and death between the communist and noncommunist worlds is the law of history and that this struggle can neither be abrogated nor altered by any agreements between governments. The Declaration adopted by the communist parties at the 1957 Moscow Conference reaffirmed that "as long as imperialism is preserved, there will be aggressive wars." An offer made to the Western world by Mikhail A. Suslov, member of the Central Committee (CPSU), reveals the real meaning behind Soviet peaceful coexistence: "the communists prefer for the non-communist countries a painless transition from one social system

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[meaning democratic] to another [meaning communist] more than by force."[15] The Soviets want peaceful coexistence, but only on their terms. These terms are surrender or destruction; the Kremlin offers no other alternative to the Free World.

In his statements condemning wars, Khrushchev has never said that the USSR has renounced the use of war as a means of settling differences with the West. On the contrary, he has threatened the missile destruction of the United States during the 1962 Cuban crisis and of the whole Free World during the Berlin crisis. Khrushchev remains willing to launch a surprise attack if the appropriate situation arises.

In summary, Mao and Khrushchev have the same clearly defined aims: *the destruction of capitalism and the installation of a world communist system*. The differences between them relate to timing, to the tactics to be used to attain the goal of communism, and to the official attitude to adopt, meanwhile, toward noncommunist countries.

Divergences of an Economic Nature

Divergences of an economic nature fall into two categories: China's economic and industrial dependence upon the USSR and other countries; and the economic aid which the Kremlin gives to noncommunist countries. In recent years, the Soviet Union has reduced the level of its economic, technical and military aid to China with the result that her development program has been considerably slowed and her managerial and ruling class placed under very serious strains. Mao's China is attempting to play the role of an economically independent nation while in reality she is dependent on aid not only from the Soviet Union but from other communist and noncommunist nations as well. Mao does not like to recognize that dependence; he boasts that China will some day surpass, industrially, not only the Soviet Union but the Free World.

With regard to the second category of economic differences, Mao considers unjust the assistance which Moscow grants to other countries, especially when they are noncommunist. He is disgusted with the Kremlin's generosity toward noncommunist countries such as Iran, Turkey and India. Mao may have three reasons for criticizing this Soviet aid policy. First, he believes that Soviet aid serves no communist revolutionary cause, for some

[15]Statement made at the 20th Party Congress, Moscow, February 1956.

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of the recipient countries have become more stable, in political and economic terms, and less vulnerable to revolutionary upheavals. Second, Soviet aid to China has been severely cut back as aid to such countries as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Ghana increases. Third, China realizes that Soviet aid to other countries promotes the Kremlin's, and not Peking's, interests. The Soviet decision to send MIG's to India at the time of the border crisis in late 1962 suggested to the Chinese that the Kremlin was looking after its own narrower interests rather than those of the communist bloc as a whole—and Peking's in particular.

This issue of economic and other forms of assistance points up the differences between the Kremlin's and Peking's attitudes toward peaceful coexistence and wars of national liberation. The Soviets believe that the impact of their aid to India, at least until the recent Chinese attacks, was advancing the communist cause. According to some observers, Soviet experts on India had, as early as 1956, approved Nehru's socialism as a contribution toward the achievement of a "People's Democracy." They expected that the successful implementation of future phases of this Indian socialist experiment would require further imitation of Soviet methods and the domestic assistance of the Indian Communist Party. "Economic planning following the Soviet example and assisted by Soviet planners, state ownership of key industries, land reforms and similar measures were considered manifestation of 'progress' toward the achievement of the socialist revolution."[16] Peking, on the other hand, believes in more radical measures: the direct provocation and support of revolutionary armed struggle of the Castro type which the Chinese communists contend was inspired by Mao's teachings, and the use of guerrilla warfare and other violent means for the achievement of communist goals. Mao believes that time works for the capitalists; therefore, each opportunity for advance must be fully exploited.

Conclusion

In the foreseeable future, Peking and Moscow will each have their own spheres of influence and operation; these, now roughly defined, allot the East European satellites to the USSR, and the East Asian states to China. "Gray" areas, such as Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, remain competitive areas where both will labor to advance the cause of communism. Both Moscow

[16]Peter Toma, "The Problem of Foreign Aid," *East Europe*, February 1963, p. 6.

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and Peking are now active in these areas. Indeed, some observers believe that even East Asia—for example, Laos and North Korea—is now becoming a sphere of rivalry. At the least, the regimes in these two countries are highly dependent on Soviet aid.

The emergence of two communist centers portends neither a split nor the existence of insurmountable barriers between the USSR and China now or in the near future. There are many reasons to support this conclusion. Together, they are much stronger than either could be alone. They hold the common belief that history is on their side, that capitalism is doomed to fall, and that they embody the aspirations of the masses and are the "wave of the future." Their common dedication to the communist cause and their enmity toward the capitalist camp will bind them together so long as capitalism endures.

The Soviet Union, without China, risks the disintegration of the communist bloc and the loss of the extensive frontiers now defended by China. The Soviets, moreover, would lose China's unlimited manpower which they might need in the event of a general war. China without the Soviet Union would be a weak second-rate power—the true "paper tiger." China is still a backward country, economically dependent on the USSR and the European satellites. At the conclusion of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1962, China found herself in dire need of foreign (Soviet) specialists, aid and equipment. The Chinese armed forces and Chinese industry are already feeling the ill-effects of reduced Soviet aid. China, for its own preservation, is most unlikely to precipitate a final split. Moreover, Khrushchev's personal position, not only within the Kremlin but also throughout the world-wide movement, has been strengthened during the past two years. The Chinese, as well as the Soviets, realize that a break between them would greatly weaken the communist bloc and obscure the vision of a communist millennium.

Although communist ideology has been somewhat weakened as a result of this internal debate, the overall operational effectiveness of communism may have been increased because of the active, if competitive, role of China in the affairs of world communism.

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Reviews

Atlantic Economic Problems: A European View*

by Herbert K. Folpe

Those who labored patiently for the creation of a study and action body to serve the Atlantic Community have been richly rewarded with the publication of *Partnership for Progress,* the first completed work of this new organization, The Atlantic Institute, founded in Paris in 1961. This brief study explores the problems of commercial, agricultural, financial and development aid policy which now impede progress toward closer economic cooperation in the Atlantic area. The importance of the study stems both from the eminence of its author and the bold ideas it puts forth for solution of the economic problems of the Community.

The primary author, Pierre Uri, former chief economist of the European Coal and Steel Community and one of the authors of the Treaty of Rome, has long served the "European Union" movement as its chief economic braintruster. Working quietly, removed from the public view, Uri has left his personal intellectual imprint on the institutions which form the heart of the European integration movement. Carrying these impressive credentials, Uri deserves the closest American attention. The success of his schemes over the last decade suggests his ability to translate the theoretical insights of economic science into viable institutions able to solve long-standing problems.

This book gives the American reader a chance to become familiar with Uri's position on various subjects; heretofore, Uri has transmitted his wisdom by whisper to his political superiors during negotiations with the United States. In this sense, the study could be aptly subtitled "The Atlantic Partnership as Seen from the EEC," as it comes close to being a public statement of the Community's position on the questions of trade, aid and finance.

Uri opens the study with a discussion of the tenets of commercial policy which should guide the liberalization of the trade of non-agricultural commodities in the Community. The author notes the two intellectual foundations of protectionism: the strong tendency to confuse competitive conditions in a particular industry with those in the national economy, and the notion that cost relationships existing in a closed market will remain the same under conditions of free trade. Uri asserts that the changing nature of production costs under conditions of freer trade renders both these notions fallacious and justifies a policy of gradual trade liberalization.

In the context of these theoretical underpinnings, the analysis of the present obstacles to freer trade in the Community becomes both understandable and persuasive. Three obstacles to the liberalization

**Partnership for Progress: A Program for Transatlantic Action.* By Pierre Uri. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 124 pp. $2.95.

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of trade are pinpointed: the existence of prohibitively high tariffs or "peaks" in the U.S. tariff structure as compared with the uniform and average level of EEC tariffs; the general question of objective criteria for determining a "fair" tariff level (the general problem within which the U.S. "peak" problem serves as a specific case); and the question of the varying methods of calculating tariffs.

The writer presents the strong case which can be made against the "high" U.S. tariff structure. A simple recitation of the comparative "peaks" in the U.S. and EEC tariff structures is almost enough to clinch Uri's case. He notes that "Europe has only seven types of non-agricultural products on which the common external tariff exceeds 25 per cent and the maximum (applied only to carpets) is 40 per cent, while the United States has 110 types of non-agricultural tariffs for which protection is easily 50 per cent and in many cases even 75 per cent." At the very least, these facts shift to the United States the burden of proving, in future GATT negotiations, that the height, per se, of the tariff is not the primary protectionist obstacle in the Atlantic Community. The U.S. position is that the most damaging protectionist devices are certain nontariff elements, e.g., the Italian tax on high-horsepowered automobiles and the French ban on the advertisement of grain whiskeys.

The U.S. "peak" problem is also central to the author's policy proposals. Uri argues that the principle of "linear" tariff reduction, i.e., an across-the-board reduction in a national tariff structure as opposed to item-by-item reduction, should guide future tariff negotiations. To compensate for the "significant disparities" in the U.S. tariff structure, this "linear" approach is qualified in one important respect, namely, that percentage cuts should differ for the various countries of the Community.

The study also calls for the abandonment of the application of the "most favored nation" clause to tariff reductions granted by the United States and the EEC to each other. The paradoxical effect of this clause at present is to limit any reduction of tariffs among the nations of the Atlantic Community to a level which will keep out the best placed challengers of the underdeveloped world. In place of this clause, Uri offers a rational and practical solution. The industrialized nations would abstain from demanding tariff concessions from the underdeveloped world. In exchange, the poorer nations would ensure that the increase in their sales of sensitive items, e.g., textiles, would be gradual. This twofold program, when combined with the author's fresh ideas for revamping the world's pattern of agricultural production and trade, goes far toward reconciling the two major economic problems confronting the noncommunist world, namely the stability of its developed portion and the growth of its underdeveloped portion.

The author turns his attention next to the most complex economic problem confronting the community: trade in temperate agricultural commodities. The intractability

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of the problem is matched by the boldness of Uri's solution. In place of the present national policies of price support and trade restriction, which have led to a depression of so-called "world prices" and an inverse relationship between demand for agricultural products and their price, Uri would substitute a system of free trade. A three-step program is outlined to achieve this goal. Domestic methods of price support would be gradually abolished in the nations of the Atlantic Community. Monetary grants, earmarked for the purchase of food, would be extended by the developed nations to the underdeveloped world. These grants would be financed by funds formerly committed to price support and "food for peace" plans. The beneficiary nations then would be allowed—in gradual steps so as to prevent abrupt dislocations in the agricultural sectors of the West's economies—to buy food from the cheapest producer. In this manner, the agricultural production of the developed world would be rationalized and the hunger of the underdeveloped nations alleviated. The plan cannot be faulted on logical grounds. It does, however, come to grief in the jungles of domestic agricultural politics. The chances of passage of this program in any legislative body, whether the German Bundestag or the U.S. Senate, appear slim. Thus, Uri's program must remain an ideal toward which the Community may strive, rather than a program for immediate implementation.

In contrast to this agricultural program, the author's suggestions for coordinating and expanding financial aid to the underdeveloped world suffer from a breakdown in logic. The basic suggestion is that the size of the Western aid effort should vary inversely with the movements in the terms of trade of the underdeveloped world. The logical foundation of this policy is the view that the gain reaped by the developed world from a deterioration in the terms of trade of the less developed world represents an unearned increment of income or "windfall profit," unrelated to any effort by the nation which earns it. Thus, Uri argues, it is only fair in principle to repay the windfall.

The thesis is subject to many criticisms. The short-run price fluctuations and the long-run price deterioration of primary products, which lie at the heart of the "terms of trade" issue, stem from many differing causes. In the short run, the cyclical phenomena of lessening demand, brought on by the nature of the business cycle in the developed nations, and the overproduction of these products by the underdeveloped world are the culprits. On the other hand, the long-run secular decline in the terms of trade is attributed by most neutral observers to the more efficient use of raw materials in the industrialized nations. Whether the short-run phenomena amount to "unearned" income for the developed nations is a moot question. In the long run, however, there can be no question of the "earned" nature of the improvement in the terms of trade for the developed nations. In this latter situation, an increase in

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economic aid to account for changes in the terms of trade amounts to a penalty for technological progress. The foundations of an expanded Western aid effort should lie elsewhere.

The study concludes with a discussion of the deficiencies of the present international monetary system, wherein gold plus the two "key" currencies, the dollar and the pound, serve as the means of international payment. Uri, agreeing with Professor Robert Triffin's diagnosis,[1] faults the system for the general shortage of liquidity inherent in it. In this view, the persistent United States and United Kingdom balance of payments deficits are only manifestations of the deeper problem of liquidity. The solution advanced by Uri is based on this diagnosis, which has been questioned in many quarters. The study's policy suggestions envisage a regional *centralization* of reserves in Europe, a possible European monetary union, and an international *consolidation* of reserves. To understand fully the Uri scheme, a distinction must be drawn between the policies of "centralization" and "consolidation." Centralization, in the Uri proposals, would involve the creation of a common European fund which would have the authority to manage a stipulated share of the monetary reserves of all member countries. Over time, the share of reserves held by the fund would increase until centralization was complete. The movement from this position of centralization to monetary union would involve the harmonization of domestic fiscal and credit policies in the nations of the EEC.

On the other hand, "consolidation" of reserves, the scheme posited for the Atlantic Community, would involve a lesser degree of cooperation than "centralization." This concept contains four elements: 1) the United States and United Kingdom would agree to hold foreign currencies when a surplus appeared in their balance of payments; 2) the Common Market monetary union would give assurances that shifts from one currency to another in its foreign holdings would be avoided; 3) continuing negotiations would take place between the U.S. and U.K. (barring the latter's entry into the EEC) and the EEC on the ratio of gold and foreign exchange held in their reserves; and 4) the goal of this cooperation would be agreement by the U.S., the U.K. and the EEC to hold the same ratios.

In short, Uri's proposal is a variant of the Triffin plan. The real question is whether its one difference—regional centralization within the context of international consolidation as opposed to Triffin's plea for *international* centralization —does not make it an entirely different proposal. In this vein, Uri's invocation of the Triffin scheme as a defense for his own is confusing to the general reader and leaves the mistaken impression of total agreement between the two men. Although the areas of agreement between them are significant, the differing consequences of regional as opposed to the international cen-

[1]See *Gold and the Dollar Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), Chapter one.

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tralization of reserves should be explored. A final judgment on Uri's proposal must await such a study.

In addition to the discussion of substantive issues, Uri puts forth suggestions for certain institutional bodies to facilitate the discussion of issues within the Atlantic Community. The importance of the book, however, lies in the substance of Uri's ideas on the economic issues which divide the West. His views differ profoundly from those guiding the Kennedy Administration. An intelligent presentation of the European position, this study is a significant contribution to the literature on the common problems facing the Atlantic nations.

On the Wisdom of a Nuclear Test Ban*

by William R. Kintner

The issue of a nuclear test ban, sired by the halting and unrealistic early attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons, has grown into a Cold War political genie which carries both the hope and the fear of men throughout the world. Test-ban negotiations presumably focus on limited, sober technical and psychological measures aimed at lessening the chances of nuclear war. Yet many test-ban proposals contain vestiges of the former visionary approach which characterized the early postwar plans for nuclear disarmament. Wishful thinking has lessened the Western ability to perceive clearly the issues at hand and the long-term effects of policy choices on its security.

There has long been a need for a comprehensive and systematic study of this test-ban issue. This study has now been written by a veteran Washington diplomatic and defense correspondent, Earl H. Voss. His book, *Nuclear Ambush: The Test-Ban Trap,* analyzes the factors contributing to Western confusion over nuclear questions in a clear, thorough and realistic manner all too often missing on this subject so closely bound up with profound and universal human emotion.

Within the broad perspective of the overall East-West confrontation, the author sees the test-ban issue as a critical factor. Both the general framework of the Cold War and the particular test-ban question are analyzed in a detailed historical survey which goes back to the end of World War II. The extensive chronological listing of significant and related events up to the early part of 1963 is invaluable. The book, throughout its more than 500 pages, draws heavily on the test-ban negotiations, Congressional hearings, State Department documents, and Western and Soviet policy pronouncements, as well as scientific information derived from the author's interviews with and statements by leading scientists and public officials.

Despite the broad scope of his study, Voss has concentrated his attention upon the test-ban developments since the United States in 1958 proclaimed its intention to abide by an unpoliced moratorium on testing—which lasted for thirty-four months. The author contends, with impressive evidence, that this

**Nuclear Ambush: The Test-Ban Trap.* By Earl H. Voss. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963. 598 pp. $6.50.

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resulted in a considerable setback to U.S. nuclear superiority on which Free World security has rested since World War II.

The test-ban issue has acquired since 1958 emotional overtones which have been responsible for widespread misconceptions and even near-hysteria. Small but vocal groups throughout the world, fearing severe biological and genetic effects from fall-out, have spurred the drive for a test ban. Those well-meaning efforts have often been effectively exploited by the communists, who spread half-truths and misinformation in order to generate fear and confusion—which in turn may serve eventually to force Western governments to yield to public opinion and thus risk losing their nuclear arms superiority. As a result of the militant action of these small groups, spurred by communist propaganda, and the lack of a determined campaign to reveal the facts known by Western governments, there has arisen a widespread popular fear of the effects of nuclear testing in any form. Today this fear nearly overshadows the strategic importance of nuclear weapons for the protection of free men.

Voss draws on responsible scientific sources in order to arrive at the facts and render an intelligent judgment concerning fall-out hazards; he dispels the many and gross popular fabrications and misconceptions about these hazards. The study concludes that, unless extensive testing on the level of the 1961-1962 Soviet test series is continued, there is very little chance of "polluting" the atmosphere. Furthermore, Voss argues, such extensive testing is for the future "not a realistic prospect." He admits, however, that the threat of "dirty" atmospheric testing by newly emerging nuclear powers may become a crucial issue in the next decade.

The weaknesses implicit in any test-ban agreement requiring inspection are numerous and are often overlooked by Western policymakers and their advisers. Among such loopholes are: the complexity, expense and uncertainty of the detection apparatus; the willingness to overlook the atomic program of Red China (including the use of China as a potential clandestine test area); the widespread misconception that a U.S.-USSR test-ban agreement would halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons to lesser powers; a belief that a test-ban agreement would relax tensions around the world (rather than admit even the possibility of the contrary); a complacent attitude, confident in the United States' alleged decisive nuclear superiority, despite the considerable evidence which places this superiority in doubt. The author warns that a manipulated or ignorant public opinion, which has access only to half-truths and distortions about the test-ban issue, cannot play its proper role in a democratic society.

Voss sees the "basic division of world opinion on the nuclear test-ban issue as one over the judgment of how far the Soviet Union is to be trusted." (p. 499.) He questions the humanitarianism of Western policymakers who, in "despairing for the future" if a nuclear

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test-ban accord is not reached, refuse to acknowledge the strategic and security problems involved in this issue. These men ignore the accomplishments of U.S. nuclear superiority—the termination of one war in 1945, and the defense of the United States, its allies, the neutrals and former enemies against communist imperialism. The author urges that nuclear testing should be judged within the framework of military requirements, and warns that nuclear weapons are here to stay and cannot be put back into the laboratory bottle.

The important and often forgotten distinction between the U.S. "intention" and "capability" to use nuclear weapons is clearly made in the book. In order to maintain the credibility of the American "intention" to respond effectively to a "first strike" as well as to wage limited wars, U.S. policymakers are obligated to provide their armed forces with a corresponding "capability," i.e., a broad range of modern nuclear weapons. Hence the very act of declaring a test suspension may create doubts about the President's willingness to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Soviet propaganda campaign, playing on the emotions of the many people who do not see the test-ban issue in the framework of U.S. and Western security requirements, is actually, according to Voss, a bid to deny the West use of the weapon principally responsible for preventing Soviet expansion into Europe and Asia since 1945. In 1958 the Soviets led the United States into a cleverly disguised "ambush," i.e., the test-ban moratorium. The United States stood virtually still in the field of nuclear weaponry for almost three years. There was a considerable slowdown in the development of (1) high-yield compact warheads which would enable the U.S. to use smaller and hence more easily protected and more widely dispersed offensive missiles; (2) missile defense technology, thus postponing the day when the U.S. might have the ability to destroy incoming Soviet missiles; and (3) small tactical nuclear weapons for precision battlefield use. Vital basic research activities also suffered. All this was sacrificed with no guarantee of similar Soviet action. In fact, the Soviets used the moratorium to prepare for their comprehensive 1961 tests which brought them abreast and, in certain fields, ahead of U.S. nuclear weapons technology.

In his conclusion, the author draws some cogent lessons from his extensive study of the evolution of our nuclear arms and test-ban policy. First, he holds that "to humor the fainthearted" of the world and to allow U.S. policy to be determined by them has had a debilitating effect on U.S. security. A test ban will not prohibit nuclear war; it will merely assure that a future nuclear war will be a "dirty" one. The crux of the matter is "to find some system to take into account the rapid pace of scientific (arms) progress." Furthermore, he states, since wars are waged on so broad and complex a spectrum, "meaningful disarmament . . . cannot be approached on so selective a basis." (p. 535.)

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Voss advocates the formation of a long-range national strategy which would eliminate indecision "due to lack of resolution on a grand national strategy." Political negotiators should rely on expert military advice. Had this advice been heeded in prior studies and negotiations on a nuclear test ban, the U.S. would not have been led into the current chimerical test-ban scheme.

Only time will tell whether the test-ban issue has indeed been an ambush. But the logic and depth of the analysis which Voss has made leading to this conclusion cannot be readily dismissed. If he is right and "If the Americans let it happen again—we will have no one to blame but ourselves if communism becomes the wave of the future."

Ideology in the Cold War*

by George K. Tanham

Kurt London, in his book, *The Permanent Crisis,* sees the Cold War as almost completely an ideological struggle—a conflict of philosophies of life—which modifies drastically, if not totally invalidates, accepted rules of diplomacy, established principles of international ethics, and the traditional interpretation of political terms. The communist goal of world domination, he maintains, remains unchanged though the strategy and tactics for attaining that objective may vary considerably according to the world situation. Inasmuch as communism represents a secular religion, a belief and faith with absolute goals, it is not, and cannot be, susceptible to compromise or rational discussion about ends and objectives. Settlements such as the neutralization of Laos or the independent development of the Congo are, for the communists, merely temporary pauses on the way to the final objective, while they often, though not always, seem to be final objectives for the West.

This is where London sees the danger. Our diplomats are not schooled or at the moment psychologically attuned to deal with this new crisis which involves an opponent whose absolute goal is simple and unchanging and who does not hesitate to use whatever means are needed to achieve his objective. The West seems to be unfamiliar with, and ill-prepared for, unrelenting nonviolent struggle; the democracies strive continuously, and in the author's view futilely, to work out a permanent settlement.

If this analysis of the contemporary scene is valid, and this reviewer in general believes it is, then the United States and the West, at their peril, ignore what London has to say. America, always impatient to settle differences and arrive at neat solutions to all problems, must not allow this tendency to blind it to the real threat and to deceive it as to the permanence and inviolability of settlements with the communists. Until—if history repeats itself—the communist religion loses its vigor and fervor, the West must see the present struggle as one for the minds and support of all people of the world; until this religious fervor abates, there will be no compromise on the commu-

**The Permanent Crisis.* By Kurt London. New York: Walker and Company, 1962. 328 pp. $6.00.

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nists' side as to ultimate objectives.

It is unfortunate that London did not develop his thesis more completely and provide more concrete examples to illustrate it. This would have increased the value of the book and allowed him to state that, in addition to the ideological conflict, traditional sources of conflict remain which complicate the Cold War even more. Nationalism, for example, is rather summarily dismissed as not important in the communist world. Yet it would seem that at least part of the cause of the Sino-Soviet difficulties can be attributed to nationalism. Though the main arguments may be over whether the communist world should be monocentric or polycentric and whether violence or peaceful coexistence is the best means of achieving the final communist goal, even these are based on the present national situations of China and the Soviet Union.

It also appears that there are incipient power struggles in certain areas between these two nations which hark back to earlier times and to national, not necessarily communist, interests. There has been, so far, no settlement of the Sino-Soviet borders, although China has made border agreements with other neighboring nations. There may also develop a Sino-Soviet struggle over such areas as Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would appear to have a national basis rather than one of communist ideology. In the case of the Soviet Union, its present position on Germany may be based entirely on communism, but it is interesting to know that the Czarist government before World War I suggested the partitioning of Germany as a long-term solution to the German problem. One is apt to see in many cases a surprising continuation of traditional Russian policies in regard to certain areas; nor is Chinese expansion in Asia a new phenomenon. In the Sino-Soviet conflict, it is nations which are arguing and it is nations which are lining up behind one or the other. History cannot be dismissed quite so easily.

It must be stressed, however, that the goal of world domination is so all-encompassing a factor that it is difficult to determine whether there are other subordinate factors still influencing policy in China and the Soviet Union, and just how important they are. Also, it is most likely that there would be rivalries and crises in similar areas of the world even if the Soviet Union and China were noncommunist nations, though the nature of international relations would be quite different from the Cold War of today. And this is the difference that London feels is so important.

London does not anticipate, in spite of the admittedly serious differences between the Chinese and the Soviets, that there will be, at least in the near future, a real break and the development of "two churches." He contends that the Chinese are too shrewd and realistic to allow a break in the communist ranks at this time, largely because they feel it would weaken the communist movement; they would break only as a last resort. But if this should happen, it would not mean an end to communism; num-

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erous religions have split and survived in the past. Some observers believe that if a split does occur, we can unite with one party against the other. This possibility is largely discounted by London and history does not show many cases (though a few) when, say, a Christian country joined hands with a Muslim country against another Christian nation. One wishes that London had seen fit to say more about current Sino-Soviet relations, for they are an important part of the "permanent crisis" and are a serious matter to the Soviets, as Secretary Harriman reported after his April visit to Moscow.

For the serious student of the Cold War, many parts of this book will seem too elementary and their relevance to the major theme too tenuous. The important and fascinating sections on the nature of the conflict and the changed nature of diplomacy are interspersed with rather tedious and elementary sections on current alliance systems, NATO, SEATO and CENTO. Equally brief and cursory coverage of the foreign and security policy-making machinery of various nations is included which only distracts from the development of the major thesis. London seeks to point out the differences between the governments of the world powers, but these differences are only of marginal importance to his major theme.

There is a general lack of historical perspective which, if included, would have added to the understanding of the present conflict. Ideological conflict with antagonistic goals and different ethics is not new to mankind. The desire of a religious movement, a true or secular one, to achieve global or what seemed to be global domination at the time is not as modern as London contends. It could certainly be argued that both the Christians and the Muslims wished to achieve universal domination and fought bloody wars against each other in pursuit of this goal, while Protestants and Catholics at least sought and fought to convert and dominate Europe. During these periods, different ethics were applied; for example, it was quite acceptable for a Christian prince to deal with a Muslim in a way that would have been totally unacceptable in dealing with another Christian prince.

There seems to have been an ebb and flow of highly emotional periods and relatively quiet, even rational times. Bloody wars and frustrating diplomacy have characterized the "faith" periods, while less bloody wars and more rational, orderly diplomacy seem to have been signs of less fervent eras. There are indications that history is repeating itself to some extent at present, as the older Soviet brand of communism seems to be losing some of its fervor while the newer Chinese belief is far more aggressive and dynamic. Our own period was preceded by a relatively quiet period characterized, at least in hindsight, by limited objectives and orderly diplomacy. This has made it very difficult for the West to adjust to the new ideological challenge, absolute objectives and new techniques of the communists. The really new element, which may

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make historical experience less useful, is the technological revolution which has made the world so small and such a potentially dangerous place in which to live.

It is interesting to note that in recent history one ideology, democratic-nationalism, with the exception of its performance in the French Revolution, seemed to avoid excess and bloody wars. One explanation may lie in the nature of the doctrine, but there may be two others. One is that it is difficult if not impossible in a democracy to keep all the people "up" all the time, while in the case of communism the hard "core" party can be kept at a high pitch of devotion for rather long periods. Second, just as it has been claimed that the frontier was a safety valve for the United States, perhaps Asia and Africa served the same purpose for European democratic-nationalism.

London concludes with an excellent chapter on the amalgamation of policy and propaganda which he calls "Politprop". This union is a product of totalitarian regimes, especially the communist ones, which wish to convert people, not merely to achieve a rational settlement of differences resulting from a clash of limited objectives. London argues that the communists do not have limited objectives and thus traditional diplomacy is no longer an adequate tool for the West to cope with present international crises. The West still views diplomacy and propaganda as different disciplines and has not yet coordinated the two closely enough.

London could have gone even further in discussing the amalgamation of techniques to indicate that the communists try to coordinate all techniques and tools very closely to gain their objectives. In insurgency, or "wars of liberation" as Khrushchev refers to them, the communist effort to coordinate all elements is clearly revealed. The military, political, economic and propaganda aspects are all carefully controlled and coordinated to bring about the desired goals, and the guerrillas, at different times, may be soldiers, propagandists and economic developers, depending on the needs of the situation. The United States, at least in Vietnam, is beginning to see the basic nature of the struggle and to understand that in many ways it will have to adopt the coordinated approach to the problem.

London does not provide very many constructive suggestions as to how the West can cope with this complex and dangerous challenge. However, by clearly and forcefully pointing out the nature of the communist threat and urging that the West try to understand it and adopt new methods for conducting its foreign policies, London does make a positive contribution. Furthermore, his proposal that the West can and should adopt the technique of Politprop is a useful one; this reviewer would go further and say that the United States and the West must use and integrate all means available in order to convince the people of the world of the benefits, validity and dignity of its way of life. However, this may be difficult as there seems to be one significant ingredient missing—a dynamic belief in our own system.

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Latin America in Ferment: A Canadian View*

by Arthur P. Whitaker

After producing four years ago a large book on China, *Impatient Giant: Red China Today,* Gerald Clark now comes forth with another of the same order of magnitude on Latin America. The sequence was a natural one for a number of reasons: Latin America, too, is today an "impatient giant." Its impatience provides a fertile field for communism, and as Clark shows, Red China has cultivated this field assiduously during the past decade. And some observers believe that, as Eudocio Ravines pointed out several years ago in *The Yenan Way,* Chinese communism is particularly relevant to the Latin American environment (neither Ravines nor his book appears in the index of the one under review).

Yet Clark does not overplay Red China's role in Latin America. Instead, he balances it with the Soviet Union's, rather to the latter's advantage, and subordinates both to Fidelismo. On a recent visit to Havana (date unspecified), he was much impressed to find that among the assorted Latin American visitors there, the universal theme was: "All Latin Americans are brothers. Two hundred million Latin Americans look to Cuba, and Cuba looks to them." His impression was much the same when he visited other Latin American countries, and his chapter on this subject closes with a quotation from a high Brazilian official, Celso Furtado, to the effect that "the peasant is drawn toward Fidelismo because he believes that society is an enemy."

Clark's own conclusion, stated in the Foreword, is that "Fidelismo has become . . . the greatest single force" in Latin America. Nor does he share the comforting North American belief that this force was greatly diminished by the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In his opinion, "even if Castro as an individual no longer has unlimited prestige abroad, it is the movement to which he has given his name that is important. It will long outlast the man himself."

It is no wonder, then, that the author thinks an explosion is coming in Latin America—just how soon he does not tell us, but one gathers that we do not have long to wait. Clark's estimate is based on a study for which he has important qualifications. As a Canadian he could be expected both to be well attuned to the anti-Americanism that is one of the chief components of Latin America's explosive charge, and yet at the same time to bring judicious sympathy to his appraisal of the tensions within the Pan-American family since his own people, too, are made up mainly of Latins and "Anglo-Saxons." At any rate, as a citizen of the only American state that is not a member of the Organization of American States, he views the scene from a vantage point which is *au dessus de la mêlée* but not too far above it for good visibility.

**The Coming Explosion in Latin America.* By Gerald Clark. New York: David McKay Company, 1963. 436 pp. $6.75.

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He has indeed descended into the Latin American arena for a close look, visiting all the major countries and almost all of the minor ones, according to the jacket; he says his survey "embraced 50,000 miles," and adds that "a concentrated course of drilling" in Spanish enabled him to "get by without total reliance on interpreters." (What he did about the language problem in Brazil and Haiti is not clear.) With this equipment he made, as he says, "close contact with peasants and presidents, generals and priests, Communists and conservatives, intellectuals and laborers, and other representatives of the economic, political, and social complex of the continent." And finally, as an experienced journalist (now an associate editor of *The Montreal Star*) he has a quick eye for dramatic and picturesque details, a keen ear for good stories, and skill in packaging his goods.

As might be expected from the foregoing, the book gives a fair sampling of the whole vast Latin American scene, both geographically and by issues; the issues are in most cases those that are or have recently been in the headlines; and the most effective passages are those dealing with outstanding personalities, revolutionary upheavals, the woes of slum dwellers and peasants, and grievances against the United States.

In the chapter on "Students and Intellectuals," for instance, there are reports of interviews that yielded rich nuggets. One was with Benjamín Carrión, "one of Ecuador's most distinguished men of letters," who asserted that "the mass of people are for Castro" and lauded Castro's Cuban revolution as "the most economical revolution of all time," since only 700 were killed in it, compared with one million in the French Revolution and more than 200,000 in Colombia in recent years. The Brazilian author of *Black Orpheus,* Vinicius de Moraes, called Jânio Quadros "a tragic figure . . . almost like Christ" and, sipping a gin tonic, sighed, "He was our great hope and the shock of his resignation was overwhelming, as though a trusted father had gone."

In a different vein another Brazilian, Giberto Freyre, "Latin America's most noted social scientist," described Quadros as "a dramatic man, but not a statesman or even a leader," and generalized:

"We [Latin Americans] are going through a tremendous crisis in leadership. Young men, instead of entering politics, are gravitating toward industry. . . . As industrial leaders, they are not interested in leading politically. This trend is apparent in Argentina and Mexico, but in an acute way in Brazil. The political leaders of nineteenth-century Brazil were far superior to the leaders of today. . . . At the present there is not a single political leader in Brazil who could be described as a statesman."

These pages are also replete with vivid descriptions of experiments and crises. Several pages each are devoted to Cornell University's now-famous Vicos community project on an hacienda in the Andes of Peru, and to *Sudene,* an organization recently established by the Brazilian government in an effort

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to revitalize the stricken Northeast, a region that contains one third of Brazil's 70 million inhabitants and is the stamping ground of Francisco Julião, leader of the peasant ferment and, some think, potentially a second Fidel Castro.

Clark draws on his observations in China for his description of Vicos: "On the surface [Vicos] even resembles a Chinese commune . . . as in Communist China, exteriors [of buildings] are covered with hand-lettered slogans. But here," he continues, "the similarity fades away. In Hsushui commune . . . I read such phrases as: 'Chairman Mao thinks of our welfare.' . . . In Vicos the quotations were from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. . . . The option of whether Hsushui or Vicos will set the future pattern for Peru remains with the government in Lima." China also turns up in other and broader contexts: "More than half of [the] Latin Americans are chronically undernourished, and some of them live under conditions worse than any I saw in China a few years ago."

Most of the chapters skip from country to country as they follow a topical arrangement. There are two exceptions. One is, of course, Cuba, which today is inevitably a major focus of any broad discussion of Latin America. The other is the Dominican Republic, which gets full treatment in a chapter called "In the Wake of Trujillo." This allocation of space may surprise some readers, especially since most of the chapter deals with the end of the Trujillo regime and its immediate aftermath, rather than with the new Dominican leader Juan Bosch, of whom Clark obviously approves as a man of the moderate Left who has broken with conservatism and is therefore best fitted to stave off Fidelismo.

In his discussion of the role of the United States, Clark tries to be fair, and even at times expresses impatience with the Latin Americans and their complaints against the northern Colossus. In the main, however, he gives the impression that all this mess could have been avoided if only the United States had done the right thing. Nowhere is this clearer than in his account of the beginning of the rift between Castro and Washington in April 1959, which reads like C. Wright Mills watered down. Here we are told that Castro came to the United States seeking only sympathy and ("undoubtedly") a loan, but was "too proud to ask directly for a loan" and when this was not volunteered by the United States, left the country "empty-handed and indignant." The story goes on from this point in much the same vein. The watering-down comes in a way that does the author little credit and the reader less good: after what appears to be a straightforward narrative of established fact, the reader trips over such qualified recantations as, "The foregoing part of the story is muffled in contradictions" (p. 315), and "I am not at all sure . . . I am not even sure . . . I am merely throwing out a few observations most commonly heard among Latin Americans. . . ." (pp. 321-322.) This is not even good journalism; a signpost should come at the beginning

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of a road, not at the end of it.

Likewise, the major responsibility for coping with the gigantic and complex Latin American problem is assigned to the United States. The author's big question here is not, "What can be done about Latin America?" but "What can the United States do?" Putting the question this way suggests that he shares with some of our own people what a British observer called the illusion of American omnipotence. Actually, the United States can do little more than help the Latin Americans help themselves.

Some of the author's proposals for U.S. action are reasonable but quite inadequate to the needs of the explosive situation described. These include the suggestions that the headquarters of the OAS be shifted from Washington to a Latin American republic, that U.S. business enterprises in Latin America take on Spanish names, and that such persons as Brazilian peasant leader Julião be invited to the United States. At the other extreme is the fantastic proposal that the United States take the "desperate, almost ruthless, gamble" of performing on Latin America the "radical surgery" of "United States intervention in every form." This would include, among other things, the promotion of violent as well as peaceful revolutions in Latin America. The author is at least frank as to what he has in mind: "The emphasis, of course, should be on bloodless revolutions; but, where these are not possible, the United States must be prepared to foment physical upheaval *in order to install governments with reformist lines*" (p. 419).

The foregoing phrase (italics inserted) indicates an assumption unwarranted by history: the assumption that violent revolutions can be counted on to produce the kind of regime intended by their promoters. Law as well as history is flouted by the exhortation to the United States to intervene in Latin America "in every form," for the United States is bound by long-standing treaty commitments not to intervene there in any form. While authorities differ on the exact meaning of the nonintervention rule, not even the most extreme strict constructionist has previously assumed that it is meaningless. Clark does not debate this question; he simply writes as if it did not exist. The fact is that it has long been, and still is, one of the major issues in inter-American relations and that the Latin Americans, who got the rule of nonintervention adopted, still cling to it as a rock of salvation.

This case illustrates the principal weakness of a book that has important merits. It fails to concentrate on key questions, state them clearly, and develop them systematically. It gives the reader no real understanding of, for example, Latin American power groups, value systems, nationalism, the middle class, organized labor, the roles of the military and the intellectuals in public affairs, and urban problems, not to mention such recent developments as the growth of Christian Democratic parties. There is a chapter on the Alliance for Progress, but it does not give

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a good account of either the origin or the assumptions or the operation of the Alliance.

Yet the book does have something worthwhile to say about many topics of current interest, and its fragments are often wryly amusing as well as instructive. One example is the scornful comment of a cultured Colombian on new-rich Venezuela of the petroleum boom period: "The Venezuelans fell into Cadillacs from trees." Another is the cynical remark of a Brazilian on the myth that there is no color line in his country: "A Negro washes the car; a mulatto chauffeur opens the door; and a white man steps inside."

There is much to be said for the author's main thesis: that there is great danger of a large-scale explosion in Latin America; that, from the United States' point of view, the best protection against it would be the strengthening of the moderate Left; and that the United States will have to learn to live with widespread socialism (not communism) and neutralism or noncommitment in Latin America.

Troublespots in the Asian Rimlands*

by John F. Melby

Borderlands is not only a fascinating book, it is an important one. It is quite possible there is no one else besides Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn who has actually visited each of the six remote areas of Asia whose problems they describe. Certainly there is no one better qualified to call our attention to the potentially explosive but largely ignored situations existing in these areas along the southern and eastern rims of the Eurasian heartland.

The regions they describe are Hokkaido, the Sulu Archipelago, northern Burma, Sikkim, Afghan Turkestan and eastern Turkey. All are part of larger, more important, and better known political entities. All lie close to the outer edge of the communist world. And all suffer from the politics of metropolitan neglect. The metropolitan centers—Japan, the Philippines, Burma, India, Afghanistan and Turkey—all, with the exception of Burma, have been the objects of major American attention and solicitude. (The only reason Burma does not qualify is its own preference to do without American largesse.) All have been and are of equal interest to the Soviet Union or Communist China, but thus far largely immune to communist pressures.

Considering the endless range of problems around the world which cry out for immediate attention, it would be comforting if these borderlands could be left alone in their primitive state of nature. Unhappily, this is a luxury neither we nor the metropolitan centers can afford. Modern communications have seen to it that these areas share with the rest of mankind an acute awareness of the revolutions which are sweeping the world. Hence, they are demanding acceptance and participation, and unless they get it from the metropolitan centers they will most assuredly seek and find it elsewhere. That what they

**Borderlands.* By Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. 335 pp. $6.75.

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secure elsewhere will not be quite what they have in mind will by that time, of course, be irrelevant.

Actually, the dangers posed by these areas are more subtle and immediate than the obvious long-term possibility of their incorporation into the communist world. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful that absorption of some or even all of these areas, however undesirable it might be, would in itself be a major catastrophe for the Free World. One might quite cynically make a case for saying that their loss would relieve some of the burden on the metropolitan centers and transfer troublesome problems to the Soviet Union and China which already have their own share of difficulties.

The more important danger arises from the harsh fact that the metropolitan centers are doing very little about the borderland problems. Until at least partial solutions are found for the problems of these areas, they will continue to be a drain on countries which cannot afford wastage of any kind and whose free survival and growth are as yet anything but assured. And most of what needs to be done must come from the metropolitan centers themselves — not from the United States or the other developed countries.

As valuable as modern technology is for much of the world, it would be useless and even grotesque, at least in the early stages of development, in the borderlands. Their own countrymen are the best equipped to provide the kind of help that is essential. But they had better do it soon or it may be too late.

Do the Kuhns, then, see any role for the United States? Indeed they do, and it is a lesson we would be well advised to keep in mind when we fall into the easy trap of thinking that all the ailments of the world can be cured by a shower of dollars and a torrent of well-meaning, if inappropriate, "high level" advice. The U.S. contribution should be ideas—ideas that are peculiar to America, ideas that account for much of our success.

They mention three such ideas. The first one is that education is a humbling experience which, among other things, should persuade that man can work with his hands without loss of dignity or status. Secondly, that government is the servant of the citizen, not his master. And, thirdly, the American practice of local initiative. Certainly the most shining example of the truth of this is one of the countries about which the Kuhns write, namely, the Philippines. No one who followed Filipino affairs leading up to the election of President Magsaysay can have any doubt that these American ideas played a major, perhaps the major, role in helping that endangered country to find itself in independence.

Without being explicit about it, what the Kuhns are really saying, I suspect, is that much of the effort that is being made by and for the underdeveloped countries has been "backwards" in nature. Too much effort has gone into the creation of things, and not enough into the growth of people. At best, a thing without a human being capable of using and understanding it is

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meaningless; at worst, it becomes a monster. Tardy recognition of this backwards approach is found in the Peace Corps. One can only hope this experience will spill over into current consideration of other aid programs.

U.S. Policy and Castro's Cuba*

by Nathaniel Weyl

During the first three years of the communist conquest of Cuba, the prevalent tone of American literature on the subject was amazingly sympathetic to Castro and hostile toward the United States. For example, the writings of the late C. Wright Mills, Herbert L. Matthews and others ranged from a wholehearted endorsement of the Castro-communist program and propaganda to a sometimes reluctant and belated admission that Castro and his movement were dominated by the Kremlin and served as a bridgehead for international communism in the New World.

Three recent books—*Strike in the West, The Great Deception* and *The Fourth Floor*—represent a healthy change in orientation. Here there is no sentimentality about the original "idealism" of the Castro revolution, its high aspirations, the urgently needed social and agrarian reforms, or the humanitarianism of its leaders. All recognize that the Castro dictatorship is an arm of Soviet policy and a threat to national security.

Strike in the West is a lucidly written, wholly absorbing chronicle of the missile crisis of last October. The authors, a staff writer and an editor of the *Reader's Digest,* have produced an invaluable record of crisis, decision and mobilization. This book will be fascinating even to the general reader who might be relatively uninformed on military-political affairs.

The first major conclusion of the writers is that a drastic failure in the interpretation of intelligence data by the Administration placed the country in dire peril. Beginning on August 31, 1962, Senator Kenneth Keating of New York made repeated charges of a Soviet offensive build-up in Cuba. Although all of his charges "were verified through official sources of the U.S. Government," Presidential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger called his statements false. On September 28, according to Daniel and Hubbell, Navy photo-reconnaissance aircraft took pictures of Cuba-bound Soviet freighters, carrying deck cargo which coincided in shape and appearance with that used to ship Ilyushin-28 Beagle jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons. A set of these photos was mislaid for eleven days.

The failure to carry out photo-reconnaissance of the key Cristobal area in Cuba during the critical period of October 3-15 was par-

**Strike in the West.* By James Daniel and John G. Hubbell. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. 180 pp. $3.50.

The Great Deception. By James Monahan and Kenneth O. Gilmore. New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1963. 213 pp. $3.95.

The Fourth Floor. By Earl E. T. Smith. New York: Random House, 1962. 242 pp. $5.00.

The Cuban Invasion. By Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc. New York: Praeger, 1962. 160 pp. $3.95.

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tially due, according to White House sources, to bad weather and the advent of Hurricane Ella. Daniel and Hubbell point out that this explanation is "demonstrably false": Hurricane Ella did not become a tropical storm until October 15.

The writers make two significant points about the role of Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson in this crisis and the charge that he played the role of an appeaser in White House meetings. According to "a friendly account," Stevenson urged the President on October 17 to send "a personal emissary to the Kremlin" to remonstrate. Had this course been followed, Khrushchev would have been able to seize the initiative with an announcement that the MRBM missiles were in place on Cuban soil.

The second point is that so much attention was later given to Stevenson's alleged "softness" on the Cuban issue "that Robert Kennedy's role as the leader of the 'peace' faction became obscured." According to the authors, it was Robert Kennedy who led the successful fight to eliminate the surprise air attack on the Cuban missile bases, advocated by John A. McCone, C. Douglas Dillon, Dean Acheson and all the service chiefs.

The highly efficient reconnaissance efforts and mobilization of the armed forces were in the end frustrated, the authors believe, by a willingness on the part of the Administration to let victory slip from its fingers. In the end, the hopes for the liberation of the Cuban people were dashed, and they were left to suffer "from starvation, misery, crime and terror." Fidel Castro continued to rule Cuba, thousands of Soviet troops and technicians remained on Cuban soil, and significant Soviet military equipment, including "twenty-mile-range, surface-to-surface, nuclear missile artillery," remained stored in Cuban caves. There was no valid reason to assume that our aerial reconnaissance had conclusively verified the removal of all the offensive missiles from Cuba. After all, we had detected only 30 of the 42 missiles that Khrushchev did in fact remove.

The missile crisis, Daniel and Hubbell suggest, revealed no failure of U.S. intelligence. In fact, CIA Director McCone warned in early October that the Kremlin would probably plant offensive nuclear arms in its Cuban outpost. This warning fell on deaf ears because "Washington's Kremlinologists could not bring themselves to believe that Russia would do what it did. . . ." An alert intelligence service is worthless if its reports and findings are filtered through "experts" who believe in the good faith and fundamental decency of the enemy.

The Great Deception is another book on Cuba by editors of the *Reader's Digest*. It is based on hundreds of interviews with escapees from the unhappy island, taken over a period of months by a large and competent task force. Monahan and Gilmore present conclusive evidence that the communization of Castro's rebel army began before it gained power. Their book is one of several which successfully buries the myth that the Castro

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revolution was a liberal movement which at the last moment was captured or "betrayed" by the communists.

One of the most revealing of the incidents recorded in *The Great Deception* is Dr. Manuel Artime's report of a meeting of the directors of the Agricultural Reform Institute (INRA), the real government of Cuba. According to Artime, after mentioning some of the gross economic blunders of his administration, Fidel Castro said: "When the state has absolute control of the economy, that will be simple. Let us see who dares to oppose us when we are confronted with a hungry population! This is something that Karl Marx never dreamed of. . . . Hunger will be the midwife attending the birth of the socialist state in Cuba."

At the end of the meeting, Che Guevara warned the persons present that they must never repeat "outside this room anything that is discussed here. Get used to the fact that, at these meetings, we talk about *what we are going to do,* and not what we tell the people we are going to do. These are seldom the same thing."

In Cuba, as in China, it would appear that man-made famine is both the consequence of economic incompetence and part of an ambitious plan of psychological warfare against the subjugated population. Hunger deadens criticism, resistance, altruism and any independence of mind. The people, submerged in apathy, are irritable, self-centered and almost solely concerned with getting food for themselves. In short, hunger disintegrates the human personality and the moral code. The troubling thought arises that, in the Mao-Castro brand of communism at least, hunger may be as normal a method of domination as the resort to genocide and aristocracide.

The Great Deception contains a series of eyewitness accounts of such basic processes in the communization of Cuba as the infiltration and destruction of the rebel army; the liquidation of the free press and the trade unions; the assault on religion and the Church; the battle for the mind of the youth; the processes and stages of sovietization; the export of subversion throughout Latin America; and the missile crisis. Although it does not contain much that is basically new, it provides many and varied personal accounts of the way darkness descended over the island of Cuba.

The Fourth Floor, by Earl E. T. Smith, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Cuba during the last years of the Batista regime, describes the problems of an American envoy who attempted to warn the State Department and his countrymen concerning the true nature of Fidel Castro and his movement.

Ambassador Smith did not discover that Fidel Castro was a communist. However, he did find out that the 26th of July Movement was heavily infiltrated by the forces of international communism and that its leader hated the United States and could not be trusted to live up to his commitments with this country. For expressing these views, Smith was assailed as a reactionary and undercut, bypassed

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and ignored by his subordinates. In one instance, Smith was informed by a member of his staff that "we don't care what you think." In another, he states that a CIA official on his staff was holding secret conversations with the Castro underground and promising it diplomatic recognition.

Ambassador Smith believes that U.S. policy is made on the "fourth floor" of the Department of State by anonymous men who bear no responsibility to the public for their actions. In the Cuban case, he says, the principal operating technique of these men was to decide which reports and cables were to be forwarded to high-level officials in the State Department and which were to be filed or lost. Smith avoids mentioning the names of these officials, except in the case of William Arthur Wieland, the then head of Mexican, Central American and Caribbean Affairs in the State Department.

Smith's book also suggests that it is high time that the Cuban disaster be subjected to the same sort of full-scale Senate investigation as the Pearl Harbor disaster. This should not be an ex parte affair in which only friendly witnesses are summoned; those high in the State Department should not be exempted from cross-examination. To serve any useful purpose, the investigation would have to be impartial and comprehensive.

A fourth volume, *The Cuban Invasion,* is the work of Karl E. Meyer, a *Washington Post* reporter, and Tad Szulc, a member of the staff of the *New York Times.* It seeks to throw the blame for the Bay of Pigs fiasco on the shoulders of the CIA. The authors assert that the debacle was caused fundamentally by the CIA's failure to throw its support to the really "progressive" elements in the Cuban underground, such as the forces under Manolo Ray and other groups, who, in this reviewer's opinion, had defected either because of personal ambition or because they preferred national communism to Soviet-controlled communism.

The authors manage to present a book-length treatment of the failure of an invasion and its cause without even discussing the *fundamental* issue—the denial of air cover. This is as preposterous as a historian who would analyze the Normandy invasion with reference to the political factions among the French *maquis* but without regard to such "prosaic" military considerations as air supremacy, supply of landing craft, and beachhead logistics.

According to Meyer and Szulc, "the bright insiders in the Kennedy Administration discuss it [the failure of the invasion] with a certain mordant relish." (p. 146.) One hopes that this sentence is not true. It is difficult to believe that the President would choose advisers who relish U.S. defeats and rejoice in the weakening of our national security.

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Books Received

I. Politics, History, Economics

America and the World Revolution and Other Lectures. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 231 pp. $4.75.

The eminent British historian, in lectures at the University of Pennsylvania, McGill University and the University of Puerto Rico, reflects on the abandonment of the American Revolution by an affluent United States, on the history of Hellenic civilization and the decline of parliamentary government, and on the movement for social justice in Latin America.

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. By James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. 361 pp. $6.95.

A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing social choice, based largely on the methods of modern economics and game theory. The authors analyze political institutions, and especially majority decision-making, in terms analogous to the part played by individual calculus in shaping the forces of the market.

Capitalism and Freedom. By Milton Friedman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1963. 202 pp. $1.50 (paper).

Professor Friedman, who teaches economics at the University of Chicago, presents his view of the proper role of competitive capitalism as both a device for achieving economic freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom. The author applies his views to a variety of issues, such as the control of money, international financial and trade arrangements, fiscal policy, distribution of income, social welfare and alleviation of poverty.

In Defense of Liberalism. By K. M. Panikkar. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962. 135 pp.

A noted Indian educator-statesman examines the basic tenets of nineteenth century Liberalism, its rise and decline. He concludes that Liberalism brought much to India and that the liberal approach to solving national problems in India should be strengthened in order to provide for both social justice and individual opportunity and liberty.

The Diplomacy of Economic Development and Other Papers. By Eugene R. Black. New York: Atheneum, 1963. 176 pp. $1.25 (paper).

The three William L. Clayton Lectures delivered at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1960, and six other major addresses by the man who was for fourteen years President of the World Bank. In several of these talks, Mr. Black expounds his concept of aid as including the "illumination of choices" for the leaders of the developing countries.

Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. By Alexander Gerschenkron. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. 456 pp. $8.75.

This book contains fourteen essays on the history of European industrial development, written during the decade of the 1950's. The author examines in particular the national examples of Italy and the Soviet Union, and concludes that, contrary to many popular notions, industrialization has not been a regular

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and smooth process in every country, but has varied widely in pace and kind. He is primarily concerned with economic realities and only secondarily with political questions. The book will appeal more to the professional economist than the general reader.

The Elements of International Law: A Casebook. By Gerard J. Mangone. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1963. 387 pp. $8.65.

This text, designed for introductory courses to international law, omits in the interests of brevity certain historical information available in other texts and concentrates on contemporary cases and issues. Although a substantial part of the doctrine and materials in the book are drawn from international practice, agreements and judgments, the author has deliberately adopted an American orientation to international law and most of the national cases are taken from U.S. courts.

Foundations of International Politics. By Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962. 734 pp. $11.75.

This text in international relations reviews the historic international system, its successive transformations, its present bipolar condition, and possible future patterns. The major part of the volume focuses on the changes in the "foundations" and environment of international relations, e.g., the technological revolution, shrinking space, ideologies, "climate and the energy of nations," rising consumption of natural resources and the population explosion, military weapons and strategy, new geopolitical configurations, public opinion, and the instability of the new nations.

Geography and Politics in a World Divided. By Saul B. Cohen. New York: Random House, 1963. 347 pp. $3.95.

Dr. Cohen, Professor of Geography at Boston University, reassesses traditional geopolitical concepts, such as the heartland-rimland theory; appraises the causes and significance of recent developments, such as the rise of a European superstate and the emergence of new "shatterbelts" in the Middle East and Southeast Asia; re-evaluates the importance of the littorals of Asia; and discusses the current prospects for geopolitical equilibrium in this divided world.

Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors. By A. A. Fatouros. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 411 pp. $12.00.

The author, a professor of law, is especially concerned with trends in the increasingly frequent guarantee agreements between governments of less developed countries and foreign investors. He analyzes and compares the various means by which states support these arrangements, and the difficult problem of equitable compensation in cases where events bring the guarantees into effect.

The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making. By Joseph Frankel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 231 pp. $5.60.

An attempt to interpret international politics in terms of decision-making, employing the techniques and the findings of the behavioral sciences, but written in a nontechnical style and with a minimum of special terminology. The author, Head of the Department of Politics in the University of Aberdeen, does not believe it possible to form a full theory of international relations, but he provides a systematic framework which will assist in formulating relevant questions and collecting, classifying and comparing facts. His model is illustrated with examples from contemporary diplomacy.

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Man in the Struggle for Peace. By Charles Malik. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 242 pp. $5.00.

The distinguished philosopher-diplomat of Lebanon and former president of the UN General Assembly calls for an authentic Western revolution, based on the classical-liberal heritage, to meet the challenge of international communism among those peoples who have been awakened in the last two centuries by the ideals of the West itself.

The One and the Many: The Individual in the Modern World. Edited by John Brooks. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. 331 pp. $6.00.

This philosophical discourse is the outgrowth of the Second Corning Conference of May 1961, which brought together ninety outstanding figures from business, labor, learned societies, the arts and public affairs in the U.S. and abroad. It includes Mr. Brooks' summation of the discussions on industry and human culture, work and leisure, as well as papers by Aron, Bundy, Heckscher and others.

The Ordeal of Co-existence. By Willy Brandt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 112 pp. $3.00.

In a published version of his Gustav Pollak lectures at Harvard University in 1962, the Mayor of West Berlin sets forth the dangers as well as the opportunities which in his estimation confront the Free World. He urges the extension of membership in the Common Market to other European as well as Commonwealth countries, and voices hope for the building of an Atlantic Partnership. It is his conclusion that the communists, by erecting the wall in Berlin, have admitted a major defeat in the only city where true coexistence has been attempted between East and West.

Peace-Keeping by UN Forces from Suez to the Congo. By Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote. New York: Praeger, for the Center of International Studies, 1963. 256 pp. $6.00.

After surveying the operations of UN forces in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, the authors examine in detail the UN Congo operations. The study evaluates the role of the Secretary-General, discusses the legal implications of UN forces in the host country, and assesses the effectiveness of *ad hoc* international armies.

Political Development in the New States. By Edward Shils. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. 91 pp. (paper).

A discussion of the processes and problems of modernization in the newly emergent states. Dr. Shils, of the University of Chicago and King's College, Cambridge, analyzes the determinants of political development (social structure, culture, personality, and political structure—including the armed forces, public opinion and civil service) and the alternative courses of political development (political democracy, tutelary democracy, modernizing oligarchy, totalitarian oligarchy and traditional oligarchy).

Political Handbook and Atlas of the World. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 294 pp. $6.95.

The latest edition of a valuable reference guide on foreign relations and world affairs. It includes a description of governments, political parties and leaders; a summary of information on the composition of governments, the programs of political parties, national political leaders, political affiliations and editors of leading newspapers and periodicals; recent domestic and foreign developments in each country; and a 30-page map supplement.

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The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries. By Bruce H. Millen. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. 148 pp. $3.50.

The author asserts that U.S. policy in support of the development of free trade unions in other nations often disregards the differences that exist between domestic and foreign labor organizations. The former have much less direct influence in the governing process than the latter. Mr. Millen explores some of these differences, using examples from the trade unions of Asia and Africa.

Primitive Rebels. By E. J. Hobsbawm. New York: Praeger, 1963. 208 pp. $5.00.

An analysis of nineteenth and twentieth century social movements which evolved when primitive societies were fully exposed to contemporary modern life. The challenge of such adjustments gives rise to social protests expressed in such "archaic" forms as banditry, rural secret societies, millenarian movements and religious sects.

Public Finance in Underdeveloped Countries. By A. R. Prest. New York: Praeger, 1962. 164 pp. $4.50.

Dr. Prest's coverage of public finance in underdeveloped countries includes taxation, government grants and subsidies, monetary and debt policy, administrative procedures and federal finance. The book is based on a series of lectures given at the Centro de Estudios de Estatística Económica, Lisbon, in April 1961.

The Quiet Battle: Writings on the Theory and Practice of Non-Violent Resistance. Edited by Mulford Q. Sibley. New York: Doubleday, Anchor Original, 1963. 377 pp. $1.45 (paper).

This collection of writings is designed to show that "there is an alternative to violence, both for purposes of external defense and in correcting social injustice." Mr. Sibley has selected writings and case studies on nonviolent resistance from many cultures and societies, from the ancient Jewish and Christian tradition to the accounts of twentieth century writers.

Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries. By George C. Lodge. New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962. 249 pp. $4.50.

Drawing upon his experience as Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, Lodge writes of the important role of labor in the underdeveloped nations where political leaders are frequently former labor officials. He urges U.S. foreign policymakers to develop courses of action which will give priority to workers' organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Toward World Order. By Amry Vandenbosch and Willard N. Hogan. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 389 pp. $7.95.

A description and interpretation of the functions and effectiveness of the United Nations and other international organizations. One section of the book is devoted to the historical development of the League and the UN; another, to the UN system and its activities, accomplishments and problems; and a brief third section to regional military and economic groupings.

The United Nations Reconsidered. Edited with an Introduction by Raymond A. Moore, Jr. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1963. 158 pp. $3.00 ($1.00 paper).

A collection of fifteen appraisals of the United Nations in terms of the United States national interest. Among the contributors are Senators Jackson, Fulbright,

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Hickenlooper, Mansfield, and Dodd; James F. Byrnes, Herbert Hoover and Max Ascoli. This is the second in a series of "Studies in International Affairs" sponsored by the Institute of International Studies of the University of South Carolina.

World Order and New States: Problems of Keeping the Peace. By Peter Calvocoressi. New York: Praeger, 1962. 113 pp. $4.25.

Mr. Calvocoressi, a member of the Councils of the Royal Institute for International Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Studies, examines the instability created by the rise of a great many new nation-states at a time when the major powers, locked in a Cold War, have lost their freedom of action to prevent the spread of disorder. He considers the internal problems of these new countries, the constructive role that the democracies can play in assisting them, and the possibilities of UN action to fill the vacuum left by the great powers.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

An Alternative to War or Surrender. By Charles E. Osgood. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. 183 pp. $1.45 (paper).

The President of the American Psychological Association presents a plan which he has named "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction" as a means of reversing the arms race through a series of unilateral initiatives to which the Soviets would be expected to respond in kind. The analysis is based essentially upon the concept of the "mirror image," according to which Soviet security fears are seen to be basically the same as those of Americans.

Anatomy of Spying. By Ronald Seth. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963. 368 pp. $5.95.

A former British secret agent in World War II, now an author and lecturer in English language and literature, has written a fascinating account of the spy, his techniques and his role in the fate of nations and empires. Ranging from the Punic Wars to the U-2 flight of Francis Gary Powers, Seth discusses the qualifications of a spy; the various "covers" used by a spy to cloak his activities; the impact of technology (codes, microfilm, U-2 planes) on the spy's trade; the organization of intelligence networks; and the use of sex, blackmail and counter-espionage.

Armed Forces in New States. By William Gutteridge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 68 pp. $1.50 (paper).

A brief description of the nature of the security forces in newly independent states and their role in society, with specific illustrations drawn from various states in Africa, e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and East and Central Africa.

The Art of War. By Sun Tzu; translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. 197 pp. 35/-.

Liddell Hart writes in his Foreword to this book: "Sun Tzu's essays on 'The Art of War' form the earliest of known treatises on the subject, but have never been surpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding. They might well be termed the concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war." These essays, written nearly 2500 years ago, are here translated, with accompanying commentary, by General Samuel B. Griffith, U.S. Marine Corps.

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Essays on Espionage and International Law. Edited by Roland J. Stanger. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, for the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, 1962. 101 pp. $3.75.

Quincy Wright, Julius Stone, Richard A. Falk and the editor of this volume present four studies of an activity on which traditional international law is silent—peacetime espionage. The book is timely in view of revived interest in spying since the U-2 incident, and deals with such current problems as space reconnaissance and arms control.

Kill and Overkill: The Strategy of Annihilation. By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Basic Books, 1962. 197 pp. $4.95.

A physicist reflects on the effects of nuclear weapons, the size of stockpiles, and the calculus of defense in the missile age. He expounds the well-known and controversial thesis that the amount of destructive power now in existence makes a continuation of armaments competition pointless.

Law, Morality and War in the Contemporary World. By Richard A. Falk. New York: Praeger, 1963. 120 pp. $4.00.

An Associate Professor of International Law at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, argues that in the absence of accepted norms for the proper use of international force in an ideologically divided world, the cultural traditions of international law and morality are still quite relevant.

A Short Course in the Secret War. By Christopher Felix. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963. 314 pp. $5.00.

Christopher Felix (a pseudonym), a former U.S. government official and veteran of secret service operations, explains how secret information is gathered; why the U.S. and other nations must employ covert tactics to gain intelligence vital to a nation's security; how an intelligence operation is set up; and the techniques of modern spying. To illustrate the "secret war," Felix has written a case history of an operation in which he took part—secret intelligence activities against the Soviets in Hungary in 1946-1947.

Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military. Edited by Harry L. Coles. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, for the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, 1962. 300 pp. $7.00.

Twelve authorities, including Norman Gibbs, Richard D. Challenger, Samuel P. Huntington and Raymond L. Garthoff, have contributed essays on the problem of the role of the military establishment in a democratic society besieged from without.

III. United States

The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation. By William C. Mitchell. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 434 pp. $10.00.

An interpretive essay on American politics, primarily intended for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students. The author, who teaches political science at the University of Oregon, has used an "explicit conceptual framework derived mostly from the work of Talcott Parsons." He sets out "to illustrate the potentialities of 'structural-functional' analysis with regard to the study of political systems, and . . . to synthesize a considerable amount of heterogeneous data—both institutional and behavioral—on American politics . . . ."

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Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO. By Roland N. Stromberg. New York: Praeger, 1963. 301 pp. $6.00.

An analysis of the concept of collective security from the League of Nations to the present. The author, who teaches in the Department of History at the University of Maryland, discusses the origins and growth of the idea of collective security, and its widespread acceptance during several periods in the last fifty years; reveals the serious contradictions and fallacies on which the concept rests; and carefully examines those cases when collective security was applied, largely without success, to international crises.

The Conservative Affirmation. By Willmoore Kendall. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963. 272 pp. $5.95.

An attempt to define American conservatism and to set forth alternatives to Liberal intellectual positions and policies.

Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations. Edited by Robert Blum. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, for The American Assembly, 1963. 177 pp. $1.95 (paper).

This collection of five essays was originally presented as background material for participants in the Twenty-second American Assembly meeting held at Arden House in October 1962. The papers cover such topics as "The Nature and Development of United States Cultural Relations," "The Role of the Arts and Humanities," "Education, Foreign Policy, and International Relations," "International Cooperation and the Two Faces of Science," and "The Past and Future in Perspective."

Freedom and Foreign Policy. By Thomas J. Dodd. New York: Bookmailer, 1962. 321 pp. $5.50 ($4.00 flexible cloth).

A collection of the foreign policy speeches of Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut. This book presents the thoughts of the man who is widely recognized as the principal Congressional spokesman for the cause of those nations which have fallen captive to communist rule. In addition to statements on "Our National Purpose" and "The Nature of the Enemy," the collection includes comments on the most serious crises of recent years, such as Berlin, Hungary, Cuba and the Congo.

The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy. By H. Bradford Westerfield. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1963. 538 pp. $7.50.

A readable and comprehensive treatment of the U.S. policy of containment of communist expansion. The organizing principle of the book is functional analysis, as Mr. Westerfield directs the reader's attention to the various techniques, methods and instruments—military, economic, informational and "undercover interventionist practices"—which the U.S. employs in the struggle against communism.

Personnel for the New Diplomacy. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 1962. 161 pp. (paper).

The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, constituted in late 1961 at the request of Secretary of State Rusk, is focused on the personnel problems and needs of the Department of State, including the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency. The Com-

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mittee makes forty-three recommendations, relating to the improvement of the recruitment, training and promotion of executive and professional personnel, and other aspects of personnel administration.

The Propaganda Gap. By Walter Joyce. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 139 pp. $3.95.

The author, a magazine editor and journalist, criticizes U.S. reluctance to engage more forcefully in a propaganda program which would attempt not only to provide information but also to persuade the peoples in other countries of the superiority of the democratic system of government. He offers recommendations for strengthening the U.S. propaganda and psychological warfare programs.

The United States in World Affairs, 1962. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963. 427 pp. $6.95.

The annual analytical summary of U.S. foreign relations in the series of foreign policy surveys which was initiated by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1931 and has become indispensable to the serious student of international affairs.

Washington Cover-Up. By Clark R. Mollenhoff. New York: Doubleday, 1962. 239 pp. $4.50.

A reporter's views about the manner in which Congress and the people have been increasingly denied full access to the information they need to make fair judgments about public policies. Although he recognizes the need for protection of national security information, Mollenhoff argues that "unlimited secrecy has been employed to hide incompetence, laxity, bungling, and outright frauds in the Defense Department, in the foreign aid program, and in dozens of other areas." He insists that the concept of "Executive Privilege" has been applied too broadly.

IV. Western Europe

The British Cabinet. By John P. Mackintosh. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. 546 pp. $8.25.

A carefully documented history of the British Cabinet, characterized by an historical analysis of the Cabinet's relations with the Crown, the Press, the Commons, Lords and external pressure groups. The material on which the treatment of the modern period is based includes interviews with thirty former and present Ministers.

The Common Market: Its Structure and Purpose. (Third edition.) By J. F. Deniau. New York: Praeger, 1962. 167 pp. $4.95.

This brief and clearly written survey of the Common Market is brought up to date in its third edition by the inclusion of material on the recent far-reaching decisions in the field of agriculture.

The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945. By Werner Warmbrunn. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 282 pp. $7.50.

The author describes the German occupation of the Netherlands and discusses the origins and nature of the Dutch reaction to the German regime. In the final chapter he seeks to test the response of groups and individuals to the occupation force.

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Facing the Dictators, 1923-1938. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962. 746 pp. $7.50.

One of the most important diplomatic accounts of the interwar years as recorded by Anthony Eden, who played a major role in the momentous events of the 1930's, as a Minister at the Foreign Office from 1931 to 1935, and as Foreign Secretary from 1935 until his resignation in 1938, when he disapproved of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasing dictators.

The German Catastrophe. By Friedrich Meinecke; translated by Sidney B. Fay. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. 121 pp. $1.25 (paper).

Professor Meinecke (1862-1954), a distinguished German historian, sums up in this small volume his views of German developments during more than one hundred years, from the era of Goethe's classical liberalism to the downfall of the Nazi tyranny. Also, in the words of Sidney B. Fay's Preface, "His analysis affords a valuable clue to the extraordinary evolution of Western Germany during the past decade and a half."

The New Europe: Today—and Tomorrow. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1963. 232 pp. $5.50.

George Lichtheim, the author of *Marxism—An Historical and Critical Study,* provides a concise study of Western Europe's march toward economic and political integration. An analysis of the progress and plans of the Common Market is the heart of the book, but the author also treats of Europe's ties with Britain, the U.S., the larger Atlantic Community, and the role of economic planning in the EEC.

United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity. By Walter Hallstein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. 109 pp. $2.75.

These are the William L. Clayton Lectures given at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy by the President of the Commission of the EEC. Professor Hallstein discusses the history, economics and politics of European integration.

V. Soviet Bloc

Berlin and the Future of Eastern Europe. Edited by David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser. Chicago: Henry Regnery, for the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1963. 240 pp. $6.00.

The editors have selected twelve papers presented by historians, political scientists and other experts at a conference held in Chicago in March 1962 under the sponsorship of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs. Contributors include Stefan T. Possony, Philip E. Mosely, William R. Kintner, Gerhart Niemeyer and five leading German scholars and members of the Bundestag.

China on the Eve of Communist Takeover. By A. Doak Barnett. New York: Praeger, 1963. 364 pp. $6.95.

A collection of twenty-three reports which the author wrote from China during the period 1947-49 as a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs and correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News.* These reports are now made available in one book as an aid to understanding the conditions existing in China in 1949, the problems that the Chinese communists initially faced, and the revolutionary changes which they have initiated since 1949.

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Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies. Volume I. (Second edition.) By Peter S. H. Tang. Washington: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1961. 745 pp. $10.00.

This comprehensive study of Communist China—its history, political structure, leadership, party machinery, economic and social programs, military policy, communes, and relations with the Soviet Union, underdeveloped countries and the West—was first published in 1957, and has now been updated to August 1961. Many parts have been rewritten and a considerable amount of new material has been added.

I Was an NKVD Agent. By Anatoli Granovsky. New York: Devin-Adair, 1962. 343 pp. $4.95.

A personal account of an NKVD officer's life in the Soviet Union.

The Iron Curtain. By Harry and Bonaro Overstreet. New York: Norton, 1963. 229 pp. $4.50.

In this, the authors' third book on the subject of communism, the focus is on the physical and psychological meaning of the iron curtain which surrounds the communist world.

The Kremlin: Nerve-Centre of Russian History. By Victor Alexandrov. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. 328 pp. $5.95.

The story of the fascinating history of the Kremlin since its founding nearly 850 years ago.

Moscow and Chinese Communists. (Second edition.) By Robert C. North. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 310 pp. $7.50.

Robert North has revised and updated his widely-acclaimed short history of the Chinese communist movement by writing two new chapters and making minor corrections and changes in the original text. The new chapters treat the first decade of the communist regime in Peking, with emphasis on Sino-Soviet relations.

Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945. By Chalmers A. Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. 256 pp. $5.75.

This study, drawing heavily upon Japanese archives, describes the Chinese peasant resistance against the Japanese invaders, especially the widespread guerrilla warfare led chiefly by the Chinese Communist Party. The author shows how the alliance between Party and peasants helped to increase the peasants' role in Chinese political life and give the Party the mass following that subsequently enabled it to conquer all of China. He advances the view that the "Communist rise to power in China should be understood as a species of nationalist movement," and he compares this movement to the rise of the Yugoslav Partisans.

Polycentrism: The New Factor in International Communism. Edited by Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz. New York: Praeger, 1962. 259 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A book of essays on the cohesive and centrifugal factors in world communism. Twenty-one of the West's leading analysts of communist affairs deal with various aspects of polycentrism, the 22nd Soviet Party Congress, Sino-Soviet divergences,

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revisionism, and the role of the East European satellites and the communist parties of Italy and France. More than one hundred pages are devoted to an examination of communist trends in Japan and the underdeveloped countries.

Red World in Tumult: Communist Foreign Policies. Compiled and edited by DeVere E. Pentony. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962. 299 pp. $2.75 (paper).

A collection of documents and articles relating to the Sino-Soviet dispute and the strategy of international communism. This volume, another in the Chandler Series in International and Intercultural Relations, contains ten speeches, articles and documents from communist sources, and seventeen articles written by Western specialists, among them William E. Griffith, Howard L. Boorman, G. F. Hudson, David Nelson Rowe, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Donald S. Zagoria, Guy J. Pauker and Kurt L. London.

Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets. By Maurice Friedberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 211 pp. $4.75.

The author examines publication policies in the Soviet Union and attempts to assess why Soviet leaders make available to the Soviet masses the work of particular authors at particular times. He also discusses the problem of "bourgeois" literature in a "socialist" society.

Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-Military Regional Cooperation. (Second edition.) By Klaus Tornudd. Helsinki: Censraltryckeriet, 1963. 288 pp. (paper).

A survey of the opinions of Soviet commentators and writers on regional political and economic organizations.

Through the Glass of Soviet Literature. Edited by Ernest J. Simmons. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. 301 pp. $1.95 (paper).

Six experts on Soviet society and literature present their views on Soviet literary controls; the image of woman in Soviet literature; the picture of the Jews in Soviet literature; children's theater and drama; the impact of Soviet ideology on literary scholarship; and the suppression of satire in the USSR.

Two Generations of Soviet Man: A Study in the Psychology of Communism. By John Kosa. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. 214 pp. $5.00.

A Hungarian scientist treats postwar Hungary as an experimental laboratory in which the communists have attempted to create a second generation of post-revolutionary Bolshevik man in non-Russian environments. He regards this experiment as a test which may determine whether a totalitarian state can manipulate its population.

VI. Middle East

Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. By H. B. Sharabi. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962. 296 pp. $8.75.

A textbook emphasizing three main lines of development: governmental structures and institutions, political organization and behavior, and regional and international relations. The opening and concluding sections deal with the Middle East as a whole, while sixteen chapters are devoted to individual country analyses and descriptions.

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Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society. By Leonard Binder. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. 362 pp. $7.50.

A description and analysis of the Iranian political system in transition. In an introductory chapter, the author sets up a theoretical framework for his analysis, attempts to identify the major components of a political system and develops a simple classification of systems. He then applies this theoretical framework to Iran's changing political scene, discussing the monarchy, aristocracy, religion, nationalism, the machinery of government, the armed forces, social and demographic factors, political parties and political functions.

A Lonely Minority. By Edward Wakin. New York: William Morrow, 1963. 178 pp. $4.50.

The first study of the four million Copts in Egypt who proudly claim a long line of descent from early Church Fathers. As a Christian minority, as well as being "true Egyptians," the Copts are simultaneously a church, a community and a nation. Mr. Wakin traces the history of the Copts and the early days of the Church; discusses current problems facing them as they seek to adjust to continuous changes in political power; and poses questions for the future of the Copts as they struggle to preserve their heritage and avert extinction.

The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government. Edited by Sydney N. Fisher. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, for the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, 1963. 138 pp. $4.75.

This study of the political-social role of the military focuses upon five countries: Turkey by S. N. Fisher; Iraq by Majid Khadduri; Syria by Gordon H. Torrey; Egypt by George Kirk; and Israel by J. C. Hurewitz. Dankwart A. Rostow and John C. Campbell present their general observations of the entire region.

VII. East Asia

Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-51. By R. N. Rosecrance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. 266 pp. $8.50.

A study of Australian diplomacy toward Japan from 1945 to the signing of the peace treaty. Professor Rosecrance examines Australian policy in the context of the balance of power in the Pacific and analyzes the relationship between Australia and the United States which brought about the ANZUS Pact and the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. By Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano and Lt. Colonel Charles T. R. Bohannan. New York: Praeger, 1962. 275 pp. $5.95.

Two veterans of the fight against the Huk movement in the Philippines tell how effective counterguerrilla strategies were developed against insurgent forces. The authors examine the conditions under which successful guerrilla movements arise, and stress the contribution which the proper use of intelligence can make in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of guerrilla bands, thereby aiding in their defeat.

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The Last Days of the British Raj. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962. 263 pp. $4.95.

Leonard Mosley, author, film and drama critic, and foreign correspondent for British newspapers since the 1930's, has written a controversial and forthright account of the crucial year during which British rule in India came to a close. He blames Admiral Viscount Mountbatten, India's last Viceroy, as well as Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah, for unwisely telescoping into a few months a complex task which should have taken several years to complete.

Papua and New Guinea: A Contemporary Survey. By Brian Essai. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 255 pp. $4.90.

A detailed description of New Guinea and Papua under Australian administration. The author does not attempt to criticize or praise the Australian record; rather, he tries to present an objective and factual account of this large and dependent Territory—its history, geography, peoples, government, economy, education and health.

Quiet Crisis in India: Economic Development and American Policy. By John P. Lewis. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962. 350 pp. $5.75.

The author, a member of the Brookings staff and Chairman of the Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University, describes the domestic and foreign efforts being made to speed up the development of the Indian economy. He discusses the significance for the West of the Indian development effort; examines various problems which India faces, especially the mobilization of idle manpower, the agricultural puzzle, and the need to increase exports; reviews the Third Five-Year Plan; and devotes considerable space to the background, types and effectiveness of U.S. assistance.

VIII. Africa

The Mind of Africa. By W. E. Abraham. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 206 pp. $4.00.

An analysis of the historical framework of present-day African problems, including a detailed study of the Akan of Ghana, a typical African society. The author refuses to compare Africa with other continents, urging instead that non-Africans consider the "soul" and the "inner workings" of Africa. Mr. Abraham, a graduate of the University of Ghana and Oxford University, is currently an associate professor at the University of Ghana.

The New Nations of Africa. By Ben Wattenberg and Ralph Lee Smith. New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1963. 480 pp. $10.00.

Illustrated with thirty maps and over 300 photographs, this reference book on Africa treats each country separately, describing its physical aspects, peoples, history, government, population, and education and health facilities.

Out in the Mid-Day Sun. By Boris Gussman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 179 pp. $5.00.

Mr. Gussman, an Englishman, examines the origins of the white European settler mentality and the behavior and attitudes of these people today. His ultimate concern is the justification for the heavy barrage of criticism and abuse

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currently leveled at contemporary Europeans in Africa. The author avoids the politics involved and concentrates on the human and social issues which make true partnership and interracial coexistence so difficult to achieve.

IX. Latin America

The Great Fear. By John Gerassi. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 457 pp. $6.95.

A pessimistic view of the situation in Latin America. The author warns that revolution, led either by communists or nationalists, will someday sweep over Latin America; that U.S. policy, including the Alliance for Progress, merely perpetuates the repressive "medievalists" who have always ruled Latin America; and that U.S. private business is the chief medium of exploitation in Latin America. The author concludes that the U.S. should discontinue all aid unless the Latin American nation in question undertakes a sweeping social revolution in which all public utilities and mines are nationalized and all large landholdings are broken up.

Jamaica: The Search for an Identity. By Katrin Norris. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1962. 103 pp. $1.95 (paper).

The author, an English journalist, who has lived for years in Jamaica and other islands in the Caribbean, comments on Jamaica's transition from colony to nation. The twin problems of establishing a national identity and a viable economy through a more equitable distribution of wealth are her main concerns.

A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress. By Lincoln Gordon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 146 pp. $3.25.

A collection of speeches by Lincoln Gordon, the United States Ambassador to Brazil. The focus is on the need for the development of a broadly based political mystique to ensure the success of the Alliance for Progress. The Punta del Este (August 1961) documents are included as an appendix.

The Organization of American States. By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: The Southern Methodist University Press, 1963. 530 pp. $10.00.

A comprehensive study of the historical, juridical and political development of the Organization of American States. Both authors are students of international law and this specialization is reflected in their approach to the OAS. In the final section, they evaluate the work of the OAS and conclude that, while intrahemisphere conflicts have been well handled, extrahemisphere threats have usually been handled in a faltering manner. The authors are generally pessimistic about the future of the OAS.

The Wine Is Bitter: The United States and Latin America. By Milton S. Eisenhower. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 342 pp. $4.95.

The author finds much to criticize in the policies of both the United States and the Latin American nations. However, he believes there still exist sufficient time and goodwill on both sides to work out solutions to the crucial economic, social and political problems of the hemisphere. He calls for support of the Alliance for Progress and warns that the failure of this program will lead to violent, communist-directed revolutions.

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